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Articles 
RETHINKING POLICE INTERROGATION:  
ENCOURAGING RELIABLE CONFESSIONS 
WHILE RESPECTING SUSPECTS’ DIGNITY  
Eugene R. Milhizer∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary approach to thinking about the role of the police 
in encouraging criminal confessions amounts to trench warfare between 
competing forces.  On one side are the champions of individual rights, 
who distrust the police, presumptively devalue confessions, and seek to 
erect impediments to obtaining them.  On the other are the champions of 
law and order, who trust the police, prize all confessions, and seek to 
remove impediments to their reception.  The enmity is palpable and the 
stakes could not be higher; both sides have a crusading spirit that makes 
claims to the greater good, empirical data, and constitutional support.  In 
recent times, they have ground to a virtual stalemate.  Unfortunately, 
both sides have got it wrong.   
This Article proposes a fresh approach to confessions based on 
traditional values, which promotes reliable confessions while respecting 
the dignity of those who might confess.  It ensures that suspects continue 
to be fully advised of their rights while also encouraging them to make 
informed decisions to acknowledge their potential guilt.  This approach, 
which is in full accord with constitutional rights and limitations, would 
better dignify suspects and serve the common good.    
Part II of this Article provides a quick overview of the terrain.  It 
briefly describes how confessions, as a matter of principle and common 
sense, are beneficial to society and the confessor.  It also explains, in an 
abbreviated manner, the dissonance between this intuitive appreciation 
for confessions and our disapproving confession jurisprudence.  It 
reviews the assumptions underlying both the traditional voluntariness 
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standard and the Miranda decision and its progeny, focusing on the 
Court’s conception of free will and dignity, and recognizing how 
psychological empiricism has exerted a growing influence in the 
formation of these assumptions.  
Part III surveys the psychological treatment of confessions, and the 
Court’s use of it.  It begins by tracing the history of psychology and 
confessions, and examines the psychological model that influenced the 
Miranda Court.  It then considers newer psychological models, their 
problems and limitations, and how they might modify confession 
jurisprudence in the future.  It concludes by critiquing the fundamental 
assumptions shared by empirical psychology generally, and how this has 
led confession jurisprudence astray. 
Part IV presents a philosophical course correction.  It describes how 
concepts such as truth, justice, the common good, human rights, and 
dignity all relate to criminal confessions.  In doing so, it provides an 
alternative to empirical psychology and negative rights philosophy that 
dominates the contemporary discourse about confessions.   
Part V recommends ways for translating the principles identified in 
Part IV into practical police procedures.  It begins by identifying the 
beneficial ends towards which confession jurisprudence ought to be 
oriented.  It then offers specific proposals regarding prohibited and 
permitted means for obtaining these ends.  Included within these 
proposals is an augmented rights warning protocol, which continues to 
fully advise suspects of their constitutional rights while additionally 
encouraging them to cooperate candidly with police for legitimate and 
virtuous reasons.  The constitutionality of the proposed changes is 
defended, and the manner in which they enhance the suspect’s dignity 
and the common good is explained. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S APPROACH TO 
CONFESSIONS AND FREE WILL 
As children we are admonished to mind our manners, brush our 
teeth, and look both ways before crossing the street.  Parental instruction, 
of course, extends beyond the mundane to the profound, sometimes 
inculcating basic norms about individual virtue and social responsibility.  
Among the most important and intuitive of these is that a person should 
acknowledge his mistakes and misdeeds, take responsibility for them, 
and try to make things right, even if this includes accepting a just 
punishment.  The objective truth and cultural consensus reflected in this 
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teaching are so obvious as to be platitudinous.1  Surely no one guided by 
a proper moral compass could disagree.  
We should expect that the same common-sense values about 
admitting mistakes and accepting responsibility would be integral to our 
criminal justice system.  These precepts, applied in the law enforcement 
context, would encourage suspects to make sincere and heartfelt 
confessions of guilt.2  Such confessions are in accord with a traditional 
                                                 
1 Truth and truth telling hold a special, deeply embedded status in American culture.  
A small sampling should suffice to make the point.  An Internet search of the phrase “truth, 
justice and the American way” yielded 70,900 hits.  See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 16 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 1999) (attributing the quoted phrase to the 
preamble of the Superman radio show of 1940 onward).  We honor presidents who are 
truthful—for example, Washington and the cherry tree, Parson Weems, Young George 
Washington Would Not Tell a Lie, http://www.buchanan.org/h-040.html (last visited Aug. 
25, 2006), and Honest Abe Lincoln, Noah Brooks, Why Lincoln Was Called “Honest Abe,” 
http://www.a-christmas-carol.com/stories/why_lincoln_was_called_honest_abe.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  We dishonor presidents who do violence to the truth, either by 
covering up (Nixon), Watergate:  The Scandal That Brought Nixon Down, http://www. 
watergate.info (last visited Aug. 25, 2006), or falsely denying, dissembling, and parsing 
(Clinton), A Chronology:  The Key Moments in the Clinton-Lewinsky Saga, http://www.cnn. 
com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/resources/lewinsky/timeline (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  
Guilty secrets burden and stain us, unless and until we “get it off our chest” and “come 
clean.”  Our children’s stories teach the virtue and telling the truth and warn about the 
dangers of crying wolf. The Boy Who Cried Wolf, http://www.storyarts.org/library/ 
aesops/stories/boy.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  Even our television game shows 
instruct us “To Tell the Truth,” To Tell the Truth, http://www.tvtome.com/tvtome/ 
servlet/ShowMainServlet/showid-4071/To_Tell_the_Truth (last visited Aug. 25, 2006), 
and warn us of the “consequences” if we do not.  Truth or Consequences, http://timstv 
showcase.com/torc.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  Above all, we are taught “the truth 
will set you free” (over 14,000,000 hits for this phrase); John 8:32 (and “you will know the 
truth, and the truth will set you free”). 
2 “A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, 
of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it.”  3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 821, at 308 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 4th rev. ed. 
1970) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE].  “The distinction between admissions in criminal 
cases and confessions by the accused is the distinction in effect between admissions of fact 
from which the guilt of the accused may be inferred by the jury and the express admission 
of guilt itself.”  WILLIAM P. RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 394, at 268 (3d ed. 1928).  
For purposes of this Article, the term “confessions” includes “admissions” unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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understanding of right and wrong,3 as reflected in natural law theory4 
and various theological sources.5  As a matter of justice,6 such 
confessions are morally beneficial to wrongdoers and can help reorient 
offenders who have acted in a disordered fashion.7  A sincere confession 
                                                 
3  [One] should accuse himself first and foremost, . . . who happens to 
behave unjustly at any time; and . . . he should not keep his 
wrongdoing hidden but bring it out into the open, so that he may pay 
his due and get well . . . .   He should be his own chief accuser, . . . and 
use his oratory for the purpose of getting rid of the worst thing there 
is, injustice, as the unjust acts are being exposed. 
PLATO, GORGIAS 480c-d, in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS 825 (John M. Cooper ed., Donald J. 
Zeyl trans., 1997) [hereinafter PLATO, GORGIAS]. 
4 The dominant traditional natural law theory is rooted in the moral and metaphysical 
philosophy of Aristotle, which culminated in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas.  See generally 
LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987) (discussing the origins and branches 
of natural law theory).  Natural law theory, as expressed in a realist philosophical 
approach, is discussed in infra Part IV.B, and its application to confession jurisprudence is 
considered in infra Parts IV.C and V. 
5 The Catechism of the Catholic Church instructs that 
The confession (or disclosure) of sins, even from a simply human point 
of view, frees us and facilitates our reconciliation with others.  
Through such an admission man looks squarely at the sins he is guilty 
of, takes responsibility for them, and thereby opens himself again to 
God and to the communion of the Church in order to make a new 
future possible. 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 365 (United States Catholic Conference, Inc. 1997).  
Not surprisingly, many of the world’s great religious traditions share in the belief that 
wrongdoers ought to admit their misdeeds with a sincere heart.  For example, the 
Penitential Psalms, which are part of the Jewish and Islamic (as well as Christian) 
traditions, teach that one should admit his misconduct and seek divine mercy.  Psalms 51:1-
5 (King David admitted to God that he was sinful and implored God’s mercy).  Similarly, 
for trials in the Hindu tradition, the guilty party is required to process before a crowd and 
admit his guilt while the charge against him is read aloud.  ARIEL GLUCKLICH, RELIGIOUS 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE DHARMASASTRA 78 (1988). 
6 “Justice” is a complicated term having many meanings and connotations.  See generally 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?  WHICH RATIONALITY? 1-11 (1988) (discussing 
“[r]ival [j]ustices, [and] [c]ompeting [r]ationalities”).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“justice” as “[t]he fair and proper administration of laws.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 
(7th ed. 1999).  In the context of the natural law, “justice” is understood to mean “giv[ing] 
each one his due.“  THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II–II, Q. 62, art. 1 
(Blackfriars of English Dominican Province trans., 1964) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE].  “Justice” and its relationship to confession is considered in greater detail in 
infra Part IV.B.2. 
7 Gad Czudner & Ruth Mueller, The Role of Guilt and Its Implication in the Treatment of 
Criminals, 31 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 71, 73-74 (1987) (discussing 
how therapists, by challenging offenders’ excuses and rationalizations, can trigger feelings 
of guilt that can be used for rehabilitative purposes).  Indeed, many programs will not 
admit an offender or deem that he has successfully completed treatment unless he 
acknowledges guilt for the underlying misconduct.  See, e.g., Morstad v. State, 518 N.W.2d 
191, 192 (N.D. 1994) (referring to the decision of a therapist at a sex offender treatment 
program that the defendant “was not amenable to out-patient sex-offender’s treatment at 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 1
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also can be indicative of a wrongdoer’s rehabilitative potential and can 
serve as an important first step toward his restoration and reintegration 
into society.8    
True and heartfelt confessions of guilt can likewise be greatly 
beneficial to the common good.9  They can assist in repairing the 
disorder and harm caused by an offense, and can sometimes have a 
profound compensatory effect by helping an offender repay his debt to 
society.10  Confessions are also efficient, often saving the state the time, 
effort, and expense of a lengthy investigation and trial,11 as well as 
                                                                                                             
the center because [he] would not admit sexually assaulting his daughter”); RESTORE:  
Justice that Heals, Responsibility and Equity for Sexual Transgressions Offering a 
Restorative Experience, http://restoreprogram.publichealth.arizona.edu/questions/rp. 
htm#rp12 (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (“[O]ffenders do not have to admit guilt to enter 
RESTORE, but they do have to acknowledge that the act happened and that they were 
responsible for it.”). 
8 PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 2 (2000) (“Confession of wrongdoing is 
considered fundamental to morality because it constitutes a verbal act of self-recognition as 
wrongdoer and hence provides the basis of rehabilitation.”); DEP’T OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 
27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK ch. 8, § III, para. 8-3-35 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter 
BENCHBOOK] (in boilerplate sentencing instructions in guilty plea cases, the military judge 
advises court members (military jurors) that they may consider the accused’s guilty plea as 
constituting “the first step towards rehabilitation”). 
9 In natural law philosophy, “the common good” refers to “the sum total of social 
conditions which allow people, either as groups or individuals, to reach their fulfillment 
more fully and more easily.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 5, at 365.  
The common good is discussed in greater detail in infra Part IV.B.3. 
10 As one proponent of restorative justice puts it, 
As soon as immediate victim, society, and offender safety concerns are 
satisfied, Restorative Justice views the situation as a teachable moment 
for the offender—an opportunity to encourage the offender to learn 
new ways of acting and being in community.  These principles suggest 
that justice is a process for making things as right as possible rather 
than simply punishing the offender. 
Ron Claassen, Restorative Justice Primary Focus on People Not Procedures, 
http://www.fresno.edu/pacs/docs/rjprinc2.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  In order to 
make things as right as possible—i.e., “to restore the distributively just balance . . . between 
the criminal and the law-abiding” that criminal punishment seeks to achieve, JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 263 (1980) [hereinafter FINNIS, NATURAL LAW], an 
offender must acknowledge guilt and work toward mitigating the damage caused by his 
crime.  This, in turn, can help his re-integration into society.  Accordingly, confession is 
integral to reparation, restoration, and re-integration, in the fullest sense of these terms. 
11 A formal acknowledgement of guilt, in the fullest sense, is made by a defendant at a 
criminal trial.  If a defendant denies his guilt, then the state must have a contested trial in 
order to determine and prove the accused’s guilt, and if guilty to punish him legitimately.  
If a defendant admits his guilt and pleads guilty, then the judicial process is simplified, the 
determination of guilt can be made more certain, and the punishment can be more 
commensurate and efficient.  Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) 
(discussing some of the practical benefits of guilty plea cases), with Robert E. Scott & 
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protecting victims and others from suffering the embarrassment, anxiety, 
and inconvenience associated with a contested adjudication of guilt.12  
Indeed, confessions have a special, even unique capacity to bring closure 
and repose to crime victims and their families.13   
Beyond all of this, truthful confessions are singularly capable of 
promoting the search for truth,14 which the Supreme Court has described 
as a “fundamental goal” of the criminal justice system15 and the central 
purpose of a criminal trial.16  Truthful confessions enhance the reliability 
                                                                                                             
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1932-34 (1992) (arguing 
that more innocent persons, especially the poor, would be convicted if guilty pleas were 
prohibited).  Of course, the earlier in the process that a suspect admits guilt, the greater the 
likelihood that unnecessary investigation can be avoided. 
12 By pleading guilty, an accused waives, inter alia, his right to confront his accusers.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend VI; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).  As a consequence, it 
becomes unnecessary for the victim and other potential witnesses to testify on the merits to 
help prove the accused’s guilt. 
13 A powerful example of this is found in the recent litigation involving the infamous 
O.J. Simpson/Nicole Brown Simpson/Ronald Goldman matter.  After O.J. Simpson was 
acquitted of killing Nicole Simpson and Ronald Goldman in a criminal trial, the latter’s 
father, Fred Goldman, brought a wrongful death civil action against Mr. Simpson.  Before 
the civil trial commenced, Mr. Goldman’s attorney advised that he would be able to 
question Mr. Simpson under oath about the murders.  He further explained, however, that 
Mr. Simpson could refuse to testify, in which case the judge would enter a default 
judgment and the Goldmans “would win.”  Mr. Goldman responded that he wanted Mr. 
Simpson to publicly account for his actions, and, therefore, his attorney should use any 
legal means possible to prevent the trial from ending without Mr. Simpson testifying.  As 
far as Mr. Goldman was concerned, a public admission of guilt by Mr. Simpson was more 
important than winning monetary damages.  DANIEL PETROCELLI, TRIUMPH OF JUSTICE 32 
(1998).  A second example involves Brain Brabazon, the stepfather of Baylor University 
basketball player Brian Dennehy.  Upon learning that his son’s former teammate, Carlton 
Dotson, had pleaded guilty to killing Dennehy, Brabazon said that he was “satisfied that 
Dotson had confessed but long[ed] to know his motive.”  Brabazon continued, “‘There are 
only two things I want in my life,’ . . .  ‘One is the truth of why [Carlton] killed Patrick and 
the other is life in prison for Carlton.’”  Melissa Segura, Coming Clean, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
June 11, 2005, at 19. 
14 See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (commenting on the “truth-
finding functions of judge and jury”).  “Truth,” in a philosophic sense, is addressed in 
greater detail in infra Part IV.A. 
15 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980). 
16 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225, 230 (1985).  See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 419, 426 (2d Cir. 1991) (the ascertainment 
of truth must sometimes yield to the higher value of individual rights); JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION:  LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES AND 
INTRODUCTORY TEXT 274 (2000) (discussing the sometimes competing goals of reliably 
determining the truth and respecting individual liberty and dignity); Joseph D. Grano, The 
Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure:  The Contribution of the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 402-03 (1989) 
[hereinafter Grano, Changing World] (discussing the primacy of truth vis-à-vis other values).  
Of course, the search for truth is not an absolute, and thus the Court has spoken in terms of 
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and hence the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, real and 
perceived, by reassuring the public both that the guilty will be correctly 
identified and punished, and the innocent will not be falsely convicted.17  
Oftentimes a confession is the most compelling evidence of guilt 
presented to the fact-finder,18 and it has long been recognized that a 
voluntary confession is among the most powerful modes of proving guilt 
known in the law.19  In the end, although virtually every reliable 
                                                                                                             
ensuring that the criminal justice system “reliably serves” its truthfinding function.  Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986).  The status of truthfinding as an important but relative 
goal reflects that it sometimes is at tension with other legitimate goals, such as protecting 
individual rights from being abridged by unconstitutional police practices.  Spano v. New 
York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (finding that it must “resolve a [reoccurring] conflict between 
two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, 
and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by 
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement”); Joseph D. Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1992) [hereinafter Grano, Ascertaining the Truth] (arguing the 
central importance of discovering the truth in the criminal justice system). 
17 See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 230 (“The dual aim of our criminal justice system is ‘that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.’”) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935)); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (“the ultimate objective [of a 
criminal trial is] that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free”) (quoting Herring v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994) (the purpose of a criminal trial is to “sort[ ] the innocent 
from the guilty”). 
18 The importance of confessions in solving crimes and convicting guilty perpetrators is 
difficult to quantify, and the limited statistical evidence available on the matter is 
somewhat unclear.  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 24.05[B][4], at 471-73 (3d ed. 1999) (both citing and discussing statistical information and 
derivative arguments regarding the importance of confessions); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.1(a), at 436-38 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter LAFAVE  ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE]; Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental 
Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1997) (showing that even 
coerced confessions resulted in a greater likelihood of a guilty verdict, even when jurors 
claimed that it had no influence on their verdicts).  This statistical uncertainty is 
attributable to the fact that the magnitude of a confession’s influence upon a fact-finder 
does not lend itself to easy empirical measurement.  Nonetheless, courts and commentators 
alike have generally understood the singularly compelling impact of confession at trial.  
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (confession to a 
crime makes an “indelible impact” on a jury, and, “[a]part, perhaps, from a videotape of 
the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal 
defendant’s plea of innocence”); BROOKS, supra note 8, at 4 (confession is the “queen of 
proofs”). 
19  A confession is like no other evidence.  Indeed, “the defendant’s own 
confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that 
can be admitted against him. . . .  [T]he admissions of a defendant 
come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and 
unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct.  
Certainly, confessions have a profound impact on the jury, so much so 
that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if 
told to do so.” 
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confession can be corroborated to some extent by extrinsic evidence,20 in 
some cases a confession proves indispensable to establishing guilt.21  
Over time, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly de-emphasized 
the manifold benefits of truthful and heartfelt confessions, focusing 
instead on the potential for police misconduct and abuse in the criminal 
process.   
                                                                                                             
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) 
(White, J., dissenting)).  Accord Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1883) (“[A] deliberate, 
voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law, and constitutes 
the strongest evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated in 
such confession.”).  The special status of a confession has deep historic roots.  See JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 4 (1970) (explaining that in the absence of two 
eyewitnesses, the Roman-canon law of proof required the accused’s confession for a 
conviction; circumstantial evidence, no matter how compelling, was inadequate).  Judicial 
confessions of guilt (such as those associated with guilty pleas and accompanying 
providence inquiries) can be equally compelling.  For example, military judges are required 
to instruct accused soldiers at courts-martial, before accepting a guilty plea, that “[a] plea of 
guilty is equivalent to a conviction, and is the strongest form of proof known to the law.”  
BENCHBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 8, § 111, para. 8-2-1.  Moreover, the strength accorded to a 
guilty plea is partially responsible for appellate courts’ general reluctance to reverse a 
conviction in a guilty plea case, even where the defendant raises an objection that might 
have served as a basis for overturning his conviction if he had been found guilty at a 
contested trial.  E.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (death penalty and 
coerced confessions issues are foreclosed by defendant’s guilty plea); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (conviction based on guilty plea not reversed even if a 
coerced confession was introduced at trial). 
20 See generally WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 2071, at 395-97; A.H. Schopler, 
Annotation, Corroboration of Extrajudicial Confession or Admission, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956) 
(both discussing corroboration requirements for confessions in different jurisdictions). 
21 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (police 
questioning of suspects is “an indispensable instrumentality of justice”).  As Justice 
Frankfurter once observed: 
Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, 
offenses frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak.  
And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such 
offenses, nothing remains—if police investigation is not to be balked 
before it has fairly begun—but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses 
and ask them questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of 
knowing something about the offense precisely because they are 
suspected of implication in it. 
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961).  Professor Inbau elaborated on this same 
reasoning when he explained that “[m]any criminal cases, even when investigated by the 
best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an admission or 
confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of information obtained from the 
questioning of other criminal suspects.”  Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical 
Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16, 16 (1961) [hereinafter Inbau, Police Interrogation] 
(emphasis omitted). 
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A. Assumptions Underlying the Court’s Due Process Analysis of Confessions 
The Supreme Court’s approach to criminal confessions has changed 
significantly, even radically, since our founding as a nation.  Until the 
mid-1960s, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of confessions using 
predominately a due process standard.22  In the earliest cases in this line, 
the admissibility of a confession hinged on its reliability.23  Later, the 
Court fashioned and consulted a complex of inter-related values for 
determining voluntariness, which included reliability but increasingly 
emphasized other goals.24  In its most recent decision on the subject, the 
Court departed from tradition and jettisoned reliability from its 
“complex of values” construct.25  In all of the due process voluntariness 
cases, the Court ostensibly sought to respect the free will of each suspect 
by suppressing confessions that resulted from undue police coercion or 
compromised the adversarial system.   
While the Court’s voluntariness inquiry has assumed a 
conspicuously empirical character,26 its decision-making is also strongly 
influenced by several pervasive, normative assumptions that both 
undergird and help shape its “complex of values.”  Many of these beliefs 
are similar to those that are fundamental to the post-Miranda line of 
cases, although they are often expressed more definitively and forcefully 
in the later decisions.  These broad assumptions about confessions 
reflected in the due process cases can be grouped into two general 
categories—those relating to the suspect, and those concerning public 
policy and the common good. 
                                                 
22 The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction theoreof, are citizens of the United States and the State 
wherein they reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  For a detailed development of the due 
process standard in criminal confessions, see LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 18, § 6.2, at 441-67. 
23 E.g., Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584. 
24 E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (explaining that involuntariness is 
a “convenient shorthand” for a “complex of values” relating to the constitutionality of a 
confession). 
25 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
26 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963) (determining whether the 
confession at issue was “in fact” the product of free will); Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603 (quoted 
in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)) (characterizing voluntariness as a 
‘“psychological’ fact”). 
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The first set of basic assumptions—those relating to the suspect—are 
central to the Court’s reasoning but are often left unstated.  Most notable 
among these is the Court’s failure to express any belief that a truthful 
confession can ever be in the best interest of a suspect.  Quite to the 
contrary, the Court’s rhetoric consistently implies that all suspects, 
including guilty suspects, benefit by not confessing.  The Court goes 
even further in the later due process decisions, when it seemingly 
presumes that guilty suspects are naturally disinclined to confess and 
will rarely do so absent compelling police pressure.27  These beliefs 
contrast sharply with the Court’s thinking in early cases like Hopt v. 
Utah,28 which recognized that some guilty suspects are internally 
motivated to confess, and that police questioning may legitimately act as 
a catalyst in prompting suspects to act on such impulses. 
The second set of assumptions relates to public policy goals and the 
criminal justice system generally. While the Court at one time 
acknowledged that reliable confessions are good for society, it has since 
judged their benefits to be of a lesser significance, and ultimately of no 
import, in assessing voluntariness. This enabled the Court to free 
associate in identifying and weighing benefits and costs connected with 
reliable confessions, which ultimately lead, not surprisingly, to their 
passive and later active discouragement.  Among the ostensibly weighty 
considerations bearing on voluntariness is the preservation of the 
adversary system, which, according to the Court, may be compromised 
by proving a defendant’s guilt using his pretrial confession obtained 
through inquisitorial methods.29 Another supposed benefit of 
suppressing confessions is deterring police misconduct, which is 
premised on the belief that the police are essentially result oriented and 
                                                 
27 See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 107 (1996) (noting the 
Court’s inherent distrust of confessions and describing the Court’s normative analysis in 
Due Process cases as a two-step process:  “first, that the interrogation impose[s] undue or 
impermissible pressure . . . and, second, that such undue pressure [makes] confessing [the 
accused’s] only reasonable option”). 
28 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). 
29 See, e.g., Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 (Court reiterates that “the admissibility of a confession 
turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements . . . are compatible 
with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by 
inquisitorial means as to whether the defendant’s will was in fact overborne.”); Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (Court instructs that convictions based on coerced 
confessions must be overturned “not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but 
because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the 
enforcement of our criminal law:  that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial 
system.”). 
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will use whatever means are necessary and permitted to compel 
confessions.30   
In the end, the Court’s pre-Miranda cases fashioned and imposed a 
sterile and cynical conception of voluntariness.  While the Court 
ostensibly concentrates on protecting a suspect’s right to choose freely 
(or freely enough) vis-à-vis official conduct, it pays no attention to the 
quality of choice made or the values that it implicates.  The Court accepts 
as a given that rational suspects are rightly concerned only with 
avoiding a determination of guilt and punishment, and concomitantly 
that self-interested police are more desirous of obtaining plausible 
confessions than in ensuring that they are voluntarily rendered,31 and 
perhaps even that they are true.  It correlatively presumes that rational 
suspects would not “freely” choose to confess absent aggressive police 
prompting, or worse.32  Against this backdrop of opposing self-interest, 
the Court plays the role of a forensic telepathist, excluding evidence 
whenever it can satisfy itself that the police have in fact exerted too much 
influence in causing this suspect to render this confession, which is 
presumptively against his best interest and which he was otherwise 
disinclined to make.  Due process circumscribes the acceptable 
parameters of the dialectic, and this normatively barren landscape is the 
backdrop for the Miranda line of cases. 
B. Assumptions Underlying the Post-Miranda Approach to Confessions 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to chart a course 
that generally resolved this debate in favor of those who distrust the
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166 (citing deterrence of future police misconduct as the 
reason for suppressing a confession). 
31 YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS 31 (1980) [hereinafter KAMISAR, POLICE 
INTERROGATIONS]. 
32 See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1985) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court perceives confessions “darkly as the product of police 
coercion”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 125 (1998) 
(describing the voluntariness analysis as an attempt by the Court to “protect those suspects 
who were the most vulnerable in police interrogations . . . by . . . empowering them against 
coercive tactics”). 
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police33 and, derivatively, distrust the confessions they obtain.34  The pre-
Miranda, traditional involuntariness test was widely criticized as too 
imprecise35 and intolerably uncertain.36 The Court responded in 
Miranda37 by mandating strict compliance with specified procedural 
                                                 
33 E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 498 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (commenting 
on the majority’s “deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers” reflected in its 
reasoning).  Similarly, many of the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions finding that a 
judicial warrant is required for most probable-cause searches can be traced, in large part, to 
the Court’s same negative attitude toward the police.  As early as 1948, the Supreme Court 
held that a search warrant was required to search a hotel room based on probable cause 
because the interposition of the neutral judicial officer’s judgment helped protect against 
the predictable excesses of the police, who are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.”  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  The warrant-
requirement rule was forcefully restated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 88 (1967), and 
“[d]uring the next fifteen years or so, the Court fairly consistently reaffirmed the 
supremacy of the Warrant Clause.”  DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 190.  Evidence seized by the 
police via warrantless searches was presumptively excluded pursuant to the Exclusionary 
Rule, which was ultimately characterized by the Court as “a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect 
[upon the police].”  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  The Court’s 
suspicious attitude toward the police was likewise reflected in cases involving pretextual 
police conduct.  See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969) (finding an 
expansion of the scope of search incident to arrest to include the entire premises where a 
suspect is arrested to be unreasonable, in part because if this were allowed the police could 
pretextually avoid the warrant requirement “by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest 
suspects at home rather than elsewhere”). 
34 See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 492 (“The Warren Court distrusted confessions, was 
critical of police deception, and inclined to set up an even ‘playing field’ in the 
interrogation room.”); supra note 32. 
35 See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind:  Formalism’s Triumph over 
Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243 (1986) [hereinafter Grano, Miranda v. 
Arizona and the Legal Mind] (under the traditional involuntariness test, “everything [is] 
relevant but nothing [is] determinative”); Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good 
Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570 (1984) (under the traditional involuntariness 
test, “[a]lmost everything was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive”); Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 57 (1974) (describing a 
typical coercion case as one “in which the court[ ] provide[s] a lengthy factual description 
followed by a conclusion . . .  without anything to connect the two”). 
36 See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 
859, 863 (1979) (Court concludes the traditional involuntariness test resulted in “intolerable 
uncertainty.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869 
(1981) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Confessions] (the traditional involuntariness test “left the 
police without needed guidance”) (emphasis omitted).  Other observers have called the 
due process test “absolutely useless,” Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 430 (1954), and “legal ‘double-talk.’” ALBERT R. BEISEL, 
CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 48 (1955). 
37 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements obtained during a custodial 
interrogation cannot be used at trial unless the prosecution demonstrates compliance with 
procedural safeguards securing the privilege against self-incrimination).  Although Miranda 
was foreshadowed by decisions such as Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) 
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requirements as a predicate for admitting statements obtained during 
custodial interrogation.38  In one fell swoop,39 the Court imposed a new 
methodology for assessing the admissibility of confessions that, although 
not displacing the pre-Miranda due process jurisprudence,40 would soon 
overtake it in importance.41  
Starting with Miranda, the Court imposed a series of elaborate and 
unforgiving protocols for the admission of confessions.42  The Miranda 
                                                                                                             
(government may not deliberately elicit statements from a person under indictment in the 
absence of counsel), and especially Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (Sixth 
Amendment is violated when a post-indictment suspect confesses after police deny his 
request to consult with his counsel), none of these earlier cases established bright-line 
procedural requirements for constitutional compliance. 
38 The dicta in Miranda instructs that adequate and sufficient alternatives to the specified 
rights warnings could be developed.  384 U.S. at 469.  A statutory alternative to the Miranda 
warnings was later declared unconstitutional by the Court in Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000). 
39 This is not to discount the importance of Escobedo, 378 U.S. 478, and other decisions 
that presaged Miranda.  DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 24.03, at 458 (“The road to Miranda runs 
through Escobedo.”).  See Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches when a defendant is indicted, and therefore the Sixth Amendment is 
violated when government agents, in the absence of defense counsel, deliberately elicit 
incriminating information from a person against whom adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings have commenced). 
40 The Court observed that even after Miranda, “We have never abandoned [the] due 
process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained 
involuntarily.”  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434. 
41 See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED WOUND 157 (1970) (calling Miranda “the 
high-water mark of the due process revolution, the ultimate expression of judicial 
philosophy and technique that had characterized the Warren Court on crime”).  For 
statistical illustrations of the impact of Miranda on criminal practice, see Richard A. Leo, The 
Impact of Miranda Revisited, in RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE MIRANDA 
DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 210-15 tbls.1-6 (1998) (demonstrating the effect of 
Miranda on confessions in various aspects of criminal proceedings). 
42 Miranda imposed the well-known rights-advisement requirements for custodial 
interrogation.  384 U.S. at 444.  In order for a confession to be admissible consistent with 
Fifth Amendment protections, Miranda instructs that the suspect must be first advised of 
his right to remain silent, the consequences of foregoing this right, the right to consult with 
a lawyer and have the lawyer present during interrogation, and the right to an appointed 
lawyer if he (the suspect) is indigent.  The four so-called Miranda rights are set out in 384 
U.S. at 444, 471-74, 479.  A confession is admissible only if the prosecutor can satisfy the 
“heavy burden” of showing that the suspect waived these so-called Miranda rights 
“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 444; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938).  A confession obtained without such a showing must be excluded, even if it is not 
“involuntary in traditional terms.”  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 (the Court, after examining 
the facts of the four cases under collective consideration and concluding that it “might not 
find the defendants’ statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms,” ultimately 
concluded that they must be excluded because they were taken in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (“The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is 
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line of cases43 did more than simply mandate procedures that might 
result in fewer confessions;44 they reflected antipathy, or at least 
skepticism, toward the use of confessions themselves.45  This enmity 
extended beyond the pragmatic to the normative and was based on the 
Court’s belief that it was uncivilized, unenlightened, and even unfair to 
solve crimes though the use of confessions, which were presumably 
obtained only by using the “less refined methods” that typify police 
interrogations.46  The Court has even asserted that the criminal justice 
                                                                                                             
that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware 
of his ‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.”). 
43 Later cases applying Miranda imposed additional embellishments that were designed 
to ensure that the values protected by Miranda were safeguarded in other circumstances.  
E.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (once a suspect has been given Miranda 
warnings and requests counsel, the “interrogation must cease, and officials may not 
reinitiate interrogation without counsel present”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) 
(the Minnick rule applies even when different officers seek to interrogate a suspect about 
separate crimes).  Justice Scalia, with typical panache, has castigated some of these 
requirements as follows: 
Today’s extension of the Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)] 
prohibition is the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, 
producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined constitutional 
restriction upon law enforcement.  This newest tower, according to the 
Court, is needed to avoid “inconsisten[cy] with [the] purpose” of 
Edwards’ prophylactic rule, which was needed to protect Miranda’s 
prophylactic right to have counsel present, which was needed to 
protect the right against compelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in 
the Constitution. 
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 166 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
44 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“the thrust of the new [Miranda] rules 
is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to 
discourage any confession at all”).  Although the studies vary, most conclude that Miranda 
did in fact reduce the number of confessions obtained by police.  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, 
Miranda’s Social Costs:  An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 417, 438 (1966) 
(results from several large cities show about a 16% drop in the rate of confessions after 
Miranda, and about a 4% drop in the conviction rate for serious offenses); Paul G. Cassell & 
Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s:  An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871 (1996) (55-60% pre-Miranda rate of confessions in Salt Lake City 
dropped to a 33% rate after Miranda); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., 
Miranda in Pittsburgh—A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967) (54.4% pre-Miranda 
confession rate dropped to 37.5% immediately after Miranda, and even lower later in time).  
The methodologies used in such studies, however, have been criticized on a variety of 
empirical grounds. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect:  Substantial 
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996); George C. Thomas 
III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate:  A “Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996). 
45 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he not so subtle overtone of the 
[Miranda] opinion [is]—that it is inherently wrong for the police to gather evidence from 
the accused himself.”). 
46 The quoted words are taken from an article written by Professor Inbau; the complete 
sentence reads as follows:  “In dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with 
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system would “suffer morally” from a broad reliance on confessions to 
prove guilt.47 
The rationale of Miranda is based on the following three-part 
syllogism: 
(1) The Fifth Amendment Privilege applies to police questioning, 
and compulsion within the meaning of the privilege can include 
informal pressure to speak. 
(2) Informal compulsion actually48 (or at least presumptively)49 
exists in any and every form of custodial interrogation. 
(3) Specified warnings are necessary to dispel the compelling 
pressure of custodial interrogation and thereby preserve the 
suspect’s capacity to exercise free will in dealing with the police. 
Several other interrelated and foundational assumptions permeate 
Miranda and its progeny.50  For the most part, these are more explicit and 
fully developed counterparts of the assumptions that undergird the pre-
Miranda jurisprudence.   
                                                                                                             
criminal suspects who may actually be innocent, the interrogator must of necessity employ 
less refined methods than are considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, 
everyday affairs by and between law-abiding citizens.”  Inbau, Police Interrogation, supra 
note 21, at 19 (emphasis omitted). 
47 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (emphasis omitted) (favorably quoting 8 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 312). 
48 The Miranda Court observed that persons “subjected to the techniques of persuasion 
described above [i.e., custodial interrogation] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion 
to speak.”  384 U.S. at 461.  This was the prevalent interpretation of Miranda at the time.  
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police 
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 447 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda] (in the 
absence of the Miranda warnings, custodial interrogation necessarily results in 
unconstitutional compulsion). 
49 Elsewhere the Miranda Court observed that even when a suspect’s statement may not 
be involuntary in traditional, pre-Miranda terms, “[t]he potentiality for compulsion is 
forcefully apparent,” 384 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added), and that this potentiality is 
sufficient to justify suppression.  See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) 
(“[T]he Miranda rule creates a presumption of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, 
that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief.”). 
50 It is an over-simplification to suggest that the line of post-Miranda cases reflect a 
judicial philosophy that is identical or even consistent in all respects.  Certainly, the Warren 
Court’s jurisprudential approach is in some ways distinguishable from that of the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts.  See infra notes 77-78.  Nevertheless, several pervasive assumptions 
operate across all the post-Miranda cases, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis. 
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First, the Court assumes that it is in the best interests of guilty 
suspects not to confess.  Although this seems obvious from the general 
tenor of the opinion, the Court never says this in so many words.  Rather, 
it treats the assumption as being so well understood that it needs no 
citation of authority or explicit exposition.  The Court is probably correct 
about this insofar as the assumption conforms to the conventional 
wisdom of the legal community, i.e., that a guilty suspect (or any suspect 
for that matter) should not speak with police, let alone confess, without 
first consulting with an attorney.  Further, the assumption is implicit in 
the Court’s holding.  As a matter of common sense, suspects are not 
generally advised of their prerogative to do something that is 
detrimental to their interests.51  If advised at all, they are made aware of 
their right to avoid doing something that is presumptively harmful.  
Accordingly, it would make little sense to mint a complicated mandatory 
rights warning advisement protocol unless a confession was judged to be 
detrimental to a suspect’s interests.52   
Second, the Court assumes that confessions are not especially 
beneficial to the common good, and that they may even be detrimental to 
society.  The Court contends that Miranda’s critics have overstated the 
importance of confessions in solving crime.53  Other potential benefits to 
society—such as repairing the harm caused by the crime, helping an 
offender repay his debt, avoiding the toll of a trial on victims and 
witnesses, bringing closure to victims, and so forth—are constitutionally 
irrelevant.54  Even if confessions are needed to secure convictions in 
some cases, Miranda signals the Court’s preference for Fifth Amendment 
                                                 
51 For example, no court has ever required an advisement to a suspect that he has a right 
to confess, or to lead police to incriminating evidence, or to advise the prosecutor of 
adverse character witnesses and prior bad acts. 
52 In other words, it is assumed that, at least from the suspect’s perspective, the greatest 
possible benefit is to avoid a conviction (even if it is merited) and any associated 
punishment (even if it is just).  Thus, a suspect would prefer avoiding an adverse judicial 
determination to any intangible benefits that might be gained by confessing, such as 
clearing his conscience, accepting responsibility, making things right, and gaining 
whatever merits a just punishment might afford.  To the extent that these latter 
considerations have any value, they are seen as matters of individual preference that are 
not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) 
(commenting that Fifth Amendment is not concerned with “moral and psychological 
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion”). 
53 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 481.  To be fair, the Court has sometimes backed off 
somewhat from the assertion in recent post-Miranda decisions.  E.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (“Admissions of guilt . . . are essential to society’s compelling interest in 
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”). 
54 Supra note 52. 
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values over law enforcement interests.55  But the Court’s rhetoric goes 
beyond merely characterizing the law enforcement benefits of 
confessions as being of a lesser magnitude that should be balanced away 
to achieve greater rewards; the Court is worried that confessions can be 
detrimental to the social fabric, and that we would all “suffer morally” 
from an undue reliance on confessions to prove guilt.56  
Third, the Court assumes that the police will seek confessions at 
virtually all costs and use whatever techniques they can to obtain them, 
constrained only by the limitations explicitly imposed by the courts or 
from other external sources.57  The Court’s reasoning begins with the 
premise that police no longer torture or use brute force primarily 
because of court decisions that disallowed this.58  Further, it supposes 
that police adapted to pre-Miranda limitations by resorting to 
psychological coercion and manipulation, which is far more difficult for 
courts to superintend on a case-by-case basis.59  The reasoning continues 
that bright-line rules for custodial interrogations must be established, 
therefore, to counterbalance the more sophisticated but nonetheless 
coercive techniques now used by police.60  
Fourth, the Court assumes that the Miranda protections are necessary 
for the adversary system, as this is embodied in the Fifth Amendment 
right against compelled self-incrimination.61  The Court views the 
adversary system as requiring a fair balance between the state and the 
defendant in the prosecution of crime, and it believes that this 
equilibrium is maintained by reducing the use of confessions at trial,62 at 
                                                 
55 See Weisselberg, supra note 32, at 121. 
56 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (favorably quoting 8 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 312). 
57 This reasoning is the basis for the Court’s contemporary justification of the 
exclusionary rule, i.e., unconstitutionally obtained confessions are excluded in order to 
deter future police misconduct in obtaining confessions.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 
225 (1971) (exclusionary rule applied to the Miranda line of cases); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 
322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (exclusionary rule applied to due process voluntariness cases). 
58 See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 456 (attributing the disuse of torture and use of 
psychological ploys to “public opposition to violent police practices and a judicial 
crackdown”). 
59 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (citing “gap in our knowledge” of what 
typically goes on during police interrogations as a justification for bright-line warning 
requirements). 
60 Id. 
61 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) 
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege embodies “our preference for an 
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice”). 
62 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 320 (1991) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Some Kind Words]. 
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least those obtained by state agents.63  In the absence of a confession, the 
government would, as it should, have to convince the fact-finder of a 
defendant’s guilt using its own resources and independently obtained 
evidence.  Also, when a defendant manages to avoid confessing, he is 
less fettered when participating in an adversary trial, i.e., he can more 
effectively plead not guilty, present a conflicting version of events, and 
exercise his right to testify.  Miranda, in other words, helps ensure that 
the state investigates crime properly and undertakes its appropriate 
burden in our adversary system, thereby affording the defendant a 
fighting chance for an acquittal.  As the Court once explained, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege promotes a “sense of fair play which dictates ‘a 
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government . . . in its 
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load . . . .‘”64  As one 
Miranda dissenter put it, the “not so subtle overtone of the opinion [is] 
. . . that it is inherently wrong for the police to gather evidence from the 
accused himself.”65       
Fifth, the Court assumes that a typical police interrogation damages 
the suspect as a person and is disrespectful of his human dignity.66  In 
Miranda, the Court pronounced “the constitutional foundation 
underlying the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is the respect a 
government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of 
its citizens.”67  Using soaring rhetoric, the Miranda Court later declared 
that the atmosphere within an interrogation room “carries its own badge 
of intimidation.  To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is 
equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of 
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most 
                                                 
63 Just as in the pre-Miranda jurisprudence, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 
(1986), the post-Miranda approach does not address the “moral and psychological pressures 
to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 305 (1985). 
64 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 2251). 
65 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).  The Court’s position in this regard has 
become somewhat tempered over time, as it today is more critical of the “sporting view of 
justice” and thus less likely to view defendants as underdogs in need of a helping hand. 
66 The human-dignity justification for Miranda blends with the Court’s adversarial-
system justification.  As the Court put it, Miranda’s conception of the adversarial system is 
founded on the belief that “to respect the inviolability of the human personality, . . . the 
government seeking to punish an individual [must] produce the evidence against him by 
its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it 
from his own mouth.”  Id. at 460 (majority opinion). 
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
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cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to 
incriminate himself.”68 
The above-quoted language is telling, for it expresses the outer limits 
of the Court’s conception of a custodial suspect’s dignity, viz. a suspect is 
dignified by reinforcing his capacity to resist confessing.  Whether a 
guilty suspect ultimately confesses, remains silent, or even lies to police, 
conversely, has no bearing on his dignity as a person.  Moreover, the 
Court concludes that a suspect’s risk of suffering an indignity can be 
sufficiently minimized by a mechanical compliance with the Miranda 
protocols, even when the conduct of the police is “objectionable as a 
matter of ethics”69 and involves the “deliberate misleading of an officer 
of the court.”70  Miranda, in other words, tolerates the inevitability of 
reprehensible police behavior, and it is satisfied that a suspect’s dignity 
will be sufficiently protected by requiring procedures that can enable 
most suspects to resist confessing most of the time.   
The Court, consistent with all of the above assumptions, seeks 
substantially the same end as it had in its pre-Miranda cases—to establish 
and enforce an empirical baseline for assessing and protecting a 
suspect’s “free enough will” vis-à-vis police coercion.71  The post-
Miranda means for achieving this end, however, are radically different 
than the Court’s traditional methodology.  Where pre-Miranda cases use 
a totality of the circumstances test for assessing voluntariness, the post-
Miranda approach fashions and applies bright line criteria.  And, where 
the pre-Miranda cases consult a “complex of values” designed to inform 
                                                 
68 Id. at 457-58.  Elsewhere the Court writes that “the very fact of custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty.”  Id. at 455.  Years later, the Court re-iterated that 
Miranda protects a “privilege [that] embodies ‘principles of humanity and civil liberty.’”  
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
69 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1986).  In Burbine, the suspect’s sister arranged 
for an attorney to call the police station and inform a detective that she would act as the 
suspect’s lawyer if the police intended to interrogate him.  The detective assured the lawyer 
that the suspect would not be interviewed that night.  Less than an hour later, the police 
conducted the first in a series of interviews of the suspect.  Prior to each session, the suspect 
was informed of his Miranda rights and signed written waivers.  He was never advised, 
however, that his sister had retained counsel for him, or that the counsel had called the 
police.  The Court held that the police had followed acceptable Miranda procedures and 
established that the suspect properly waived his rights. 
70 Id. at 424. 
71 The Court has never said that compliance with Miranda guarantees free will.  See, e.g., 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (explaining that although Miranda compliance 
establishes an absence of Fifth Amendment compulsion, it does not necessarily show an 
adequate exercise of free will so as to attenuate the connection between an illegal arrest and 
a subsequent confession). 
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an essentially factual assessment of free will, the post-Miranda approach 
explicitly relies upon psychological theory and data in constructing its 
bright lines and then applying them to particular cases.72  Miranda, 
therefore, did not introduce the idea of empirically ascertaining the 
freedom of a suspect’s will as the Court had already moved in this 
direction in the pre-Miranda cases.73  But in Miranda the Court sought to 
achieve better jurisprudence through science, by using psychology to 
enhance its empirical assessment of free will, and even to provide 
normative content.  A more detailed discussion of the psychological 
theory and models used by the Court in Miranda, and its implications for 
the future, is undertaken in the next Part. 
One final observation should be emphasized before proceeding:  
Miranda and its progeny are undeniably hostile to confessions.  As 
Justice Harlan put it, “the thrust of the new rules [announced in Miranda 
is] . . . ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”74  To be fair, this is 
the only position that the Court could take and still be faithful to its 
underlying assumptions.  If confessions are truly contrary to a suspect’s 
best interest, if they are generally obtained using objectionable methods, 
if they are harmful to society, and if they undermine the adversary 
system, then they ought to be discouraged.  Even the Miranda warnings 
themselves, taken verbatim from the opinion, betray the Court’s 
antipathy towards confessions.  In the Miranda Court’s own words, “The 
warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the 
explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual 
in court.”75  Of course, the emphasized words are clearly wrong.  A 
                                                 
72 E.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. 
73 See supra Part II.A. 
74 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  This anti-confession sentiment is 
reflected in later cases, as well as some that closely predate Miranda.  E.g., Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 437, 448 n.23 (1974) (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 
(1964)) (“‘a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 
“confession” will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses’ than a system 
relying on independent investigation”). 
75 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added).  This language has been adopted verbatim 
in most rights advisement protocols.  In fact, Harold Berliner, who is credited with being 
the first to mass produce and market the Miranda rights warning cards to police 
departments around the country, recognized that the “can and will” language in the 
warning was incorrect. 
 The warning has been praised for its simplicity and clarity, but 
Berliner, who served as district attorney of Nevada County from 1957 
to 1973, admitted in a recent interview that one phrase was 
superfluous, possibly even inaccurate.  “Anything you say can and will 
be used against you in a court of law.”  Why can and will?  Berliner 
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defendant’s inculpatory statements may be used against him at trial, but 
this is not inevitable.76  More importantly, exculpatory statements, 
especially those that are convincing, are far more likely to be used at trial 
for the defendant’s benefit.  Indeed, an exculpatory statement provided 
to investigators may obviate the need for a trial altogether.  The only 
plausible explanation for the Court’s hyperbolic advice is that it wanted 
the Miranda warnings to discourage suspects from confessing to police. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Court tacked somewhat toward the law 
and order camp,77 rendering opinions that occasionally expressed a more 
                                                                                                             
paused for a long while, looking slightly stunned at the notion his 
words needed polishing. 
 “It is not an exact statement of the truth of the situation.  I would 
take ‘and will’ out,” he said, shrugging.  Berliner conceded that not 
everything will be used in court.  In fact, most of it won’t.  But 
something about the rhythm of the sentence worked, and it has been 
repeated so often that it always seemed untouchable. 
Blair Anthony Robertson, No One Wants To Hear His Words:  How Ex-DA Wrote Miranda 
Warning, OUR TOWN, www.sacbee.com/static/archive/ourtown/history/miranda.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (emphasis in original). 
76 For example, they may be subject to evidentiary exclusion, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601 
(“General Rule of Competency” of witnesses) (cited in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
167 (1986) (explaining that “[a] statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent 
might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the 
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”)), or constitutional objections, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) 
(suppressing a suspect’s confession, in spite of the fact that he was read his Miranda 
warnings, because his confession was the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation). 
77 See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:  
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 352 (2004) 
(“A working majority of the Burger Court undertook a three-pronged offensive in support 
of the police.”); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (“subsequent 
cases [to Miranda] have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law 
enforcement while reaffiming [Miranda’s] core ruling that unwarned statements may not be 
used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief”).  With the departure of Chief Justice 
Warren and other justices having a similar philosophy from the Court, “almost all Court 
watchers expected the . . . Burger Court to treat Miranda unkindly.  They did not have to 
wait very long.”  Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice:  A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 13 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, Warren Court].  As Bernard 
Schwartz put it, although the essentials of the Warren Court’s jurisprudential edifice, 
including Miranda, was preserved, these cases “were modified, even narrowed and blunted 
in some ways” by the Burger Court.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 329 (1993).  See generally LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA:  CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983) 
(contrasting the Court’s approach to confessions before and after the Miranda decision).  
The Rehnquist Court that followed tilted “toward the right,” as notably reflected in its 
criminal law decisions.  SCHWARTZ, supra, at 372.  See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING 
RIGHT:  THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992) (discussing the Court’s 
transition toward judicial conservatism). 
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favorable attitude towards police78 and acknowledged the practical 
utility of confessions.79  This resulted in some retrenchment of Miranda’s 
procedural regime for police interrogations.80  The Court, however, 
persisted in the same basic, normative understandings that undergirded 
both the Miranda line of cases and the earlier due process decisions—
namely, that confessions are presumptively contrary to the self-interest 
of the confessor, and remaining silent is, at worst, the moral equivalent 
of truthfully confessing guilt.  
                                                 
78 For example, in New York v. Quarles, the Court recognized an exception to Miranda 
based, in part, on its belief that the police act for a variety of laudable motives, including 
“their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain 
incriminating evidence from the suspect.”  467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).  See Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001) (explaining that the requested relief is not necessary, in 
part, because of the “good sense . . . of most . . . law-enforcement officials”); Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (majority rejects the dissent’s contention that police 
would routinely engage in illegal searches, consistent with broad independent source 
exception to the exclusionary rule, because obtaining a warrant can be inconvenient and 
time-consuming).  Such reasoning represents a softening of the Court’s attitude toward the 
police, as compared to some of the Warren Court’s rhetoric.  See supra note 32.  This is not 
to suggest, however, that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts presumed the police always 
behaved benevolently.  E.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (discussing 
pretextual police conduct); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1983) (while the Court 
grants that generally “police behave responsibly and do not deliberately exert pressures 
upon . . . suspect[s] to confess” in misdemeanor traffic offense cases, the “same might be 
said of [the police with respect to] custodial interrogations of persons arrested for 
felonies”). 
79 E.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (acknowledging “the need for 
effective law enforcement” in a confession case); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166 (acknowledging 
the “substantial cost” associated with suppressing a confession); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 312 (1985) (Court acknowledges the “high cost to legitimate law enforcement activity” 
associated with suppressing confessions); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7 (exclusion of a 
confession because the police failed to comply with Miranda would, in some cases, 
“penaliz[e] officers for asking the very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts 
to protect themselves and the public”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975) (Court 
does not want to “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity.”). 
80 E.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (Court recognizes a “public safety” exception to the 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted 
into evidence.); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Miranda protections are only 
prophylactic in character, and thus the fruits of a statement taken in violation of Miranda 
need not be excluded from trial.); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements taken 
in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony).  Cf. Arizona 
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (the wrongful admission of a coerced confession is 
subject to the harmless error analysis). 
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C. The Solution:  A “Principled” Approach 
Through all of these jurisprudential iterations and evolution, the 
Court has far too often “put aside childish [notions]”81 about the many 
obvious and intrinsic benefits of confessions cataloged above, fixating on 
means (how the police attempt to obtain a confession) to the exclusion of 
ends (whether a truthful and heartfelt confession is obtained).  In so 
doing, the Court has acted as if those who favor encouraging confessions 
were naive at best and disingenuous at worst, and all of the wide-
ranging advantages to be derived from confessions were less important 
than other competing values and considerations.  But the Court’s 
jurisprudence is even more troubling than this, as it often expresses 
disapproval rather than mere indifference towards confessions.  Rather 
than starting with the premise that confessions are basically good things 
that ought to be encouraged and maximized, the Court typically begins 
with the presumption that confessions ought to be discouraged because 
they are probably either coerced,82 obtained through misleading advice 
or deceit,83 or foolishly made,84 and that their importance for law-
                                                 
81 “When I was a child, I used to talk as a child, think as a child, reason as a child; when I 
became a man, I put aside childish things.”  1 Corinthians 13:11.  Perhaps childlike—rather 
than childish—is a better characterization of the favorable attitude towards confessions 
described earlier and advocated in this Article. 
82 Early due process cases, such as Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), were 
concerned with extreme and outrageous police practices that were obviously coercive.  The 
more recent Miranda cases proceed from the understanding that “compulsion inheres in 
custodial interrogation to such an extent that any confession, in any case of custodial 
interrogation, is compelled.”  Herman, supra note 48, at 735.  In other words, the Court 
presumes that custodial interrogation, without the protection of the Miranda safeguards, 
will necessarily result in unconstitutional compulsion.  Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 
supra note 48, at 447. 
83 Early due process cases, such as Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), involved police 
deception (fledgling police officer falsely creates sympathy by the suspect for the officer, 
which the police exploit).  See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (police questioning 
did not violate the Miranda requirements even though the police did not inform the suspect 
that his sister had retained an attorney for him and mislead the attorney who called 
wanting to speak with the suspect).  The modern techniques employed by the police to 
obtain confessions have been described as having “many of the essential hallmarks of a 
confidence game.”  Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge:  Police Interrogation as a Confidence 
Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260-61 (1996) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Leo, 
Miranda’s Revenge].  See also Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception:  The Changing 
Nature of Police Interrogation, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35 (1992) (quoting William Hart, 
The Subtle Art of Persuasion, POLICE MAGAZINE, Jan. 1981, at 15-16 (today “interrogation is 
not a matter of forcing suspects to confess but of ‘conning’ them”)). 
84 E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(commenting that the Miranda majority was offended by the act of confession, as many who 
confess do so in a “fit of stupidity”); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“even if I were to concede that an honest confession is a foolish 
mistake, I would welcome rather than reject it”). 
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enforcement purposes has been grossly exaggerated and sometimes even 
intentionally overstated.85  Put another way, the Court presupposes that 
guilty persons are naturally disinclined to confess, and it rejects the idea 
that confessions are intrinsically beneficial to a suspect’s dignity or the 
common good.  
The reasons for this “deep-seated distrust”86 and “palpable 
hostility”87 toward confessions are varied and complex.  Some of it no 
doubt rests on a correct understanding of imperfect human nature.  In 
the words of Justice Jackson, “It probably is the normal instinct to deny 
and conceal any shameful or guilty act[,]”88 and from this it has been 
argued that any admission of culpability ought to be viewed with a 
certain degree of wariness.89  No less an authority than Professor Inbau 
has observed that “Criminal offenders, except, of course, those caught in 
the commission of their crimes, ordinarily will not admit their guilt 
unless questioned under conditions of privacy, and for a period of 
several hours.”90 
But the suspicion and hostility toward confessions that is often 
reflected in the Court’s holdings and dicta are far more strident and 
insidious than Justice Jackson’s words or even Professor Inbau’s 
observations would logically suggest.  To be sure, much of this animus 
can be traced to a historical record that is replete with examples of 
indefensible and sometimes outrageous practices for extracting 
                                                 
85 For example, the Miranda Court’s belief that the law-enforcement proponents had 
overstated the importance of confessions is specifically mentioned as a basis for the Court’s 
holding in that case.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 481 (1966) (although “not 
unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying 
circumstances,” the Court is not persuaded by the “recurr[ing] argument . . . that society’s 
need for interrogation outweighs the privilege [to remain silent]”). 
86 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 537 (White, J., dissenting). 
87 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  A judicial 
recognition of this human inclination to deny guilt was an important premise of the 
erstwhile exculpatory no doctrine, which held that a person cannot be charged with 
making a false statement for falsely denying guilt in response to an investigator’s question.  
See King v. Erickson, 89 F.3d 1575, 1579 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled by LaChance v. Erickson, 
522 U.S. 262 (1998). 
89 Of course, a contrary conclusion can be argued from this premise—assuming people 
tend to deny and conceal actual wrongdoing, then an admission of guilt is likely to be true 
because it would be counter-intuitive for a person to falsely confess.  See Hopt v. Utah, 110 
U.S. 574, 585 (1883) (“[O]ne who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his 
interests by an untrue [confession].”). 
90 Inbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 21, at 17 (emphasis omitted). 
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confessions,91 and a belief by some that police will continue to employ 
such tactics if left to their own devices.92  Other observers dispute 
disparaging generalizations about police questioning, contending that 
police misconduct occurs only in “extraordinary cases, having no 
relation to the ordinary day-to-day operations of a police department.”93  
Quantifying the pervasiveness and magnitude of police abuse has 
remained elusive, however, largely because interrogations are typically 
conducted in private, which “results in secrecy and this in turn results in 
a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation 
rooms.”94 
A principled approach to confessions would involve more than 
simply rejecting Miranda and its progeny and returning to good old pre-
Miranda days, as these days were not so good.  The earliest Supreme 
Court decisions were concerned with the reliability of confessions to the 
exclusion of other values,95 and thus they did not properly account for 
the dignity of those confessing or the integrity of the criminal justice 
system.  In later due process confession cases, the Court concentrated on 
preserving each suspect’s ability to exercise a sufficiently free will in 
choosing whether to confess without seeking, as it should have, to 
promote confessions that were truthful and heartfelt.96  A principled and 
                                                 
91 E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (defendants whipped until they agreed 
to confess to such statements as the police dictated).  See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 n.6 
(collecting cases involving especially egregious police conduct in obtaining confessions). 
92 DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 430 (“if the police are left to their own devices to obtain 
confessions from persons they suspect are guilty, there is an enhanced risk that they will 
turn to inquisitorial techniques that . . . create an undue risk of false confessions [as well as] 
violate ‘the law’s ethical or moral responsibility[ies]’” toward suspects) (internal quotations 
omitted).  This concern about future police misconduct in obtaining confessions is the 
predicate for the Court’s deterrent justification for pre-Miranda and post-Miranda 
exclusionary rules.  E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (exclusion of confessions 
based on Miranda violations justified to deter future police misconduct); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. 
143 (pre-Miranda exclusion of confessions justified to deter future police misconduct). 
93 Developments in the Law—Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938, 940 (1966) [hereinafter 
Developments].  As one dissenting justice in Miranda put it, “the examples of police brutality 
mentioned by the Court [in the majority opinion] are rare exceptions to the thousands of 
cases that appear every year in the law reports.”  384 U.S. at 499-500 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
94 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 149-50 (“As to what happened in the 
fifth-floor jail room during this thirty-six hour secret examination the testimony follows the 
usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict.”).  In Miranda, the Court explicitly referenced this 
“gap in our knowledge” as a justification for its relying on police manuals and texts as a 
basis for surmising what typically goes on during police interrogations.  384 U.S. at 448. 
95 E.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 578, 584 (1884). 
96 E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961) (admissibility of defendant’s 
confession was “answered by reference to a legal standard which took into account . . . [its] 
probable truth or falsity . . . [which] is not a permissible standard under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” ). 
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effective criminal justice system should do both:  it ought to ensure that 
confessions are the product of a confessor’s free will, as that concept is 
correctly understood and prudently applied, while simultaneously 
encouraging suspects to exercise their will by choosing to be candid with 
police and honestly admit any wrongdoing.  These twin aspirations of 
preserving free choice and encouraging the right choice are 
complimentary, and one need not inevitably be sacrificed or 
shortchanged at the expense of the other.97   
The goals of choosing freely and choosing well can be promoted 
within the existing framework of Miranda and its progeny, but not 
without some important modifications.  Miranda’s ostensible objective of 
ensuring that a suspect makes an informed choice regarding whether to 
confess is completely compatible with a correct understanding of the 
preeminence of a suspect’s free will, and thus should be preserved.  But 
the Miranda warnings ought to be expanded and improved, so that a 
suspect makes a better-informed and more meaningful decision about 
the benefits of confessing when deciding whether to speak with police.  
In other words, the present Miranda warnings should be augmented so 
that they do more than simply advise a suspect he has the right to choose 
whether to speak with police and warn him about the possibilities of 
self-incrimination; they also ought to explain to a suspect why he should 
speak candidly with police even if this would be self-incriminating.  
Before considering any of the proposed changes to the present approach 
to criminal confessions, however, it is necessary to understand the 
empirical (and especially, the psychological) studies that have fueled the 
misguided assumptions described here and that have created a system 
so in need of reform.  
III.  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VOLITION:  CONFESSION JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPIRICISM 
The Court’s normative assumptions about confessions (discussed in 
the previous Part) have remained largely unchanged over the last several 
decades because they have generally rested on similar jurisprudential 
values and decision-making sources.  For over a century, the Court has 
increasingly viewed constitutional issues through the prism of legal 
                                                 
97 See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996) (arguing each action 
must have its own justification, and if the law is to protect freedoms then it is permissible 
and even necessary to make judgments about the quality of actions). 
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realism and empiricism,98 which assume that the judicial decisions 
should be based on all the facts and data pertaining to a particular case 
rather than upon legal rules expressing abstract notions of truth, justice, 
the common good, and human dignity.99  This empirical approach to 
judicial decision-making attained preeminence through the influence of 
legal realists such as Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who once 
famously observed “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics.”100  Holmes and others like him believed that man 
and his laws are merely material in nature, which contrasted sharply 
with the traditional understanding of man as a moral creature having 
responsibilities towards God and his fellow man.101   
As the courts have become increasingly receptive to using empirical 
sources in all forms, traditional understandings of free will and 
voluntariness have been gradually replaced by expansive reliance on 
ostensibly deductive explanations for the same concepts.102  This 
                                                 
98 Ian McLean expresses the ascendance of this jurisprudential approach as follows: 
The dominant American legal paradigm is in broad outlines secular 
and positivist.  It speaks and acts as though “moral values derive their 
source from human experience[:] Ethics is autonomous and situational, 
needing no theological or ideological sanction.”  Moral principles 
enforced by law are simply chosen by the community from an infinite 
range of possibilities through the application of supposedly scientific 
standards to selected data. 
Ian A.T. McLean, Criminal Law and Natural Law, in COMMON TRUTHS:  NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON NATURAL LAW 259, 280 (Edward B. McLean, ed., 2000) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) (emphasis omitted).  See generally Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  Quasi-
Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 122 (2003).  “Where the 
Supreme Court has viewed legislative hypotheses, predictions, theories, and claimed 
causal relationships as novel or implausible, it has applied a heightened empiricism, one 
which demands evidence of a real harm or evil and seeks to quantify the legislative 
predicate.”  Id. 
99 JOHN HENRY SCHEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 
(1995). 
100 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
101 See generally Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2003). 
102 As Professor Blumenthal has noted: 
The use of social science—of psychology in particular—to inform legal 
theory and practice is fast becoming the latest craze in the pages of 
legal academia.  Books and symposia have recently been devoted to 
the interplay between psychology and law and between emotions and 
the law, and to the application of other psychological and social 
scientific research to legal questions.  An increasing number of such 
articles are appearing in the legal literature; prestigious law journals, 
for instance, are showing an increased willingness to publish empirical 
work by both lawyers and psychologists. 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. 
INTERDIS. L.J. 1, 1 (2002).  See also Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  Quasi-Neutral 
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conflation of law and science has been particularly pronounced with 
regard to confession jurisprudence and the use of psychology.103  As a 
consequence, any thorough consideration of the Court’s approach to 
police interrogations would be incomplete without at least a brief review 
of the psychological theories104 that have influenced past judicial 
                                                                                                             
Principles and Constitutional Truth, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2003) (discussing the adoption of 
empirical data by courts in the realm of constitutional law). 
103 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 602 (2004) (discussing the “psychological skill” of 
police investigators); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 811 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(examining the “psychological problems” of the defendant, as provided by a psychologist’s 
testimony at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1966) (providing examples of 
psychological interrogation ploys such as the “Mutt and Jeff” method); Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (declaring a confession involuntary when the “evidence 
indisputably establishe[d] the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and 
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed”); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 
(1959) (taking into account defendant’s “emotional instability”); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 
191, 196 (1957) (reasoning that the inadmissibility of the defendant’s confession was due to, 
among other factors, the fact that he was “certainly of low mentality, if not mentally ill”).  
For a more complete discussion of the relationship of confession law and psychology, see 
Stephen J. Thurman et al., Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581 (2001). 
104 This undertaking begs a preliminary question:  is psychology a science?  Few would 
dispute that portions of psychology, and especially psychoanalysis, is not a “hard” science 
like chemistry or physics.  Indeed, some aspects of psychology may not even be a proper 
science at all, for when one says that a person confesses either because of appropriate guilt, 
shame, or conscience, or “inappropriately” because of psychic service to come compulsion 
neurosis, see OTTO FENICKEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS 268-74 (1945), this 
judgment seems to be much more in the nature of a metaphysical expression than a 
empirical fact.  Science is epistemological and metaphysics is ontological.  With the advent 
of psychology and psychoanalysis, the contradiction of “scientific metaphysics” was 
introduced. 
 The contradiction can be briefly illustrated.  In the Freudian system, “conscience” is 
incorporated into the theory of psychic mansions:  the id, ego, and superego.  The superego 
is the parental and social censor, the “repressed” and redirected conscience now configured 
to the “yes” and “no” of the culture.  Dr. Otto Fenickel, a disciple of Freud, contends that in 
the neurotic “[a] portion of the ego has become an ‘inner mother,’ threatening a possible 
withdrawal of affection” via internalized parental prohibitions.  Id. at 102.  Neurosis results 
either from losing or improperly resolving the Oedipus complex and the maturation of the 
superego.  For those who inadequately negotiate this, certain levels of anxiety change into 
guilt feelings and then the ego behave toward the superego as it once behaved toward a 
threatening parent whose affection and forgiveness is needed.  Id. at 102-03.  In Fenickel’s 
construct, “[p]olicemen or bogeymen represent these ‘externalized pre-superegos.’”  Id. at 
103.  Manifestly, the Freudian paradigm, like various later psychological theories, is a vast 
metaphysical system.  It is not verifiable by the reductive, controlling, and predictive 
praxology of science.  Neither, I would contend, is it universally valid—nor is it as deep, 
rich, wise, and true—as is a metaphysics grounded in ontology and Christian 
anthropology. 
 Despite the problematic status of psychoanalysis and other similar components of 
psychology as a true science, the Court, like the culture more broadly, has accepted it as 
such without differentiation. While Part IV will not directly contest the characterization of 
psychology as a science—in fact, it accepts that certain aspects of the vast field of 
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decisions pertaining to criminal confessions, and those that are likely to 
hold sway in the future.105  
In order to better comprehend and critique the Court’s so-called 
scientific approach to confessions, it is necessary first to have an 
understanding of the development of modern psychology and the 
Court’s growing reliance upon it.  Accordingly, this Part begins by 
presenting a brief history of psychology as a distinct area of study and its 
early usage by the courts, culminating with Miranda’s explicit reliance on 
the Reid Model.  It next recounts how recent interactive approaches have 
been developed within the psychology community in response to 
scientific criticisms of the Reid Model, and how these newer models have 
started to influence the courts.  It finally considers the implications of 
judicial reliance on the interactive models, both in light of the scientific 
debate as to their reliability and in view of their flawed assumptions.  
Part III concludes that the substantial disagreement within the 
psychological community (and even among the various interactive 
hypotheses themselves), as well as the incomplete and professedly 
amoral nature of contemporary psychology generally, counsel that 
courts106 and other decision-makers should be wary in relying upon 
these empirical sources when establishing general standards for the 
admissibility of confessions. A consideration of the broader 
philosophical and jurisprudential implications of the assumptions 
underlying the psychological methods is undertaken next in Part IV. 
                                                                                                             
psychology are scientific—it will expose some of the many problems associated with 
adopting an empirical approach to confession jurisprudence that accepts at face value the 
scientific character of psychology. 
105 Some have urged the relevance of other social sciences, besides psychology, in 
fashioning confession jurisprudence.  E.g., Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 77, at 18 
(applying sociolinguistic research to the holding in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 
(1994), finding that the Edwards rule does not apply unless the suspect unambiguously 
asserts his right to counsel).  The relevance of other social sciences to confession 
jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article. 
106 The argument here involves more than a simple recognition of the unsuitability of 
courts to gather and use empirical data.  See GM v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997) (the 
courts are “institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions 
can be made”).  In general, Congress has a greater institutional capacity to obtain and act 
on the basis of facts than do courts:  for example, Congress has constant contact with 
constituents while courts are more isolated; and, Congress has resources to study problems 
and issues, and it can do so proactively, while courts are dependent on litigants.  Part III 
instead addresses the special problems associated with the judicial use of psychological 
empiricism. 
Milhizer: Rethinking Police Interrogation:  Encouraging Reliable Confession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
30 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
A. The Psychology107 of Miranda:  The Rise and Fall of the Reid Model 
The birth of modern psychology is often attributed to the works of 
Sigmund Freud, who hypothesized that individual personalities are 
largely derived from the irrational impulses of the subconscious.108  As 
the scientific community came to reject Freud’s approach,109 many of 
those who criticized Freud for engaging in overly simplistic assessments 
of scientific phenomenon and the interrelationship between man and the 
environment developed so-called “social-psychological” models,110 
which tried to “bridge the gap between the broad environmentalism of 
sociology and the narrow individualism of psychological or biological 
theories.”111  This approach found expression in various “social-process” 
theories for explaining behavior, so named because they focus on both 
                                                 
107 The many usages of the term “psychology” can be confusing.  Unless otherwise 
indicated in this Article, “psychological” and “psychology” are used in their colloquial 
sense.  The exception arises below in the discussion of the “purely psychological” theories 
of confession.  Here, “psychological” carries its technical definition, which is motivated by 
a study of the way individuals perceive their own actions, and is so distinguished from the 
“social-psychological” models.  See infra Part III.B (discussing social-psychological models). 
108 Though Freud’s writings gave the role of the subconscious new emphasis in the 
scientific realm, accounts of the internal struggle between a person’s subconscious mind 
and his rationality can be found in much earlier works, such as Sophocles’s plays and the 
writings of medieval thinkers such as Augustine.  SARAH TRUELOVE ET AL., PATTERNS IN 
WESTERN CIVILIZATION 216 (3d ed. 2003).  The courts have consulted and applied Freudian 
psychoanalytic theories in only a few scattered cases.  See Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 
767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (focusing on the role of guilt in Freudian analysis as applied in 
criminal cases); United States v. Torniero, 570 F. Supp. 721, 725 (D. Conn. 1983) (examining 
the psychological tendencies of a compulsive gambler). 
109 Though Freud’s work brought about a shift in psychological thought, psychologists 
and others within the scientific community have roundly criticized Freud’s theories.  For a 
general discussion of these criticisms, see C. BADCOCK, ESSENTIAL FREUD (1988); A. 
BERNSTEIN & G. WARNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYSIS (1981); E. 
KURZWEIL, THE FREUDIAN ESTABLISHMENTS (1989); O. A. OLSEN & S. KOPPE, THE 
PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FREUD (1988); J. REPPEN, BEYOND FREUD (1984).  Yet while the scientific 
community has grown largely skeptical of Freud’s approach, most psychologists 
nonetheless continued to presume that human behavior is at least partly motivated by the 
workings of the subconscious.  See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 123-24 (2003). 
110 Social-psychological models attempt to explain a person’s behavior through balancing 
the individual perceptions emphasized by the “purely psychological” theories and the 
broad impact of a person’s social environment.  LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 104 (4th ed. Brooks/Cole Publ’g Co. 1998).  While 
social-psychological models all stress the importance of understanding the interaction of 
the individual perception with the individual’s social environment, the models vary greatly 
depending on which of these two factors—individual assessment or environment—is 
emphasized. 
111 Id. 
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the internal and external processes that can cause a person to engage in 
criminal conduct.112   
In Miranda, the Supreme Court was profoundly influenced by social-
process thinking, and, in particular, the psychological tactics of the Reid 
Technique,113 when it considered the admissibility of confessions with 
regard to the psychological coerciveness of police interrogation 
strategies.114  By the 1960s when Miranda was decided, the Reid Model, 
developed by Brian C. Jayne115 to help explain the Reid Technique for 
police questioning, had became the preeminent social-process approach 
to confessions.  It describes interrogation as “the psychological undoing 
of deception.”116  According to the Model, criminal deception is a 
conditioned avoidance mechanism, i.e., it is a means for “avoiding the 
. . . consequences of being truthful.”117  Successful, undetected lying 
encourages future lying.118  Conversely, successful socialization teaches 
that lying is “wrong” and causes liars to experience anxiety.119   
Because apprehensiveness can lead to confessions,120 the Reid 
Technique concentrates on methods by which police can increase a 
suspect’s anxiety and then take advantage of his discomfort during an 
interrogation.121  Although most psychologists agree that the Reid 
                                                 
112 Id. at 118 (emphasis omitted).  The models of these processes can then be further 
divided into those based on control theories, which is to say those assuming that “people 
will behave antisocially unless they are trained not to by others,” and those based on 
learning theories that concentrate on criminal behavior as a learned trait.  Id. 
113 The Reid Technique is a nine-step interrogation method first published by John Reid 
and Fred Inbau in the early 1960s.  For a fuller explanation of the Reid Technique, see FRED 
E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962). 
114 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456-58 (1966). 
115 Jayne was a colleague of Reid and Inbau.  He differentiates between the Reid 
Technique (the official method taught for police interrogation) and the Reid Model (Jayne’s 
psychological analysis of why suspects confess as a result of the Technique).  For a general 
discussion of Jayne’s principles and method in developing the Reid Model, see Brian C. 
Jayne, The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation:  An Appendix, in FRED E. INBAU ET 
AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 327-47 (3d ed. 1986). 
116 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 118.  Though Gudjonsson’s work centers primarily on 
the Cognitive Behavioral Method, a later psychological theory concerning confessions, he 
provides a good historical overview of the Reid Model and its influences on confessions 
law, both within the United States and abroad. 
117 Id. 
118 See Jayne, supra note 115, at 328. 
119 Id. 
120 GUDJONNSON, supra note 109, at 118. 
121 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS xii (4th ed. 2001).  
An introduction to a more recent account by Reid and Inbau explained:  “We are opposed 
. . . to the use of force, threats of force, or promises of leniency.  We do approve, however, 
of psychological tactics and techniques that may involve trickery and deceit; they are not 
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Technique “represents a potentially very powerful way of breaking 
down resistance during interrogation,”122 many also object to its heavy 
reliance on “trickery and deceit” and use of “considerable psychological 
manipulation and pressure.”123  These critics contend that the 
Technique’s purpose is to override the will of the suspect through the 
imposition of the interrogator’s will.124    
Referring principally to the Reid Technique, the Miranda Court 
condemned psychologically manipulative police questioning,125 finding 
it to be inherently coercive and ultimately unconstitutional, at least 
without a preceding rights warning and waiver.126  Although the Court 
has, on occasion, been self-critical of its reliance in Miranda on the Reid 
Model and Technique,127 it has never since doubted that psychological 
                                                                                                             
only helpful but frequently indispensable in order to secure incriminating information 
from the guilty or to obtain investigative leads from otherwise uncooperative witnesses or 
informants.”  Id. 
122 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 120. 
123 Id. at 10.  In particular, the Reid Model postulates that suspects confess “when the 
perceived consequences of a confession are more desirable than the anxiety generated by 
the deception.”  Id. at 118.  The Reid Technique seeks to exploit this reaction by “[b]reaking 
down denials and resistance[,] [thereby] [i]ncreasing the suspect’s desire to confess.”  Id. at 
11.  A suspect is broken primarily through an evaluation and exploitation of his expectancy, 
persuasion, and belief.  Jayne, supra note 115, at 333.  Consistent with the theory, police 
officers are taught to obtain confessions by manipulating a suspect’s expectancy (or what 
he identifies as desirable) through persuasion, or by changing a suspect’s “beliefs in the 
structure of internal messages that tend to support or refute an expectancy.”  Id.  The Reid 
Model describes two types of perceived consequences that affect a suspect’s expectancy:  
real consequences, which may involve fines or incarceration, and personal consequences, 
relating to damaged self-esteem or integrity.  GUDJONNSON, supra note 109, at 118.  Jayne’s 
work suggests that the suspect’s perception of these two types of consequences require two 
forms of persuasion.  See Jayne, supra note 115. To alter the perceived real consequences, a 
police officer must exploit a suspect’s defense mechanisms by emphasizing the sentencing 
reductions that a confession might yield as compared to a conviction without confession.  
Id. at 332-35.  Expected personal consequences, on the other hand, are best altered though 
sympathy and compassion in order to reduce the guilt and shame associated with 
confessing.  Id 
124 Cf. GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 120.  “[T]he success . . . depends on the extent to 
which the interrogator is successful in identifying psychological vulnerabilities, exploiting 
them to alter the suspect’s belief system and perceptions of the consequences of making 
self-incriminating admissions and persuading him to accept the interrogator’s version of 
the ‘truth.’”  Id. 
125 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966). 
126 Id. at 457-58. 
127 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (“The Fifth Amendment itself 
does not prohibit all incriminating admissions; ‘[a]bsent some officially coerced self-
accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning 
admissions.’  The Miranda Court, however, presumed that interrogation in certain custodial 
circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made under those 
circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda 
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theory and data ought to play a central role in determining the 
voluntariness of a confession.128  
From the perspective of the psychological community, a principle 
objection to the Reid Model and similar approaches129 is that they are 
reactive, i.e., they place too much emphasis on practical experience and 
police manuals as opposed to tested scientific hypotheses.130  
Psychologists in the main ultimately rejected the Reid Model because it 
fixated on police interrogation techniques to the exclusion of other 
                                                                                                             
rights and freely decides to forgo those rights.”) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 
U.S. 181, 187 (1977)) (citations omitted). 
128 Since the Miranda decision, many Supreme Court decisions have cited to the Miranda 
court’s use of the Reid Model as influencing the Court’s reasoning in that decision.  See 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 602 (2004); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 
(1994); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 580 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 459 n.45 
(1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 328 (1985); James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 996 (1984); 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 306 (1980).  For a discussion of this trend from the 
perspective of an advocate of Miranda’s reliance on the Reid Model, see Weisselberg, supra 
note 32. 
129 One variant, which has gained considerable influence in the United Kingdom, is the 
Decision-Making Model.  It is related to social choice theory and was developed by 
Hilgendorf and Irving in the early 1980s.  Hilgendorf and Irving’s model postulates that 
although a suspect may discount the objective, legal ramifications of the confession, he is 
likely to be influenced by more subjective factors, such as those “related to self and social 
approval and disapproval.”  GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 121.  The Model was 
conceived after reviewing the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure’s report regarding 
the criminal interrogation process in the United Kingdom.  The Decision-Making Model 
contends that when a criminal suspect is interrogated, he becomes entangled in a complex 
decision-making process, causing him to weigh a number of values and possibilities for 
action.  Id. at 120-21.  Among the most important of these are “whether to speak or remain 
silent, whether to make self-incriminating admissions or not, whether to tell the truth or 
not, whether to tell the whole truth or only part of the truth, and how to answer the 
questions asked by the police interrogator.”  Id. at 120.  Despite their differences, the 
Decision-Making Model and Reid Model both emphasize the role of the police officer vis-à-
vis the suspect, and they both hold as an underlying assumption that a suspect would not 
confess absent the influence of the interrogating officer. 
130 Many within the psychological community, as well as the public outside the 
psychological context, also object on ethical bases to Reid’s use of deceit: 
Another problem relates to ethical and professional issues.  Many of 
the tactics and techniques recommended [by the Reid Model and 
Technique] encourage the police officer to employ trickery, deceit and 
dishonesty. Although such measures are commonly allowed in 
American courts, they raise very serious questions about the ethical 
nature of this form of interrogation.  Public awareness of this kind of 
police behaviour must inevitably undermine the public’s respect for 
the professionalism of police officers.  Deception and trickery will also 
cause resentment among suspects and are likely to increase the 
likelihood that the confession will be disputed at trial. 
Id. at 37. 
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external and internal factors that might lead suspects to confess.131  
Ironically, it is this same psychologically discredited emphasis on police 
practices that resonated so powerfully with the Warren Court in Miranda 
and continues to echo throughout later confessions cases.132  Since the 
Miranda decision, the Court has trended away somewhat from 
disapproving police aggressiveness to accepting some level of police 
pressure as a component of effective crime control.133  Roughly during 
this same period, the psychology of confessions has moved from earlier 
police-centric approaches to models that incorporate a much wider array 
of considerations and influences.134  These more expansive psychological 
models are reviewed next in Part III.B. 
                                                 
131 Id. at 25-27. 
132 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (emphasizing that a confession will 
not be ruled involuntary absent a finding of police coercion).  Many psychologists have 
criticized the Court’s decision in Connelly as placing too great an emphasis on police 
activity, while at the same time de-emphasizing the importance of the suspect’s own 
psychological state.  One writer opined that, after Connelly, “Concerns for reliability and 
preservation of ‘free will’ fell by the wayside as, in the interests of administrative ease and 
consistency, courts were removed from the business of looking into a defendant’s mind in 
order to determine the voluntariness of his or her confession.”  P.T. Hourihan, Earl 
Washington’s Confession:  Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 
1503 (1995). 
133 See generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:  The Warren 
and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 189-97 (1983) (contrasting the 
Warren Court’s application of Miranda with that of the Burger Court).  This trend of 
carving exceptions from the Warren Court’s decisions to facilitate criminal investigation 
was not limited to the Court’s treatment of confessions.  More broadly, the Burger Court 
also 
refused to apply the [F]ourth [A]mendment’s warrant requirement to a 
broad range of police investigatory practices, weakened the strength of 
the warrant’s particularity requirement, enhanced the power of the 
police to stop and frisk, diluted the prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, discouraged the use of civil suits to remedy 
alleged police and prosecutorial misconduct, and curtailed the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
Id. at 193 (citations omitted). 
134 Though there appears to be little evidence to indicate a corresponding relationship 
between these two trends, both the jurisprudential and psychological understandings of 
confessions have broadened over the past four decades.  Courts, however, have been 
generally hesitant to expand the law of confessions to consider the admissibility of an 
admission made in the absence of police coercion.  But see United States v. Zerbo, No. 98 
CR. 1344(SAS), 1999 WL 804129, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1999) (concluding that police 
interrogation of a 53-year-old man who was mentally disabled was “unconstitutionally 
coercive in light of his disabilities”).  Modern psychology, on the other hand, is more 
willing to view police behavior as merely one of a number of factors that contribute to a 
suspect’s decision to confess.  See infra Part III.B. 
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B. Post-Miranda Psychology and Beyond:  Interactive Models and the Courts 
The newer, more comprehensive135 psychological approaches are 
embodied in the so-called “social-psychological” or “interactive” models, 
which have predictably begun to influence judicial decision-making with 
respect to criminal confessions.136  Social-psychological models attempt 
generally to explain a person’s behavior by balancing individual 
perceptions emphasized by the “purely psychological” theories, of which 
psychoanalysis is one example, with the broad impact of a person’s 
social environment.137   
All social-psychological models stress the importance of 
understanding the interaction between an individual’s perception and 
his social environment.  They vary greatly, however, depending on 
which of these two factors—individual assessment or environment—is 
emphasized.  Rather than presuming the criticality of one factor, the 
                                                 
135 “Comprehensive” in this sense refers only to the attempt by interactive models to 
incorporate a wider variety of personal and environmental factors in order to better 
understand confessions.  The models are somewhat akin to “totality of the circumstances” 
made by courts applying the due process voluntariness standard.  See supra Part II.A.  The 
comprehensive approach has often been criticized within the psychological community, 
however, because of difficulty in controlling the vast number of psychological variables 
and differing opinions regarding the relative levels of importance to be ascribed to each.  
For example, this difficulty in controlling variables in the study of confessions is 
particularly evident with respect to the studies concerning the impact of the accused’s age 
on his decision whether to confess.  See, e.g., D. W. Neubauer, Confessions in Prairie City:  
Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 107 (1974) (hypothesizing that 
suspects who are more mature are better able to resist police interrogation).  One 
psychological study found that juveniles in Colorado were more than twice as likely to 
confess as those over 25 years of age.  L. S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado:  The 
Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENVER L.J. 1, 19 (1970).  A later study concluded a suspect’s 
age has a demonstrable but less significant impact on the rate of confessions.  C. PHILLIPS & 
D. BROWN, ENTRY INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  A SURVEY OF POLICE ARRESTS AND 
THEIR OUTCOMES (1998) (62% admission rate for juveniles, 54% for adults).  Still other 
studies determined that age is not a significant factor with respect to confessions.  Richard 
A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 291 (1996) (no 
significant difference in confession frequencies among different age groups); Neubauer, 
supra (finding no statistically significant relationship between confessions rates of those 
ages 16-20 and over 21).  Indeed, some researchers treat age itself differently, as if it 
encompasses a combination of factors rather as a discrete variable.  See GUDJONSSON, supra 
note 109, at 142 (describing “tempermental differences related to age” as a combination of 
related factors such as “neuroticism, impulsiveness and venturesomeness”). 
136 See infra note 165, listing cases in which the Court considered psychological matters 
addressed by the interactive models and showed a greater willingness to consider this 
when determining the voluntariness and admissibility of a suspect’s confession. 
137 See WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 104. 
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newer interactive138 (or integrative) models apply a deductive approach 
in which all of the variables that might lead a suspect to confess are 
studied, and from this examination the factors that prove to be the most 
influential are deduced.139   
All interactive models thus begin by acknowledging that confessions 
are the product of “a particular relationship between the suspect, the 
environment and significant others within that environment.”140  They 
each also describe confessions as a bridge between antecedent factors 
and the consequences of confessing.  Antecedent factors occur prior to 
the investigation and may strongly influence a suspect to confess.141  The 
consequences of confessing can be manifested immediately thereafter or 
much later in time.142  While interactive models may disagree about the 
pertinence and relative weight of particular antecedent factors and 
                                                 
138 The term “interactive” is not one that is uniformly employed throughout the field of 
psychology.  The approach referenced here is alternatively referred to as interactive process 
models, see GUDJONNSON, supra note 109, at 124, or integrated models, see WRIGHTSMAN ET 
AL., supra note 110, at 124.  For purposes of this Article, the term “interactive models” 
incorporates all such approaches. 
139 Cf. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 125 (explaining the study of the individual 
and societal characteristics that predominates modern psychology).  As one psychologist 
has explained: 
No single variable causes all crime, just as no one agent causes all fever 
or upset stomachs.  However, several causal factors are associated 
reliably with criminality.  Any one of these factors will sometimes be a 
sufficient explanation for criminal behavior; more often, however, they 
act in concert to produce criminality. . . .  Our model emphasizes the 
etiological principles that we believe are among the best supported 
findings in criminological research. 
Id. 
140 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 124. 
141 Id. at 125. 
142 Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/1
2006] Encouraging Reliable Confessions 37 
consequences, they all acknowledge the importance of biological,143 
environmental,144 and psychological145 considerations generally.146   
The distinctive attribute of the interactive models—i.e., that which 
sets them apart from earlier psychological theories (such as the Reid 
Model)147—is that the relevant factors pertaining to a suspect are not 
viewed in isolation or a contextual vacuum.  Rather, each factor is 
considered to be mutually dependent on all of the others, albeit to 
varying degrees.148  This interrelation of factors with regard to 
confessions is illustrated by the manner in which modern social-
psychologists view guilt, shame, and relief.149   
                                                 
143 Relevant biological factors include a suspect’s genetic composition and 
neurotransmission, his testosterone level and strength, and his physiological status during 
the interrogation.  See WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 126 fig.5-1; James W. 
Pennebaker et al., The Psychophysiology of Confession:  Linking Inhibitory and Psychosomatic 
Processes, 52 J. PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 781-93 (1987).  Physiological responses might 
include the suspect’s increased heart rate and blood pressure, perspiration, and respiratory 
difficulties.  Id.  Although these physical manifestations tend to return to fairly normal 
levels immediately following a confession, the building tension and uncertainty 
experienced by a suspect over time will often cause these elevated physiological processes 
to reoccur.  Id. 
144 Environmental factors, in contrast, involve any of the “external influences” that may 
cause a suspect to confess, ranging from isolation from family and friends to the many 
dynamics relating to the interrogation itself, including the specific techniques used by the 
police.  See GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 126. 
145 The psychological considerations contemplated by interactive models are particularly 
wide ranging.  They include a suspect’s general predispositions, such as IQ and empathetic 
or psychopathic tendencies, as well as his emotional and cognitive status at the time of the 
interrogation.  See WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 126 fig.5-1.  Other factors concern 
a suspect’s subjective sensibilities and reactions at the time of the confession or afterward, 
whereas the cognitive elements focus more on a suspect’s mental perceptions and thought 
process during this period.  Id. 
146 Another example of an interactive model, the Cognitive Behavioral Model (“CBM”), is 
discussed in detail in GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 124-28.  The CBM divides relevant 
considerations into five categories: social, emotional, cognitive, situational, and 
physiological factors.  The CBM approach is similar to that set out in WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., 
supra note 110, at 124-28, with further delineation of the psychological (involving the 
emotional and cognitive factors) and environmental (which encompasses the social and 
situational considerations) groupings. 
147 In the broadest sense, the Reid Model uses social-psychological methods to reconcile 
the individual motivations of the suspect with the external pressures exerted by police 
interrogators.  See WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 104.  Yet, as was noted earlier, the 
Reid Model concentrates on the interrogator’s role in altering a suspect’s decision-making 
process to the virtual exclusion of other influences. 
148 See WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 125-26. 
149 Numerous definitions of guilt, shame, and relief can be found within psychology, 
which sometimes focus on seemingly minor disagreements as to the cause and connotation.  
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According to the interactive models, guilt arises when a past action 
is inconsistent with a suspect’s conscience.150  Shame results from the 
public exposure of the suspect by an accusation and through 
interrogation.151  These two emotions, although inter-related, can prompt 
radically different behavior.  Guilt may lead a suspect to reparative and 
rehabilitative action.  Shame, on the other hand, often strengthens a 
suspect’s sense of denial and increases his desire to hide from the public 
spotlight.152  Guilt and shame might also be accompanied by biological 
responses, such as heightened heart rate, blood pressure, or levels of 
perspiration.153 
Interactive theory acknowledges that a confession can have 
superficial, short-term benefits for confessors.  Guilt may prompt a 
suspect to confess,154 which can lead to an immediate sense of relief 
because some of the uncertainty felt by a suspect stemming from his 
misconduct has thereby been resolved.155  A suspect may even believe 
that by confessing, he is satisfying some unspecified need to discuss his 
actions openly with someone else, including police.156  In contrast, 
interactive theory holds that the long-term emotional effects of a 
confession are detrimental to confessors, and they are generally marked 
by humiliation, disgrace, and shame.157  As time passes, confessors may 
experience these feelings because of public condemnation and their need 
to inform loved ones about their wrongdoing and try to explain it.158 
A suspect may also experience cognitive relief, similar to the 
emotional relief discussed above, as an immediate consequence of 
                                                                                                             
This general discussion undertaken here is intended only to provide broad observations as 
to those understandings that have achieved some consensus within the field. 
150 J.P. Tangney, Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt:  
Development of Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 102, 102 (1990).  The use of “conscience” here does not refer to the understanding 
of moral conscience discussed later in Part IV of this Article.  Rather, it is the motivating 
psychological element “associated with some real or imagined past transgression that is 
inconsistent with the person’s internalized values and standards.”  GUDJONSSON, supra note 
109, at 126. 
151 Id. 
152 Tangney, supra note 150, at 102-05. 
153 See Pennebaker, supra note 143, at 782-83. 
154 Tangney, supra note 150, at 103. 
155 Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Compliance Without Pressure:  The Effect of Guilt, 7 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 117, 117-24 (1967). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 126-27. 
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confessing.159  This consolation may be disturbed, however, by a 
suspect’s unresolved confusion regarding the underlying facts of the 
case and the legal impact of his confession at a criminal trial.160  Over 
time, these uncertainties and doubts will often dominate a suspect’s 
long-term perceptions.161  A suspect may even seek to retract his 
confession or explain it away in an attempt to mitigate these powerful 
feelings.162 
In summary, all of the interactive models hypothesize that certain 
discrete factors contribute to the rendering of a confession, and that these 
factors exert varying relative influence in the process.  In accordance 
with the scientific method,163 specific hypotheses regarding these factors 
and their influence are tested in order to verify or refute them, based 
largely on empirical data gathered by researchers.  The data used for 
these purposes, however, is often inconclusive as a matter of science and 
especially problematic when applied outside of a strict psychological 
context.  A particularly confounding and pervasive difficulty involves 
the practical inability to identify all of the variables at play and then 
accurately calibrate their relative weight.  Scientists typically address 
these imponderables by using statistical correlations, which can render 
the reliability and utility of data-based conclusions even more dubious.   
Despite these scientific limitations, however, these models often 
provide ostensibly convincing explanations for confessions,164 which, not 
surprisingly, have begun to influence courts.165  The increasing judicial 
                                                 
159 Id. at 127. 
160 See id. at 125 tbl.5.1. 
161 Id. at 127. 
162 Id. 
163  [T]he steps of a scientific method are:  1) observing the empirical facts; 
2) analyzing the accumulated data into general categories; 3) forming a 
tentative hypothesis that will explain the observed data; and 4) using 
the hypothesis to predict new events and observing whether these 
predictions come true.  Such a method uses three different forms of 
logical reasoning:  induction in generalizing the data; abduction in 
forming an hypothesis to explain the data; and deduction in using the 
hypothesis to predict future occurrences. 
Catherine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method:  The Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of 
Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 329, 338 (1994). 
164 As the discussion that follows will illustrate, interactive methodologies are themselves 
criticized by many within the psychological community (given the nature of psychology as 
a scientific pursuit), as well as by those who believe in the criticality of free will and its 
relationship to human dignity. 
165 The Court has continued outwardly to maintain that psychological persuasion alone 
cannot invalidate an otherwise licit admission.  See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
669 (2004).  See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).  The Supreme Court, while 
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receptivity toward interactive psychological theories and supporting 
data calls for a more detailed consideration of the scientific methods of 
psychological inquiry and the inherent limitations of these methods 
when translated to a jurisprudential context. 
C. Limitations in Translating Interactive Psychology to Confessions 
Jurisprudence 
As a matter of historical fact, social-psychological research 
pertaining to the causal factors for criminal confessions is comparatively 
scarce.166  The limited research that does exist can be categorized into 
three groups based on the methodology employed:  (1) studies that focus 
on the factors associated with confessions (or refusal to confess); (2) 
studies that analyze the confessions through professional observation 
and video and audio recordings of interrogations; and (3) studies that are 
based on interviews with and self-reporting by suspects who have 
confessed.167  Clearly, an extensive discussion of this research would be 
                                                                                                             
generally disapproving of the use of psychological manipulation, emphasized that it “has 
never held that the psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies 
as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver.”  
Id. at 312.  Dicta in numerous recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, indicate an 
increasing reliance on the psychological considerations contemplated by the interactive 
models, as well as a greater willingness to consider these factors when determining the 
voluntariness and admissibility of a suspect’s confession.  See, e.g., Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 
667-68 (“[T]he voluntariness of a statement is often said to depend on whether ‘the 
defendant’s will was overborne,’ a question that logically can depend on ‘the characteristics 
of the accused.’  The characteristics of the accused can include the suspect’s age, education, 
and intelligence, as well as a suspect’s prior experience with law enforcement.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (holding that a defendant 
has the burden to establish his own incompetence, but considering the psychological 
testimony of numerous experts regarding defendant’s alleged schizophrenia); Mitchell v. 
Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1027 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing defendant’s counsel 
for making “no inquiries into his client’s academic, medical, or psychological history”); 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (holding the exclusion of professional hypnotically-
induced psychological testimony to violate a defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf).  
This expanded scope of judicial review relating to empirical psychology—and interactive 
psychological models in particular—has grown to encompass such considerations as a 
suspect’s age, (see, e.g., Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 660); intelligence (see, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 
483 U.S. 776, 792 (1987) (considering a suspect’s Intellectual Quotient as a factor in his 
decision-making ability)); and “current mental state” (see, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 159 (1986) (considering the psychology of the accused but declining to find a Due 
Process violation in the absence of police coercion)).  Courts have become increasingly 
willing to consider such factors, even in the absence of any demonstrable psychological 
abuse by police. 
166 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 151.  This portion of the Article by no means purports 
to consider all of the findings derived from this research, which would be far beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
167 See id. at 130-57 (describing each of these techniques in greater detail). 
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ancillary to the aims of this Article and inevitably unfair to the science 
and its proponents.  For these reasons, only the first and third categories 
are discussed here,168 and then only briefly, focusing principally upon 
the particular methodology used and the problems associated with its 
application both within and beyond the confines of science.  
The first category—the factor-based analysis—focuses on 
characteristics of the suspect (for instance, the suspect’s age, gender, or 
previous criminal activity), characteristics of the offense (the nature of 
the criminal charges), and characteristics of the interrogation itself (such 
as the duration or location of the interrogation, and whether the suspect 
was read his Miranda warnings).169  The imponderable number and 
variety of factors that might be associated with a confession, as well as 
the body of research necessary to demonstrate the predictability of 
                                                 
168 For practical reasons, the second research method for studying the psychology of 
confessions described above—observation of the interrogation itself through either direct 
presence or by later observing the confession through video or other media—is not 
discussed at length in this Article.  Though recording confessions allows psychologists 
systematically to evaluate the police interrogation as well as the characteristics of the 
suspect at the time of the interrogation, some critics have nonetheless questioned the utility 
of such methods.  See generally J. Baldwin, Police Interviewing Techniques:  Establishing Truth 
or Proof?, 33 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1993).  In particular, they contend that 
videotaping may place too great a reliance on non-verbal signs rather than the content of 
the interview.  See G.D. Lassister & A.A. Irving, Videotaped Confessions:  The Impact of Camera 
Point on View of Judgments of Coercion, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 268-76 (1986) 
(demonstrating the dangers associated with showing videotaped confessions in jury trials).  
These same problems can arise with respect to the psychological study of juries, where 
subtle variations, such as in the placement of the camera or the angle of recording, can be a 
source of manipulation or coercion.  Id.  Recording confessions have proven effective in the 
United Kingdom, where, since 1991, the law has required that suspects of indictable 
offenses have their interviews tape-recorded.  See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REPORT 26 (1993).  The same cannot be said of the American experience, where generally a 
suspect’s first interrogation (and also any subsequent interrogations) is not recorded, and it 
is often impractical to have professional researchers routinely present during questioning.  
Even as the use of videotaping has become more commonplace with regard to police 
questioning in serious cases, American police departments remain reluctant to require the 
taping of interrogations for a variety of reasons.  See William A. Geller, Police Videotaping of 
Suspect Interrogations and Confessions:  Preliminary Examination of Issues and Practices, REPORT 
TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 54 tbl.1 (Police Executive Research Forum 1992).  
Professor Inbau has written that 
while the videotaping of selected confessions may certainly be 
beneficial to the prosecution, the practice opens the door for wider 
sweeping court rulings or standards that could eventually require the 
videotaping of the entire interrogation along with its subsequent 
confession for each and every suspect interrogated.  In the final 
analysis, would this be good for the criminal justice system? 
INBAU ET AL., supra note 121, at 395-96. 
169 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 141, 146, 148. 
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certain individual factors, precludes an extensive examination of any 
particular trends or theories in this Article.170  For present purposes, it is 
important to simply note that factor-based studies are generally 
conducted via the observation and compilation of external data.171  
Accordingly, a researcher might consult the records of all people who 
either confessed or refused to confess within some arbitrarily defined 
group, and then compare this information to the reported data 
concerning the individuals’ ages, genders, past criminal records, or other 
selected variables. 
The inherent difficulties of this approach, even just within a scientific 
context, are readily apparent.  Because factor-based analysis is limited to 
a suspect’s objective traits that can be objectively measured, its scope is 
necessarily circumscribed to the external factors that may influence 
confessions without regard to a suspect’s actual emotional or cognitive 
state of mind at the time of the interrogation.172  Such superficial 
observations can provide little insight regarding the impact of internal 
factors, or about how these intangibles may have interacted with 
external variables, in causing a suspect to confess. The problems 
associated with this methodology are exacerbated when it is used 
beyond the strict bounds of psychology inquiry, such as in the realm of 
jurisprudence, where the internal motivations of a suspect can be just as 
important as his external actions.173  
                                                 
170 For those interested in reviewing the empirical data produced from these studies, the 
leading work on confessions psychology within the United States is Saul M. Kassin, The 
Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997).  See also Lawrence E. 
Hinkle, Jr., The Physiological State of the Interrogation Subject as It Affects Brain Function, in 
THE MANIPULATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19 (1961); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, 
“I’m Innocent!” Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation 
Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499 (1999); Leo, Miranda’s Revenge, supra note 83; Richard A. 
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 293 (2001). 
171 See generally GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 140-41 (explaining the methodology used 
in factor-based analysis). 
172 See id. at 140 (describing factor-based analysis as being limited to study of the 
objective “background characteristics of the suspect,” “characteristics of the offence,” or 
“contextual characteristics” of the interrogation such as access to a lawyer and the strength 
of evidence against the suspect). 
173 Our criminal justice system places great emphasis on the internal motivations of 
suspects.  Almost all offenses require that mens rea (a guilty state of mind) be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a criminal conviction.  See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1, at 229 (1985) (stating that “unless some element of mental culpability is 
proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction 
may be obtained”).  The only exception to this broad rule is the “narrow class of strict 
liability offenses,” which is concerned only with the actus reus (the wrongful act or 
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The basic differences between the scientific method and 
jurisprudential development reveal other intractable problems inherent 
in using the former to accomplish the latter.  Science advances through 
the relentless cycle of hypothesizing, testing, and validating or refuting, 
which in turn leads to a revised hypothesis and another cycle.174 This 
process, which is integral to the very fabric of scientific exploration, is 
fundamentally inapposite to the development of sound jurisprudence, 
which depends on predictability, certainty, and repose,175 and properly 
rests on immutable truths and invariable norms.176  Whereas one scientist 
might reasonably hypothesize that age, for example, is the determinant 
factor in a suspect’s decision to confess,177 another may later reject this 
premise and test to ascertain whether external characteristics 
predominate, such as the length of the interrogation178 or the size and 
color of the interrogation room.179  Basic conceptions of truth and justice, 
on the other hand, are not transient and volatile conclusions that are 
susceptible to scientific calibration and validation.  Indeed, they need not 
be empirically verified and cannot be empirically refuted in a scientific 
sense.  Any attempt to scientifically determine or quantify what is 
                                                                                                             
omission) itself.  Id.  The suspect’s state of mind is important not only in defining the crime 
itself but also in establishing affirmative defenses such as duress or insanity, which “can 
arise from a number of sources, both internal and external to the actor . . . .”  Eugene R. 
Milhizer, Justification and Excuse:  What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To 
Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 817 (2004) [hereinafter Milhizer, Justification and Excuse] 
(excuse defenses “focus on the actor and not on the act,” and in particular on the actor’s 
state of mind).  The mental components of excuse defenses include “involuntary actions, 
actions related to cognitive deficiencies, and actions relating to volitional deficiencies.”  Id. 
at 816.  Further, a defendant’s criminal state of mind may aggravate or mitigate his 
criminality and punishment, even when it does not change the crime of which he is guilty.  
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 5(K)2.1 (2000) (in determining whether an upward departure 
from a sentence is warranted, “[t]he sentencing judge must give consideration to matters 
that would normally distinguish among levels of homicide, such as the defendant’s state of 
mind and the degree of planning or preparation”) (emphasis added).  See also United States 
v. Singleton, 49 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that an upward departure from usual 
sentence was appropriate for defendant’s murder conviction, given the defendant’s 
culpable state of mind when he committed the offense). 
174 See supra note 163. 
175 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective:  From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 650 (1999). 
176 See infra Part IV.B. 
177 See, e.g., Leiken, supra note 135 (finding that suspects under the age of 25 were more 
than twice as likely to confess as suspects over 25). 
178 See S. Moston et al., The Incidence, Antecedents and Consequences of the Use of the Right to 
Silence During Police Questioning, 32 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 23, 24 (1992) (finding a 
number of contextual factors to be more determinative of a suspect’s decision to confess 
than age, including the time spent in custody and the number of police interviews). 
179 See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 121, at 57-64 (describing the physical features of 
the interrogation room that will best facilitate confessions). 
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normatively true runs the risk of misusing data and misapplying theory, 
and could corrupt any jurisprudence derived from it.180 
The problems inherent in predicating jurisprudence on science are 
magnified with respect to the third category of studies described 
above—those based on self-reporting methods.  These studies attempt to 
explain the influences that lead to confessions based on the subjective 
views of suspects rather than through the observation of external 
manifestations.  The data can be collected through face-to-face interviews 
with confessors or, as is more frequently the case, through surveys 
distributed to these individuals.181   
                                                 
180 The oral argument before the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
provides a stark example of a judge seemingly requiring physical proof of a metaphysical 
principle when fashioning jurisprudence. 
Counsel:  We say there is life from the moment of impregnation. 
Justice Marshall:  And do you have any scientific data to support that? 
. . . I want you to give me a medical, recognizable medical writing of 
any kind that says that at the time of conception that the fetus is a 
person. 
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 348, 352 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (cited in 
McLean, supra note 98, at 280).  The problem is not so much with seeking scientific support 
for some truth, but rather it is with requiring scientific validation in order for something to 
be considered truthful and thus a legitimate foundation for jurisprudence. 
181 Proponents of interactive models distribute surveys that typically focus on three 
general factors that are thought to facilitate confessions: 
1. External pressure to confess, which is associated with persuasive 
police interrogation techniques, police behaviour and fear of 
confinement. 
2. Internal pressure to confess, where suspects experience a great deal 
of guilt about the crime they committed and consequently need to 
relieve themselves of the guilt of confessing. 
3. Perception of proof, where suspects believe that there is no point in 
denying the offence because the police will eventually prove they 
did it. 
GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 152 (emphasis and enumeration in original).  Though the 
elements of the models previously described do not coincide directly with this list, some of 
the elemental considerations lend themselves to particular facilitating factors.  For example, 
the environmental elements of the model–those dealing with factors as “external 
influences”–are primarily a source of external pressure, though they may eventually 
manifest themselves in other ways as well (for example, leading to an increase of internal 
guilt or shaping the suspect’s perception of the evidence he faces).  Psychological elements 
encompass the other two categories:  emotional elements can be seen to generally shape the 
suspect’s internal motivations to confess, and cognitive elements fall largely into the 
perceptive considerations.  Id. at 153.  Some studies have demonstrated that a fourth 
inhibitory factor, namely fear of the possible consequences associated with the charged 
activity, can also play an important role in a suspect’s decision whether to confess; 
however, these influences have most often been rolled into the consideration of external 
pressures.  Id. 
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While this approach allows for a more individualized inquiry into 
reasons why a particular suspect confessed, it raises a variety of 
additional problems related to its accuracy and usefulness.  Bluntly put, 
the objective reliability of self-reporting studies, unlike factor-based 
inquiries, is contingent upon the quality of the information provided to 
researchers by the putative confessors themselves.182  From a 
psychological perspective alone, the reliability of such data is highly 
doubtful.  First, the self-reporting methodology necessarily presupposes 
that a confessor actually can be self-aware about what truly motivated 
him to confess.  This premise is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
underlying psychological theory, at least insofar as it seeks to prove that 
a person can be subconsciously influenced to confess by factors of which 
he is not consciously aware.183  Second, a particular confessor may, for a 
variety of reasons, be incapable of accurately remembering what really 
happened in the interrogation room, and, more importantly from the 
perspective of the study, why he confessed.184  The self-reporting 
methodology assumes that these persons will not confabulate or, if they 
do, that this can be correctly identified.  Third, even if a confessor is able 
                                                 
182 See Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in Crime 
Research, 25 CRIME & JUST. 291, 321-48 (1999) (describing the problems with ascertaining the 
validity and reliability of self-report studies).  Professors Junger-Tas and Marshall explain 
that 
People must be willing to admit to the act and they must be able to 
answer truthfully (i.e., they must remember, and they must remember 
correctly).  People may be more willing to admit to nonserious acts, 
even those committed with high frequency . . . but there may be 
questionable validity with regard to details and accurate timing of 
events, most probably because such events are easily forgotten.  
However, serious- and low-frequency offenses have more salience and 
thus may lead to more accurate reporting; yet, because of their more 
serious nature, respondents may be more inclined to deny their 
involvement in such offenses. 
Id. at 322-23. 
183 See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 110, at 100-01 (emphasizing that psychologists study 
criminal behavior in order to discover its causes, of which the actual actors are unaware). 
184 Professors Junger-Tas and Marshall have emphasized these problems with reliability 
and memory recall in self-reporting studies: 
A major problem in most self-report studies is that they are 
retrospective.  Our memory is essentially unreliable.  Even assuming a 
willingness to answer questions, the issue of ability accurately to 
answer questions about the past remains.  Our memory is not a passive 
registration machine; remembering events is more a reconstructive 
than a reproductive process.  Some events are completely forgotten, 
missing parts are filled in, “new” facts—that may be invented—are 
added.  In addition, there are problems of memory storage, forgetting, 
deleting, and recalling. 
Junger-Tas & Marshall, supra note 182, at 338-39 (citations omitted). 
Milhizer: Rethinking Police Interrogation:  Encouraging Reliable Confession
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
46 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
to recall circumstances and motivations leading to a confession, he may 
have a motive to lie or mislead researchers.185  Again, the methodology 
presupposes that intentionally false responses can be identified and 
discounted.  
Another empirical problem with the studies generally involves how 
to identify and measure the relative influence of all the potentially 
relevant factors.  A confessor, for example, may be asked to evaluate 
whether a certain factor—such as police behavior during an 
interrogation—played an “important role” in causing him to confess.  
Inherent in his response are several intermediate subjective assessments, 
such as what does it mean to be an important factor, which necessarily 
involves some determination generally of what it means to say that 
something is important.186  Other definitional and assessment issues 
abound, e.g., what constitutes “police behavior,” what were the 
parameters of the “interrogation,” and what comprises the “confession.”  
While this inability to account for all variables might be surmountable 
for researchers within the strict parameters of the science of 
psychology—especially when their object is to isolate a single variable—
the ramifications can be mind-boggling for those who attempt to 
interpret and apply the data to the universe of potentially relevant 
variables outside of its theoretical context.187  
Psychologists have sought to address and minimize the empirical 
vagaries and vicissitudes arising in all categories of research by drawing 
statistical correlations between different interactive factors to discern 
trends, rather than basing conclusions on demonstrable, case-specific 
causal relationships.188  Researchers using this approach immediately 
                                                 
185 See id. at 328 (describing evaluations of self-report studies that call into question 
respondents’ truthfulness). 
186 Id. at 352 (“Important issues in the construction of the questionnaire are the selection 
of items, item overlap, question wording, clarity of questions, and the use of open-end 
questions or response categories.  Of the many sources of response error . . . , the[se] task 
variables are most amenable to researcher manipulation and control.”). 
187 See Blumenthal, supra note 102, at 23-34 (discussing the numerous difficulties legal 
scholars and psychologists face when attempting to translate psychological studies into 
judicial decisions and legal research). 
188 See generally Thomas K. Park, Understanding Children:  Reflections on Criminality and 
Demographic Structure:  A Multi-National Examination of the Links Between Youth and National 
Crime Statistics, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 597 (2003) (examining the effects of society’s growing 
dependence on psychology and sociology’s development of statistical trends to predict 
individual behavior, particularly in juveniles).  See also Jesse G. Kalin, Determinism, 
http://mb-soft.com/believe/text/determin.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (“[B.F. 
Skinner’s] stimulus - response account also uses modern statistical and probabilistic 
analyses of causation.”). 
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confront the truism that “Correlation is not causation, and causality 
cannot be convincingly inferred from correlation unless the process that 
binds the relationship is understood.”189  Although statistical correlation 
can be scientifically useful despite its many limitations, its aptness as a 
jurisprudential resource can be especially problematic.190  Even where 
statistical evidence seems empirically apt, its use may be morally 
objectionable.191  Finally, even when judicial usage of statistical 
correlation seems apt and moral, it is particularly susceptible to being 
misapplied by judges and policy-makers who are not specially trained in 
the uses and limitations of statistics and correlative data.192   
In summary, the methodologies that typify contemporary science 
demonstrate the limitations and danger of converting psychological 
theory into jurisprudential tenets.  Such an approach, besides being a 
departure from our venerable Western legal tradition, is incompatible 
with the belief that the law pertaining to confessions necessarily 
implicates moral judgments about the common good and individual 
dignity.  In properly oriented confession jurisprudence, values should 
not be replaced by data and normative discernment by statistical 
correlation.  Human confession, as with all aspects of human life, should 
                                                 
189 Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 405, 437 (2005). 
190 See generally Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense:  A Reply to the Critics of 
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 496 (1984) (discussing why the law of 
probable cause should insist on case-specific facts and discount statistical evidence); see also 
Mark A. Small, Legal Psychology and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 675, 690-92 
(1993) (finding most psychological studies are “descriptive” in nature and thus do not 
translate to a prescriptive legal system). 
191 See STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 313 (1997) (Pinker argues that racial 
profiling is a repugnant practice “not because it is irrational (in the sense of statistically 
inaccurate) but because it flouts the moral principle that it is wrong to judge an individual 
using the statistics of a racial or ethnic group.  The argument against bigotry . . . . [is] a rule 
of ethics, that tells us when to turn our statistical categorizers off.”). 
192 See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:  Increasing Verdict 
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
246, 266 (1990) (arguing in favor of “intuitive” decision making strategies as opposed to 
statistical probability logic as a basis for decision making by statistically untrained people).  
As described earlier in Part III, the study of psychology, like other sciences, involves the 
identification and verification of trends relating to psychological behavior through the 
repeated testing of hypotheses.  When data and hypotheses generated by this process are 
removed from its scientific context and imported into jurisprudence, a danger exists that 
untrained courts will “discover” and overstate a causal relationship when the evidence 
establishes only a correlation.  Broadly speaking, “[a]rguments about causes are often 
caustic.  In particular, arguments that devolve into dichotomous choices are rarely fruitful 
because behavior has multiple causes.  When the analysis also fails to recognize basic 
principles relevant to studying and understanding behavior, the problem is even deeper 
and more insidious.”  Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 189, at 454. 
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dignify and not objectify the human person, and should ensure that the 
incommensurable worth of each individual is expressed with reference 
to common good.  Modern psychology, by its very nature, ought to 
confine itself to its proper parameters, which are not nearly as expansive 
as the Court’s post-Miranda jurisprudence would allow.193  In order to 
place the science of psychology in the proper context, one must come to 
understand the assumptions underlying the modern psychological 
theories concerning confessions as compared with the philosophical 
relevance of confession to the human person.  These are discussed in the 
next Part of this Article. 
IV.  THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF CONFESSION TO THE COMMON 
GOOD AND THE HUMAN PERSON 
Part III examined the relationship between criminal confessions and 
psychological empiricism.  This Part seeks to compare the fundamental 
assumptions underlying the psychological treatment of confessions to 
traditional philosophical understandings of confession, rooted in notions 
of truth, justice, human dignity, and the common good.  Psychology and 
                                                 
193 My criticism of the Court’s use of psychological empiricism in fashioning confession 
jurisprudence should not be construed as a categorical objection to the judicial use of 
scientific or statistical data generally.  For example, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 
(1977), the Court concluded that the a uniform practice of ordering motorists out of their 
vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in large part because it was justified by 
statistical evidence showing “‘that a significant percentage of murders of police officers 
occur[ ] when the officers are making traffic stops.’”  Id. at 110 (citing United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).  The Court’s holding was influenced by one study 
finding that approximately thirty percent of police shootings took place when a police 
officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.  Id.  Assuming such evidence is 
relevant and appropriate for the Court’s consideration consistent with the observations 
made earlier in note 102, there is no reason to suppose that the Court would be practically 
incapable of using the cited research to help it address the issue.  See also United States v. 
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (citing the number of gas tanks that were 
disassembled and reassembled at the border without causing damage or an accident, the 
Court held that such a procedure does not significantly intrude upon a vehicle owner’s 
property interest); Michigan Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (in ruling on the 
constitutionality of suspicionless sobriety roadblocks, the Court considered evidence about 
the percentage of drivers passing through the checkpoint who were arrested for alcohol 
impairment); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2001) (probable cause 
established where record revealed the drug sniffing dog had been correct sixty-two percent 
of the time).  For the many reasons discussed in this part, psychological empiricism is 
qualitatively different from the type of statistical evidence involved in cases like Mimms, 
Flores-Montano, Sitz, and Limares, and these differences render psychological empiricism 
much less accessible and apt for use by courts. 
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philosophy, it should initially be noted, have long been intertwined.194  
The twin disciplines often share the same subject of investigation:  the 
human intellect.195  Throughout history, philosophers have gladly taken 
up the garments of psychologists196—Augustine,197 Aquinas,198 
Descartes,199 and Kant200 are some of the more familiar—though many of 
                                                 
194 The well-known and influential philosopher Aristotle is sometimes referred to as the 
“Father of Psychology.” “Aristotle [384-322 BC] is often regarded as the father of 
psychology, and his book, De Anima (On the Soul), the first book on psychology.”  Human 
Intelligence, Aristotle, http://www.indiana.edu/~intell/aristotle.shtml (last visited Aug. 
25, 2006).  There are other claimants for the title, most notably Sigmund Freud.  TRUELOVE, 
supra note 108, at 216. 
195 Psychology’s approach to studying the human intellect is as “[a] branch of science 
dealing with behavior, acts, or mental processes, as well as the mind, self, or person who 
behaves or acts or who has the mental processes.”  THE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 65 
(Raymond J. Corsini ed., Brunner/Mazel 1999).  Philosophy most directly examines the 
human intellect in the branch of study known as epistemology (the study of human 
knowing).  See generally VINCENT G. POTTER, READINGS IN EPISTEMOLOGY:  FROM AQUINAS, 
BACON, GALILEO, DESCARTES, LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME, KANT (1993) (containing a variety of 
short selections from some of the founders and proponents of different epistemological 
schools); LOUIS MARIE REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY (Imelda Choquette Byrne trans., 1959) 
[hereinafter REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY] (primarily intended as an introduction to Thomistic 
Epistemology, but also traces the development of modern epistemology, particularly Kant 
and Descartes). 
196 This is a natural consequence of the classical approach to philosophy, which contrasts 
sharply with the modern preference to reduce the search for knowledge into disconnected 
studies.  The classical philosopher made much less distinction between subjects of study 
inasmuch as they were all connected to the “love of wisdom,” from which he derived the 
title of his profession. 
197 Augustine [354-430] famously provides insight to his notion of psychology (use of this 
term subject to the limits in the text above) in his Confessions, which traces his journey to 
Catholicism.  A practical translation is AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS (John E. Rotelle ed., Maria 
Boulding trans., 1997). 
198 Thomas Aquinas’ [1225?-1274] principle work is his massive volume, The Summa 
Theologiae, which gives a comprehensive treatment of his theory of the human intellect.  A 
sufficient Latin text with English translation is AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6.  
Aquinas’ broad range of subjects covers both intellect and human ability to know.  See 
generally REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 195; LOUIS MARIE REGIS, ST. THOMAS AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY (1946). 
199 Descartes is sometimes referred to as the father of modern philosophy—and 
rationalism.  JACQUE MARITAIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 137 (E.I. Watkin trans., 
1962) [hereinafter MARITAIN, INTRODUCTION].  Descartes’ Discourse on Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy took him far afield from the investigative methods of 
classical and medieval philosophy.  He began his attempt to refute skeptics by doubting all 
things, in the end affirming only his own existence.  He then sought to work back to a 
position of knowledge by virtue of that one undeniable–to his mind–truth.  REGIS, 
EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 195, at 40-47 (emphasis omitted) (discussing the “Psychological 
Structure of the Cartesian Problem”).  This was his famous “Cogito ergo sum”—I think, 
therefore, I am.  Id. at 41. 
200 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) wrote on the nature of human knowledge.  His 
identification of the noumena (things in themselves) and phenomena (appearances) is a 
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them would hardly recognize psychology and philosophy as distinct 
fields of study.201  Psychologists have similarly shown little compunction 
about donning the robes of philosophers when it suited their 
purposes.202 Although this interrelationship of philosophy and 
psychology has sometimes been contentious, the two disciplines are by 
no means naturally hostile to each other as evidenced by their many 
shared adherents.203  
Nevertheless, some variants of either discipline inevitably clash 
given their contrasting conclusions about certain issues.204  Beyond this, 
as either discipline strays into the realm more properly governed by the 
other,205 the possibility of conflict only increases.  It should thus come as 
no surprise that the area of confessions has become a point of diversion.  
The purpose here is to identify and understand the abstract values that 
ought to guide a principled approach to confessions from a distinctly 
philosophic vantage and to use these values to critique the assumptions 
                                                                                                             
fundamental distinction of his work.  “According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish 
between the distinct realms of phenomena and noumena.”  REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY, supra 
note 195, at 47-59 (emphasis in original).  Kant is also considered to be one of the 
archetypical deontologists.  IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 1962).  Several of his more 
popular works include Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of 
Judgment. 
201 Jacque Maritain ascribes the word “philosophy” (“love of wisdom” in Greek) to 
Pythagoras.  MARITAIN, INTRODUCTION, supra note 199, at xiii (citing Cicero).  According to 
Maritain, philosophy in this sense is nothing more than “wisdom itself so far as it is 
accessible to human nature. . . .  It is the wisdom of man as man, which he acquires by the 
labor of his intellect, and it is for that very reason that his wisdom . . . .“  Id. 
202 This refers to some of the modern variants of the discipline such as Evolutionary 
Psychology, which at times tends toward denying free will, ROBERT F. SCHOPP, 
AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1991), or 
reducing human knowledge and belief to a sum of inchoate experiences.  Center for 
Evolutionary Psychology, http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep (last visited Aug. 25, 
2006). 
203 Consider, as proof of this, the number of societies that combine interest in the two 
disciplines:  The Society of Philosophy and Psychology; Association for the Advancement 
of Philosophy and Psychiatry; American Psychological Association, Division 24 
(Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology); and British Psychological Society, History and 
Philosophy of Psychology Section. 
204 Compare ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1106b36, in THE BASIC WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 959 (Richard McKeon trans., 1941) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS] (expressing the traditional view of classical philosophy which focuses, inter alia, on 
the development of the individual via virtue and choice; “[v]irtue, then, is a state of 
character concerned with choice”), with B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 343 
(1972) (a proponent of behavioral determinism, which reduces all internal psychological 
states to publicly observable behavior prompted by a stimulus-response reaction). 
205 This premise assumes without argument the modern breakdown of disciplines into 
discrete studies, each having its own independent focus.  See supra note 195. 
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underlying modern psychology’s treatment of confessions.  In order to 
understand this divergence, it is first necessary to discuss the 
fundamental assumptions regarding confessions inherent in modern-day 
psychology. 
A.  Interactive Psychology and Human Will:  Some Fundamental Assumptions 
As discussed in Part III, social-psychological models generally, and 
interactive models in particular, hypothesize about the motivations for 
human behavior.  The particular theories can vary greatly, with one 
sometimes bearing little resemblance to the next.  For purposes of this 
Article, distinguishing between distinct hypotheses and models is of far 
less importance than understanding the fundamental assumptions that 
typify them all.  Accordingly, Part IV.A focuses on a four-part logical 
progression that dominates contemporary psychological inquiry and a 
realist philosophical critique of this understanding of the human will.  
The progression proceeds as follows: 
(1) Human thought and action can be understood and explained 
through scientific inquiry and testing alone. 
(2) Science and its methodology are amoral (and properly so) in 
nature and make no moral judgments concerning man’s 
behavior. 
(3) People are not motivated by “moral” values in the traditional 
sense but rather act to maximize their tangible self-interest. 
(4) Because criminal confessions are against a person’s tangible self-
interest, they can only be obtained through coercive techniques. 
It is only by appreciating these ubiquitous assumptions (1-3, above), 
and the conclusion that they support (4, above), that one can begin to 
understand the full philosophical import of tethering confession 
jurisprudence to empirical psychology.    
Sigmund Freud once stated, “an illusion it would be to suppose that 
what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.”206  This strident 
belief that scientific inquiry could provide sufficient empirical answers to 
previously metaphysical questions undergirds the first premise 
                                                 
206 SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 56 (James Strachey trans. & ed., Norton 
& Co. 1961). 
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underlying modern psychological inquiry:  human thought and action can 
be understood and explained through scientific inquiry and testing alone.   
This assumption about the sufficiency of empirical research 
discounts the hermeneutical component in the sciences of man.207  More 
than this, it engenders and reinforces a reductionist view of the human 
psyche, and derivatively of the human person.208  In applying this 
approach to the realm of psychology, “medical thinking magnified its 
measuring sticks and severely narrowed their objects so that life 
processes were studied on an ever decreasing scale, increasingly 
removed from their condition within the harmony of an organic 
whole.”209  One thinker explained: 
Science, in order to study man, takes him in himself, as 
an individual and not as a person, isolating him from his 
environment; it is able to analyse his physical and 
psychical relationships with his environment, but it 
cannot have any knowledge of his spiritual relationship, 
his personal communion with his fellows.210 
Focused and deductive methodology can be quite efficacious in a 
pristine laboratory where discrete variables might be isolated and 
controlled.  In contrast, the study of the human psyche—and the 
psychology of confessions in particular—cannot be situated in such an 
environment,211 at least not without sterilizing all the ostensibly 
extraneous normative influences that are not susceptible to scientific 
quantification.  As a consequence, psychology has neither the capacity 
nor the inclination to place the biological and experiential factors 
pertaining to confessions in the broader normative context.212  
                                                 
207 See CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15-57 (1995). 
208 If nothing else, the use of numerical terms and statistical analysis can lead to “the 
dehumanization of the legal process.”  Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number 
Three:  Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1147 (1987). 
209 JOSEPH MAUCERI, THE GREAT BREAK:  A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF 
MEDICAL SCIENCE FROM RELIGION 104 (1986) [hereinafter MAUCERI, THE GREAT BREAK]. 
210 PAUL TOURNIER, THE MEANING OF PERSONS 129 (1957). 
211 WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 8 (distinguishing psychology from other 
biological study). 
212 A corollary of this amoral reductionism is that psychological study of confessions is 
performed without regard to the greater implications of confession in society.  For example, 
very few (if any) psychological studies have been performed to investigate the effect of 
criminal confessions on crime victims.  Id. at 207.  Furthermore, because psychology focuses 
on individual subjects, psychological research about confessions does not address at all the 
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The difficulty inherent in isolating variables, coupled with the 
imperative that scientific hypotheses be “provable” or “disprovable,” has 
produced a staggering body of research and data whose purpose is to 
investigate some discrete psychological detail of the human mind by 
validating or contradicting earlier psychological assumptions and 
studies.213  Even assuming that this process can lead to a better scientific 
understanding of the human psyche, it does not follow that courts or 
lawmakers would be well served by relying upon any particular 
psychological theory or theories in formulating confession doctrine or 
procedures.   
The preceding point is proved by history.  Recall that the Reid 
Model, which greatly influenced the Miranda decision,214 has since 
become widely disfavored within the psychological community.215  
Miranda nonetheless remains a viable legal precedent, with its reasoning 
and references to the Reid Model favorably quoted and systemically 
applied.216 There is every reason to believe that today’s pet psychological 
theories will suffer the same ignoble fate as the Reid Model.  Given 
psychology’s fluid and indeterminate character, it is a weak foundation 
indeed for a legal system that relies on precedent and should rest on 
immutable principles.217 
In performing their scientific examination of the human psyche, 
most proponents of social-psychological theory would readily 
acknowledge that they are unconcerned with what is good for the suspect 
in terms of abstract and external absolutes; some even reject the idea that 
such absolutes exist at all.  Rather, researchers define what is good for the 
suspect in the narrow terms of what the suspect perceives to be in his 
own best interests, as a matter of demonstrable and quantifiable fact.  
Any other considerations are dismissed as a matter of subjective 
theology and personal morality, and accordingly are judged to be 
scientifically irrelevant.218  Thus, the second operating premise:  science 
                                                                                                             
implications that a particular understanding of confessions might have on society at large 
or the criminal justice system. 
213 See supra note 135. 
214 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. 
216 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of 
our national culture.”). 
217 See generally infra Part IV.B. 
218 “By any psychological theory the will as an agency by which man chooses good and 
avoids evil remains almost exclusively a religious concept today.”  JOSEPH MAUCERI, 
THERAPY OR THEOLOGY? 29 (1995). 
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and its methodology are amoral (and properly so) in nature and make no moral 
judgments concerning man’s behavior.   
Prominent scientists have described the contemporary expatriation 
of morality from science as follows: 
Whether at conferences or in conversation, each of us [in 
a scientific field] has regularly encountered concerns 
that what is “natural” or “biological” will come to be 
thought “good[ ]” . . . .  The tendency to link facts with 
meanings is not new; people have sought normative 
implications in natural phenomena for centuries. 
Nonetheless, our preferences in the normative world of 
meaning cannot create scientific facts, and the bare 
existence of facts cannot alone support any normative 
conclusions whatsoever.  To put this more bluntly, 
description is not prescription, and explanation is not 
justification.219 
The reductionist and amoral lens of contemporary psychology 
renders a distorted view of free will and self-determination, and thus 
again derivatively of the human person.  Contemporary psychology 
essentially treats “[a]ny emotional transaction [as] a psychological deal 
. . . not a matter of freedom or moral choice.  The transaction is rooted in 
conflict and repression and the uncertainty of our motives; no moral 
choice here, only utilitarian preferences . . . .”220  With respect to the 
notion of free will, the contrast between modern psychology and the 
classical philosophic thinking that proceeded could not be more starkly 
drawn.  For example, the classical philosopher Aristotle, in addressing 
the development of the individual through the exercise of free will, 
writes “[v]irtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice.”221  
Quite to the contrary, modern psychology, as epitomized by the 
determinism of B.F. Skinner,222 “reduces all internal psychological states 
                                                 
219 Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 189, at 484-85. 
220 MAUCERI, THE GREAT BREAK, supra note 209, at 105. 
221 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1106b36, supra note 204, at 959.  The philosophical 
relevance of confession to the human person in general, and the importance of self-
determination (free will) in particular, is discussed in greater detail in infra Part IV.B. 
222 See generally SKINNER, supra note 204.  The determinism of Skinner is perhaps the most 
extreme example of science’s rejection of a traditional understanding of free will.  Although 
some schools of modern psychology differ from Skinner as a matter of degree, few are 
different as a matter of kind.  For a general description of Determinism and the 
assumptions upon which it rests, see Robert Young, The Implications of Determinism, in A 
COMPANION TO ETHICS 536 (Peter Singer ed., 1991).  Skinner was by no means the first to 
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to publicly observable behavior” resulting from a “stimulus - response 
account.”223   
Human volition, in other words, loses its moral component and is 
viewed simply as a conditioned response to stimulation, or at most as a 
matter of gratification moved by tangible self-interest.  This latter 
understanding of human behavior finds explicit expression in the social-
psychological study of confessions,224 and this supports the third 
assumption that is integral to social-psychological studies involving 
confession:  people are not motivated by “moral” values in the traditional sense 
but rather act to maximize their tangible self-interest.  As a noted 
psychologist once commented, “[i]t is easy to understand that suspects 
would generally be resistant to confessing, considering the adverse 
consequences of doing so.”225   
The irrelevance of moral absolutes and value judgments to social-
psychological theory is plainly illustrated by the latter’s conception of 
guilt.226  While social-psychological theory acknowledges a relationship 
between guilt and conscience, its understanding of conscience as such 
discounts any transcendent determination of right and wrong.  
Conscience is instead viewed as something that is “learned,” in the sense 
that it is acquired and internalized exclusively from one’s environment.  
As the discussion below illustrates, the belief that the moral aspects of 
guilt can be divorced from environmental circumstances is 
fundamentally misguided.227  But this is precisely what social learning 
                                                                                                             
proffer a deterministic ideology in scientific study and observation.  See SIMON DE LAPLACE, 
5 THEORIE ANALYTIUE DE PROHIBITS:  INTRODUCTION VII (Oeuvres 1812-1820) (explaining 
mechanical determinism); GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, MONADOLOBY (Robert Latta ed. & trans., 
1925) (1898), http://eserver.org/philosophy/leibniz-monadology.txt (last visited Aug. 25, 
2006) (discussing predetermination in the context of “Monadic” theory); JAMES V. 
MCGLYNN, S.J. & JULES S. TONER, S.J., MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES 125 (1962) (describing the 
influence of determinism on Freud).  It is Skinner’s theory of Behaviorism, however, that is 
often used as the prototypical example of modern determinism’s interaction with 
psychology. 
223 Kalin, supra note 188. 
224 Specifically, it is a variant on rational or social choice theory.  For a general description 
of these assumptions in the context of the social sciences, see PAUL E. JOHNSON, SOCIAL 
CHOICE:  THEORY AND RESEARCH (1998). 
225 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109.  This assumption—that a person will not choose to 
confess because it is against his interest to do so—corresponds to the apparent hostility to 
confessions that was demonstrated by the Warren Court.  See supra notes 33-38 and 
accompanying text. 
226 See supra Part III.B. 
227 See infra notes 322-24 and accompanying text. 
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theory holds, i.e., that one’s behavior is determined by what one 
observes to be acceptable in one’s surrounding environment.228   
The conclusion that follows from the previously recited assumptions 
is predictable, pervasive, and perverse:  because criminal confessions are 
against a person’s tangible self-interest, they can only be obtained through 
coercive techniques.  The immediate syllogism supporting this conclusion 
is widely accepted among researchers:  (1) a criminal suspect seeks to 
maximize his tangible self-interest;229 (2) a criminal confession is adverse 
to a suspect’s tangible best interests;230 and, therefore, (3) “it is 
impractical to expect any but very few confessions to result from a guilty 
conscience unprovoked by an interrogation.”231  The corollary, which is 
especially pertinent to confession jurisprudence, is that “[m]ost people 
who are exposed to coercive procedures will talk.”232    
The just-recited conclusion and corollary, while ostensibly 
corroborated by some research,233 has not been convincingly or 
universally verified.  Quite the opposite, recent studies reflect that about 
one-fifth of the guilty suspects who confess would have chosen to do so 
even in the absence of any police interrogation.234  Social psychologists 
                                                 
228 GUDJONNSON, supra note 109, at 124.  This argument regarding social learning theory 
is not unique to modern psychology; rather, it was addressed by St. Thomas Aquinas in his 
Summa Theologicae.  There, Aquinas rebutted the objection that a choice is not freely made if 
it is “moved by another”—that is, if it is motivated by external or environmental factors.  
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at pt. I, Q. 83, art. 1.  To this objection, Aquinas 
explains that “[f]ree-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man 
moves himself to act.  But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should 
be the first cause of itself . . . .“  Id.  In other words, one cannot say that the mere existence 
of environmental influences and motivations, such as those prompting a guilty suspect to 
confess, excludes the possibility that the confession was freely given or that the motivation 
to confess came from other sources, such as a suspect’s natural inclination to be remorseful 
and accept responsibility. 
229 Supra notes 222-23, and accompanying text. 
230 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 39 (confessions have “obvious negative consequences” 
and are inherently contrary to a person’s best interests).  In a rare demonstration of judicial 
candor, the Court acknowledged in one post-Miranda case that “[i]t is difficult to tell with 
certainty what motivates a suspect to speak.”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).  
Such expressions of candor are the exception, not the rule. 
231 INBAU ET AL., supra note 121, at xiv. 
232 L.E. Hinkle, The Physiological State of the Interrogation Suspect as It Affects Brain Function, 
in THE MANIPULATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 44 (A.D. Biderman & H. Zimmer eds., 1961). 
233 See, e.g., id.; G.H. Gudjonnson & H. Petursson, Custodial Interrogation:  Why Do Suspects 
Confess and How Does It Relate to Their Crime, Attitude, and Personality?, 12 PERSONALITY & 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 295 (1991). 
234 See, e.g., G.H. Gudjonsson & I. Bownes, The Reasons Why Suspects Confess During 
Custodial Interrogation:  Data from Northern Ireland, 32 MEDICINE, SCI. & L. 204 (1992); J.F. 
Sigurdsson & G.H. Gudjonsson, Alcohol and Drug Intoxication During Police Interrogation and 
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cope with this dissonance by politely discounting such findings as 
“interesting”235 or “counter-intuitive.”236  Their attachment to modern 
science, and all that it promises and holds, will allow for nothing else.  
Yet it is this failure of modern psychological methods to account for a 
person’s seemingly natural inclination to confess that makes the 
scientific hypotheses so inappropriate for application by the courts and 
so open to philosophical criticism.  The basis for this criticism is 
discussed next. 
B.  Philosophical Values and the Natural Inclination Towards Confession 
The assumptions underlying modern psychology’s assessment of 
confessions, as described above, are fundamentally opposed to the 
traditional philosophical view that genuine, heart-felt confessions are not 
only possible, but should be fostered by the community.  Philosophically 
speaking, confession (as an act) is a nexus of sorts where humanity’s 
desire for truth, impulse for justice, and need for both to achieve the 
common good all intersect.  A proper confession balances these first two 
goals against the imperative of human rights and dignity, allowing the 
power of human choice to promote the common good.  Thus, in order to 
provide a meaningful critique of the psychological treatment of 
confessions and the court’s reliance on that psychology, one must first 
become oriented to the overarching values implicated by confessions—
truth, justice, human dignity, and the common good—and the particular 
way that these values interact in the confessions context. 
Before engaging in an exploration of these philosophical concepts,237 
it is important that a primarily realist238 position is adopted here, to the 
exclusion of other philosophical schools.239  Central to the realist position 
                                                                                                             
the Reasons Why Suspects Confess to the Police, 89 ADDICTION 985 (1994).  It is telling that such 
a high percentage of self-motivated confessors is identified in studies that are premised on 
the belief that these people do not exist. 
235 GUDJONSSON, supra note 109, at 153. 
236 Id. at 152. 
237 It must be acknowledged that any comprehensive discussion of philosophy is vastly 
unsuitable to the task at hand and far beyond the scope of this Article.  Anything even 
approaching this magnitude of endeavor is better suited to an encyclopedic set of volumes.  
The History of Philosophy series by Frederick Copleston and The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
published by the MacMillan Company, stand out as two of the best. 
238 Realist here is used to denote one who believes human thought can correspond 
accurately to reality.  See generally HENRY VEATCH, REALISM AND NOMINALISM REVISITED 
(1970). 
239 For example, nominalism takes a view that absolutes do not exist in nature, but only 
in the human mind.  Id. at 43-45.  Other theories, such as the idealism of Descartes, propose 
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is the claim that truth exists and can be known.240  Further, realism 
presumes that nature has an order and goods knowable to us, i.e., there 
exists a type of natural law241 that governs human actions.242  These same 
basic principles are indispensable to a properly ordered criminal justice 
system. The first (that truth exists) is indispensable because the 
“preeminent” goal of any such a system is to uncover truth;243 indeed, 
                                                                                                             
that ideas are what we know, as opposed to ideas being that by which we know the world.  
CHARLES RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 128 (1999). 
240 “The philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas is in fact what a modern philosopher has 
termed the natural philosophy of the human mind, for it develops and brings to perfection 
what is most deeply and genuinely natural in our intellect alike in its elementary 
apprehensions and its native tendency towards truth.” MARITAIN, INTRODUCTION, supra 
note 199, at 74. 
241 As Gilson describes natural law: 
Man, as a rational creature, has the strict duty of knowing what eternal 
law exacts of him and of conforming to it.  This might be an insoluble 
problem, were this law not in some way written in his very substance, 
so that he has only to observe himself attentively in order to discover it 
there.  In us, as in every thing, the inclination which draws us toward 
certain ends is the unmistakable mark of what eternal law demands of 
us.  Since it is eternal law that makes us what we are, we have only to 
yield to the legitimate inclinations of our nature in order to obey it.  
Eternal law, thus shared by each one of us, and which we find written 
in our own nature, is called natural law. 
ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 266 (1956) 
[hereinafter GILSON, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY]. 
242 Yves Simon discusses the natural law and various thinkers such as Aristotle, Plato, 
Aquinas, and Maritain, (thinkers listed in order of appearance in his work) in his work on 
it.  YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 7, 27-30, 32-34, 122-25, 186-87 n.16. 
(1965).  “The immediate context of Thomist epistemology is thus a philosophy of nature.  
Every nature is a complex but unified reality, at the same time that it is predestined or 
predetermined to an end.”  REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 195, at 143.  C. S. Lewis, the 
great apologist of Christianity in the 20th century, offered a succinct and simplistic 
definition:  “Human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to 
behave in a certain way, and can’t really get rid of it.”  C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 21 
(1943).  For contemporary elaboration on the natural law, see ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND 
THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION:  CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (John Goyette et al., eds., 
2004). 
243 David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking:  A New Theory on Expert Services for 
Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494 (1992) (“The criminal justice 
system, like most institutions, has many objectives.  Nevertheless, one goal emerges as 
preeminent:  finding the truth.”).  The Supreme Court has also recognized this.  “There is 
no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.”  James 
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).  “The essence of the brief 
amicus of the American Bar Association reviewing practices long accepted by ethical 
lawyers is that under no circumstance may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a 
client’s giving false testimony.  This, of course, is consistent with the governance of trial 
conduct in what we have long called ‘a search for truth.’”  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170-71 
(1986) (emphasis added). 
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the word “verdict” means to assert the truth.244  The second (that truth is 
knowable) is indispensable because uncovering truth is a realistic but not 
an absolute goal, insofar as it is limited to methods that are proper 
within the natural order of rights and dignities accorded to human 
persons.245  Thus, the criminal justice system engages in a relenting 
“‘search for truth,’”246 which sometimes properly yields to truth-
defeating principles such as the right to remain silent (discussed in depth 
in other Parts of this Article),247 the attorney-client privilege,248 and the 
marital-communication privilege,249 to name a few.  These preliminary 
observations about truth and the criminal justice system set the stage for 
a more detailed consideration of the first of our philosophical topics:  
truth itself. 
1. Truth 
The basic questions about truth—such as what is it and whether it 
exists in an unadulterated form—have alternatively plagued and 
spurred philosophy.  Like two biting gadflies, they have driven 
everything from the Socratic dialogue250 to phenomenological 
                                                 
244 MORTIMER ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS 36 (1981) [hereinafter ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS]. 
245 Paul L. Seave, And Nothing But the Truth:  A Review of Judge Rothwax’s “Guilty:  The 
Collapse of Criminal Justice,” 28 PAC. L.J. 533, 534 (1997) (“The criminal justice system, Judge 
Rothwax explains, should reflect ‘equal measures of truth and fairness.’”); Kara Lundy, 
Note, Juror Questioning of Witnesses:  Questioning the United States Criminal Justice System, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2001).  “Therefore, although determining truth is the ultimate 
goal of the United States criminal justice system, certain violations of a defendant’s dignity 
or autonomy can lead to some evidence of truth being kept from the fact-finder.”  Id.  
“Against this strong governmental interest, we must weigh the nature and extent of the 
intrusion upon the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when the police briefly detain 
luggage for limited investigative purposes.”  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).  
“‘There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal 
system.’  But various constitutional rules limit the means by which government may 
conduct this search for truth in order to promote other values embraced by the Framers 
and cherished throughout our Nation’s history.”  James, 493 U.S. at 311 (citations omitted). 
246 Nix, 475 U.S. at 171. 
247 See infra Part V. 
248 See generally David B. Leland, Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598 
(2000). 
249 Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 
137 (2001). 
250 A type of philosophical investigation utilized by Plato in a series of works that have 
come to be known, quite appropriately, as Dialogues.  It involves using a conversation 
between individuals, who usually hold varying and conflicting views, as both a literary 
and analytical method to reach and teach philosophical conclusions.  The accessibility of 
such a method to the reader is remarkable, especially vis-à-vis the existing works of Plato’s 
student, the treatise-minded Aristotle.  This is not to say that Aristotle did not write 
dialogues; he was praised by no less a rhetorician than Cicero.  Aristotle, http://en.wiki 
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bracketing251 to any number of other methodologies and approaches.252  
The purpose here is not to resolve or even catalogue all of these disputes; 
it is beyond the scope of the Article, and the intent and capacity of the 
author.  Pause is appropriate, however, to consider truth as such, so as to 
draw some useful deductions about it, which can later be applied to 
criminal confessions.  
“All men by nature desire to know.”253  Thus did Aristotle begin 
Book I of his Metaphysics.  The thirst for knowledge, of course, is not 
quenched by falsehood but is satiated by truth.254  Augustine observed 
that he had “known many who wished to deceive, but none who wished 
to be deceived.”255  Truth is an innate desire of humanity;256 it is our 
                                                                                                             
pedia.org/wiki/Aristotle (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  Regrettably, Aristotle’s dialogues 
have been lost over time.  Id. 
251 Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) noted that phenomenological reflection does not 
presuppose that anything exists, but rather it amounts to a “bracketing of existence,” i.e., 
setting aside the question of the real existence of the contemplated object.  European 
Graduate School, Edmund Husserl, http://www.egs.edu/resources/husserl.html (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
252 An old favorite is Oliver Wendell Holmes:  “[T]ruth [is] the majority vote of that 
nation that can lick all others.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 
40, 40 (1918). 
253 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 980a1, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 689 (Richard 
McKeon trans., 1941). 
254 Louis Regis provides a fascinating discussion of the connection between the desire for 
truth and the foundation of Greek Philosophy: 
Sir Arthur Eddington clearly reveals the universal law governing the 
existence of every problem.  In the mind there must be two storytellers, 
who must each tell different stories about the same fact or the same 
universe.  As long as there is but one narrator there is no problem.  
Neither is there a real problem when there are several storytellers 
whose stories agree.  Only when there is a coexistence in the mind of 
two storytellers giving divergent accounts does a problem develop. . . .  
We may begin our . . . inquiry at the very cradle of Western thought, 
with the Greeks.  We see that as long as there exists in the Greek mind 
only the theogonic and cosmogonic universe described by Homer and 
Hesiod there is no problem. . . .  But as soon as keen-minded thinkers 
start to reflect, as soon as they try to explain the three outstanding facts 
in this universe of immediate perception—namely, motion, the 
multiplicity that motion implies, and order among the different 
phenomena—as soon as they attempt to give a cosmological 
explanation of reality and try to bring into it the first law of the mind, 
its need for unity, then a universe other than that of the cosmogonies 
springs up in the human consciousness. 
REGIS, EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 195, at 8-9. 
255 AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, supra note 197, at bk. XI. 
256 Consider the opening words of Fides et Ratio: 
In both East and West, we may trace a journey which has led humanity 
down the centuries to meet and engage truth more and more deeply.  
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taking hold of and knowing the world in which we live.257  Yet, despite 
(or perhaps because of) the desire for truth and its description by some 
as the “ultimate good of the human mind,”258 conclusions about it are far 
from uniform. 
The basic characteristic of truth given by Aristotle and accepted by 
Aquinas—and Augustine259—is “[t]hat which affirms the existence of 
what is, and denies the existence of what is not.”260  This imparts the 
transcendent relationship of truth to being.261  Furthermore, truth 
assumes the characteristic of determinacy as a consequence of its 
relationship to being.  To say that truth is determinate simply 
acknowledges the principle of non-contradiction.262  The principle holds 
                                                                                                             
It is a journey which has unfolded—as it must—within the horizon of 
personal self-consciousness:  the more human beings know reality and 
the world, the more they know themselves in their uniqueness, with 
the question of the meaning of things and of their very existence 
becoming ever more pressing.  This is why all that is the object of our 
knowledge becomes a part of our life.  The admonition Know yourself 
was carved on the temple portal at Delphi, as testimony to a basic truth 
to be adopted as a minimal norm by those who seek to set themselves 
apart from the rest of creation as “human beings”, that is as those who 
“know themselves”. 
Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_ 
paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2006). 
257 The recipients of Aristotle’s philosophical and intellectual beneficence often go further 
and connect truth to beauty and good in a “sovereign” fashion, even to the point of 
“regulat[ing]” our thinking on them.  ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS, supra note 244, at 135.  For a 
more strictly Thomistic view of the relationship of truth and beauty, see the writings of 
Jacque Maritain, particularly an acknowledged classic of his early scholarship Art and 
Scholasticism.  JACQUE MARITAIN & J.F. SCANLON, ART AND SCHOLASTICISM WITH OTHER 
ESSAYS (1943). 
258 ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS, supra note 244, at 63. 
259 Augustine offered the following definition:  “Verum est id quod est” (truth is what is).  
Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Veritas Sequitur Esse, Catholic University of Lublin (1999), 
http://www.vaxxine.com/hyoomik/lublin/veritas.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  See 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 17, art. 1 (where Aquinas discusses 
Augustine’s definition.); see also AQUINAS, QUESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VERITATE vol. I, Q. 1, 
art. 1 (Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. trans., 1952), [hereinafter AQUINAS, DE VERITATE] 
(answering the first difficulty, Aquinas writes that if the meaning of Augustine’s statement 
is “‘The true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed[ ]’ . . . then 
Augustine’s definition agrees with that of the Philosopher [Aristotle] mentioned above”). 
260 AQUINAS, DE VERITATE, supra note 259, at vol. I, Q. 1. art. 1. 
261 Although not differing in reality, the words “true” and “being” express different 
things.  As Aquinas writes:  “The reason why it is not tautological [or meaningless 
repetition] to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word true that is not 
expressed by the word being, and not that the two differ in reality.”  Id. (answer to first 
contrary) (emphasis in original). 
262 Sometimes referred to as the principle of contradiction.  RICE, supra note 239, at 137. 
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that a “thing cannot both be or not be at the same time under the same 
aspect,”263 or, put another way, “that the same thing cannot be affirmed 
and denied at the same time.”264   
In light of the foregoing, several conclusions about truth can be 
deduced.  First, a desire for truth is a result of human beings’ natural 
desire for knowledge.  Second, truth is a relationship of conformity 
between the human intellect and the object of that intellect: reality.  
Third, the relationship of truth and reality necessitates that truth is 
determinate, such that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at 
the same time.   
The opposite of truth, of course, is falsity265 or, as a voluntary act, 
lying.  Falsity is a lack of conformity between one’s thoughts and reality, 
while lying is a lack of conformity between what one does or says and 
what one believes.266  The relationship and meaning of truth and falsity is 
obvious and intuitively understood; as Mortimer Adler once observed, 
they “are common notions, commonly used.”267 Because of this, the act of 
                                                 
263 Etienne Gilson, Medieval Realism, http://www.ellopos.net/theology/eckhart_gilson. 
html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
264 Id. 
265 Falsity in its various forms has often been condemned, often forcefully.  Augustine 
wrote “Truth is that which setteth free from all error, and Falsehood that which entangleth 
in all error, one never errs more safely, methinks, than when one errs by too much loving 
the truth, and too much rejecting of falsehood.”  AUGUSTINE, DE MENDACIO bk. 1, para. 1, 
http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF1-03/npnf1-03-35.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).  
Aquinas likewise instructed that “[i]t is evident that lying is directly and formally opposed 
to the virtue of truth.” AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 110, art. 1.  Falsity, 
therefore, is contrary to the basic inclination for knowledge and separates the mind from its 
object—the reality that is—for the sake of what is not.  Thus, the basic definition of a lie is not, 
it should be noted, connected to any intention of harm—at least not as commonly defined.  
Rather, what defines a lie is the lack of correspondence between what one is saying and 
what one believes to be true.  “[W]hether the false statement turns out to be injurious or 
beneficial, it remains a false statement because what its words say do not correspond to 
what the person who has made the statement actually thinks.”  ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS, 
supra note 244, at 32.  Thus, as Adler also notes, there is the concept of the so-called “‘white 
lie.’”  Id. 
266 Acts include signs.  Aquinas agrees with Augustine on this point:  “And so when it is 
said that ‘a lie is a false signification by words,’ the term ‘words’ denotes every kind of 
sign.  Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he 
would not be excused from lying.”  AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 110, 
art. 1.  William James summed up the distinction nicely:  “Truth, as any dictionary will tell 
you, is a property of certain of our ideas.  It means their ‘agreement,’ as falsity means their 
disagreement, with ‘reality.’”  William James, Pragmatism, http://www.emory.edu/ 
EDUCATION/mfp/truth.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
267 MORTIMER ADLER, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY 139 (1985) [hereinafter ADLER, 
ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY].  Adler continues that “everyone knows how to tell a lie.”  Id.  
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lying is particularly offensive to human nature and the interrelationships 
of human beings.  Lying is nothing less than the intentional obstruction 
by another of each person’s natural inclination to know.268  Truth, or 
correspondence between thought and reality, is thus needed both to 
satisfy our innate desire for knowledge and to enable us to make 
accurate judgments about reality.269  It is thus most fitting that an ardor 
for truth rests at the heart of any system of justice.270 
2. Justice  
The common definition of justice as external action271 is as “a habit 
whereby a man renders to each one his due.“272  Justice, according to this 
view,273 is concerned both with the internal quality of an act and with its 
external consequences, i.e., the good of another.274  As justice is a habit, 
                                                                                                             
This knowledge, Adler asserts, requires a basic understanding of the difference between 
truth and falsity.  Id. 
268 As Adler makes the distinction between speaking falsity and lying: 
 There is a clear difference between the judgment that what a man 
says is false and the judgment that he is telling a lie.  His statement 
may be false without his necessarily being a liar.  Try as he will to 
speak truthfully by saying precisely what he thinks, he may be 
mistaken in what he says through error or ignorance. 
 The person we ask for directions may honestly but erroneously 
think that a certain road is the shortest route to the destination we 
wish to reach.  When he tells us which road to take, what he says is 
false, but not a lie.  However, if he does in fact know another road to 
be shorter and withholds that information from us, then his statement 
is not only a false one, but also a lie. 
ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS, supra note 244, at 38. 
269 Id. 
270 See generally Stephen J. Safranek, The Legal Obligation of Clients, Lawyers, and Judges to 
Tell the Truth, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 345 (1998) (discussing the importance of truth in the legal 
process). 
271 It is “external” in the sense that it is directed toward the good of another.  See infra 
notes 272-74. 
272 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 58, art. 1. 
273 This should not be taken as the only theory of justice; there are several others of note.  
One such approach is the social-contract theory,  reflected preeminently in writings of John 
Rawls, in particular in his A Theory of Justice.  In this work, Rawls proposes a notion of 
“justice as fairness” and a theoretical “original position” from which to determine the 
principles that order a just society.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1999). 
274 “[Justice] is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of a 
complete virtue.  It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only 
in himself but towards his neighbor also . . . . justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 
‘another’s good’, because it is related to our neighbor . . . .”  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS V1129B 30 - 1130a 5, supra note 204, at 1003-04 (citing Plato’s REPUBLIC). 
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however, it remains fundamentally a disposition of the individual.275  
This basic definition of justice originated with Plato276 and Aristotle.277  
Christian thinkers, building upon these premises,278 reached various 
conclusions about justice by adding in elements drawn from theology.279 
Notwithstanding these variations, several common understandings 
about justice can be confidently asserted. 
Foremost among these is that justice cannot be sustained in the 
absence of truth.  This is so because justice, by its very nature, is an 
equitable judgment directed to the external in the guise of other 
persons.280  As Aquinas instructs, the purpose of justice is “to direct man 
in his relations with others . . . because it denotes a kind of equality, as its 
very name implies.”281  This does not mean, of course, that justice and 
                                                 
275 Id. 
276 PLATO, REPUBLIC bks. I & II, 331b - 369e, in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS 975-1009 (John M. 
Cooper ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., 1997) (discussing various theories of justice before 
reaching a conclusion as to its nature). 
277 “We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which makes 
people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just . . . .“  
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V1129a 6-10, supra note 204, at 1002. 
278 “‘To everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the notion of a certain equality.  
From Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas Aquinas, down to the jurists, moralists and 
philosopher of our own day runs a thread of universal agreement on this point.’”  Peter 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543 n.20 (1982) (quoting HENRY 
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 380 (7th ed. 1907)). 
279 As Gilson writes of Aquinas: 
St. Thomas hastens to profit by this admission to make a distinction 
between Greek justice, which is entirely directed to the good of the 
city, and a particular justice, enriching the soul which acquires and 
exercises it as one of the most precious perfections.  This time it is no 
longer in Aristotle that St. Thomas finds the text which authorizes him 
to proclaim that this justice exists, it is in St. Matthew’s Gospel:  
“Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice.” 
GILSON, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 241, at 308. 
280 See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 17, art. 4 (“True and false are 
opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation . . . . For as 
truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary.”). 
281 Id. at Q. 57, art. 1. 
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equality are synonymous, as justice is an “unlimited good”282 while 
equality is not.283  
Just as truth is the conformity of the intellect with reality, so to 
justice is the equitable conformity of our intentional acts284 with reality in 
relation to other persons.285  As some have noted, in a society of friends 
there would be no need for justice; as a matter of historical reality, justice 
is the mortar that binds men together.286  To act justly (equitably in 
regard to others) necessarily demands conformity of the intellect with 
reality so that proper judgments can be made.  In this sense, lying or 
deceptive silence287 can compound the injury to justice, as this may 
                                                 
282 Adler writes: 
[A]ll real goods are not of equal standing. . . .  Some real goods are 
truly good only when limited.  Pleasure is a real good, but we can 
want more pleasure than we need or more than is good for us to seek 
or obtain.  The same is true of wealth.  These are limited real goods.  In 
contrast, knowledge is an unlimited real good.  We can never seek or 
obtain more than is good for us. . . . [J]ustice is an unlimited good, as 
we shall presently see.  One can want too much liberty and too much 
equality—more than it is good for us to have in relation to our 
fellowmen, and more than we have any right to.  Not so with justice.  
No society can be too just; no individual can act more justly than is 
good for him or for his fellowmen. 
ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS, supra note 244, at 137.  As Aristotle writes of justice, “‘neither 
evening nor morning star’ is so wonderful . . . .“  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1129b 
26-29, supra note 204, at 1003. 
283 See supra note 278. 
284 Aristotle, for one, claims that “a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such 
acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an 
incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust.”  ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1135a 15-17, supra note 204, at 1015.  In this sense, T commits an 
unjust act but is not unjust if he testifies, with all sincerity, that A+ was the man he saw 
murder B—the reality being that A+ has been long lost and as his yet unknown twin 
brother, A-, was the real killer.  Even though A+ will be unjustly convicted, T is not guilty of 
being unjust.  Were results all that mattered, then absurd possibilities would be allowed, as 
where one who intended to unjustly deprive an investor of money by selling a worthless 
piece of property could be considered to have acted justly if the land is later discovered to 
have large oil reserves on it and turns a nice profit for the investor. 
285 See supra note 268-69 and accompanying text. 
286 ADLER, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, supra note 267, at 100.  As Adler goes on to state:  
“Where love is absent, justice must step in to bind men together in states, so they can live 
peacefully and harmoniously with one another, acting and working together for a common 
purpose.”  Id. at 104. 
287 No claim is made here that all permissions of falsity in another’s mind are unjust.  For 
instance, few (not members of the SS) would claim that the patrons of Ann Frank would 
have been committing injustice by refusing to let Nazis erroneously believe she was in the 
home.  ANNE FRANK, ANNE FRANK:  THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL (B.M. Mooyart trans., 
1993).  The question of affirmative lying is more complicated and has spurred great debate.  
Even Albertus Magnus and his pupil, Aquinas, are reported to have disagreed on such 
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create (by intentional act or omission) disparity between the intellect and 
reality in another’s mind.   
Lying can thus be doubly injurious to justice.  First, it can frustrate 
the desires of another for true knowledge.  Second, it can separate the 
intellect of another from reality, thereby causing skewed judgment and 
baseless actions.288  Such discordant conduct is commonly referred to as 
injustice.  In other words, while justice is the equitable conformity of 
action with reality, injustice conversely is the inequitable discordance of 
action and reality.289   
In summary, several conclusions about justice can be deduced.  First, 
justice is a habit or disposition of character for acting with equity toward 
another.  Second, conformity between act and reality requires conformity 
between intellect and reality, i.e., truth.  Third, the relationship between 
truth and justice creates a special necessity between them, and it gives 
truth a doubled value in the order of justice—not only as what is due 
another, but also as what effects the justice of one’s relations with others.  
Accordingly, truth occupies a position of prominence in any system of 
justice, so much so that even the earliest mythologies accorded truth and 
justice a complimentary and exalted status.290  As both truth and justice 
are necessary for the fulfillment of the human person and, therefore, are 
required for an ordered society, they share an indispensable relationship 
to the common good.  
                                                                                                             
matters.  “Aquinas, like Kant and apparently unlike his teacher Albert the Great, was a 
rigorist in allowing no exceptions to the prohibition of lying.”  A.S. McGrade, What Aquinas 
Should Have Said? Finnis’s Reconstruction of Social and Political Thomism, 44 AM. J. 
JURISPRUDENCE 125, 132 (1999). 
288 Thus, if A lies to B, claiming that C took his TV when A really was the thief, then A 
doubly injures justice.  First, A intentionally confounds B’s desire for knowledge of what 
happened to his TV.  Second, A directs blame (and possibly punishment) toward the 
undeserving C.  Hence, B will be rightly angry should he discover A’s fraud, not only that 
he was lied to, but also because of any retributive acts he was tricked into imposing against 
C. 
289 “[W]e speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, 
when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, 
such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice 
opposed to particular justice.”  AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 6, at Q. 59, art. 1. 
290 “The origin of the Goddess of Justice goes back to antiquity.  She was referred to as 
Ma’at by the ancient Egyptians and was often depicted carrying a sword with an ostrich 
feather in her hair (but no scales) to symbolize truth and justice.”  Barbara Swatt, Themis, 
Goddess of Justice, (Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library), http://lib.law.washington.edu/ 
ref/themis.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
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3. The Common Good 
The “common good,”291 in the classic sense, refers to “the complete 
set of conditions necessary for every member of the community to 
flourish as a member of the community.”292  The common good, therefore, is 
not attained by some communal calculus, where 51% of the people exist 
happily on the suffering of the other 49%.293  Nor can it ever contemplate 
the Leviathan-type government that consumes its members, turning 
them into atomic particles of its structure.294  The common good has a 
human relevance far beyond simple numbers and percentages, or mere 
interdependence.  As Jacque Maritain described it: 
The common good is common because it is received in 
persons, each one of whom is a mirror of the whole.  
Among the bees, there is a public good, namely, the 
good functioning of the hive, but not a common good, 
that is, a good received and communicated.  The end of 
society, therefore, is neither the individual good nor the 
collection of the individual goods of each of the persons 
who constitute it. . . .  The common good of the city is 
neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the 
proper good of a whole which, like the species with 
respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its 
bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them 
to itself.  It is the good human life of the multitude, of a 
multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living.  It 
is therefore common to both the whole and the part into 
which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit 
from it.295  
                                                 
291 This notion appears in the Politics of Aristotle.  “The true forms of government, 
therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the 
common interest . . . .“  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1185 
(Richard McKeon trans., 1941) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS]. 
292 Robert Kennedy, The Virtue of Solidarity and the Purpose of the Firm, in RETHINKING THE 
PURPOSE OF BUSINESS 53 (S. A. Cortright & Michael J. Naughton eds., 2002) (“[T]he proper 
definition of the common good for a society is not simply a matter of liberties and 
protections, but is instead the complete set of conditions necessary for every member of the 
community to flourish as a member of the community.”). 
293 JACQUE MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 52 (John J. Fitzgerald trans., 
1947) [hereinafter MARITAIN, THE COMMON GOOD] (“The common good includes all of 
these and something more besides . . . .  For it includes also, and above all, the whole sum 
itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units.  
(Even in the mathematical order, as Aristotle points out, 6 is not the same as 3 + 3.”)). 
294 Id. at 100-01. 
295 Id. at 49-51 (emphasis added). 
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Justice and truth, although not proposed as the only values 
necessary for the common good,296 are inextricably connected to a proper 
conception of the common good.  For if the common good is understood 
as a “communion in good living,” then such living must perforce consist 
of acts that are in accord with, inter alia, justice and truth.297  Indeed, only 
a society defined by justice and truth can satisfy all of its constituents’ 
basic human needs and fulfill all of its communal responsibilities.298  
The common good, in this sense, presupposes certain individual 
duties and societal imperatives.  With respect to truth and justice, the 
common good creates a duty on the part of each individual to live life in 
such a way as to promote these values, while calling upon society to 
advance and foster the same.299  In the absence of truth and justice, the 
common good is little more than an idealized impossibility, which is 
largely disconnected from the real world and actual human activity.  
Even so, it must be remembered that basic human dignity cannot itself 
be compromised in meeting the requirements of human flourishing, lest 
the endeavor be lost before it begins.  Put simply, the individual person 
                                                 
296 Security and happiness as mentioned elsewhere in this Article are included in the 
content of the common good.  See infra Part IV.B.3.  As the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
teaches, “[T]he common good requires peace, that is, the stability and security of a just 
order.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 5, § 1909.  This is by no means an 
exhaustive list.  Professor Finnis has explained that 
in the case of political community, the . . . common good of such an all-
round association was said to be the securing of a whole ensemble of 
material and other conditions that tend to favour the realization, by 
each individual in the community, of his or her personal 
development. . . .  ‘[T]he common good’ refer[s] to the factor or set of 
factors . . . which, as considerations in someone’s practical reasoning, 
would make sense of or give reason for his collaboration with others 
and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their 
collaboration with each other and with him. 
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 154 (citations omitted). 
297 As Adler writes: 
What do others have the right to expect from us?  That we keep the 
promises we make to them.  That we tell them the truth whenever 
telling them a lie would hurt them in some way. . . .  That we do not 
steal what belongs to them. . . .  It is their need for real goods that gives 
them a right to them, and it is their right to them that we are obliged to 
respect—if we ourselves are just. 
ADLER, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, supra note 267, at 105-06. 
298 Id. 
299 The “common good of political society is . . . the sum or sociological integration of all 
the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, 
material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of 
moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of 
its members.”  MARITAIN, THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 293, at 42. 
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cannot be treated unjustly to achieve communal justice.  For this reason, 
some discussion of human rights and human dignity is appropriate and 
necessary. 
4. Human Rights and Human Dignity  
Any serious reflection about the human person and society 
inevitably leads to contemplation of human rights and human dignity.  
Rights and human dignity flow from each other, with dignity informing 
rights and rights upholding dignity.300  Truth, justice, and the common 
good are inextricably related to duties and dignities.301  From this, some 
consideration of human rights,302 natural rights,303 or fundamental 
rights,304 as they are alternately called,305 inevitably follows.   
The idea of human or natural rights is certainly one of the most 
contentious in philosophy.306  As David Ritchie wrote of it, the words 
“are constantly bandied about in controversy as if they settled quarrels, 
whereas they only provoke them by their ambiguity.”307  With this in 
mind, an initial disclaimer as to the insufficiency of the instant treatment 
of human rights is necessary.  The present purpose is not to settle long-
standing disputes or to frame new ones; rather, it is merely to skim the 
surface to glean a basic understanding of rights and establish a frame of 
reference for later use.  Nor is this section intended to evaluate rights in 
the sense that they are guaranteed by the Constitution or granted by the 
Supreme Court.  To the extent that these matters are addressed at all in 
this Article, it occurs elsewhere.308 
                                                 
300 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 218-21. 
301 GILSON, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 241, at 306. 
302 See generally LAURA HITT, HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
303 See generally DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS (1894). 
304 “[T]he right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 
(1978). 
305 Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “human rights,” “natural rights,” and 
“fundamental rights” are used interchangeably. 
306 In writing on natural rights theory, Ritchie fears the he “occupied in slaying the 
already slain,” but nonetheless notes that “it yet remains a commonplace.”  RITCHIE, supra 
note 303, at ix. 
307 Id. at 20.  Ritchie goes on to point out several uses and debates on the words “nature” 
and “natural.”  Id. 
308 The constitutional parameters of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pertaining 
to criminal confessions is addressed in supra Part II.  Additional discussion of these rights is 
found generally in infra Part V, and is particularly referenced infra note 327. 
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It is nonetheless worthwhile for present purposes to address, if only 
briefly and in an abstract manner, the philosophical view of human or 
natural rights.  This does not require an examination of distinct rights 
such as, for example, liberty309 or alternatively self-determination,310 
equality,311 the right to worship freely and without coercion,312 and more 
                                                 
309 Sometimes this is taken to extremes.  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed 
under compulsion of the State.”  Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  At 
face value, the quoted proposition is incomprehensible.  Such room for diversity of opinion 
as to what existence is or is not, what the universe is or is not, or what meaning is or is not, 
could hardly hope to operate in a society of individuals who, nevertheless, must function 
as a unit.  For example, the proposition that Blacks are inferior to Whites and fit for 
enslavement has been tried in this country and rightly rejected.  Although there are 
members of certain organizations who decry this lack of legal recognition of their own 
concept of meaning, the mystery of human life, and existence, most would not consider it a 
loss of liberty to say that one cannot own slaves.  Fewer still would consider it the heart of 
liberty. 
310 See generally JOSEPH RICKABY, FREE WILL AND FOUR ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS (1906) 
(discussing Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill).  Adler takes 
self-determination to be the more accurate nomenclature for what is commonly referred to 
as liberty.  Adler writes: 
We must, therefore, find some term other than these to identify the 
freedom which a large group of authors attributes to anyone who is a 
man. The identifying designation must not only be wholly 
unobjectionable, in the sense of being without prejudice to the theory 
of any author in this group; but it must also be capable of conveying 
unambiguously a meaning that is distinctive of natural freedom.  We 
propose to use “self-determination” for this purpose. 
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 402 (1958) [hereinafter ADLER, IDEA OF 
FREEDOM]. 
311 See generally EQUALITY (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1967) (series of 
essays by legal and philosophical societies). 
312 Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae:  Declaration on Religious Freedom, CATHOLIC DOSSIER, 
Nov/Dec 1965, at 34.  While stating that the “one true religion subsists in the Catholic and 
Apostolic Church,” Pope Paul VI teaches 
The council exhorts Catholics, and it directs a plea to all men, most carefully 
to consider how greatly necessary religious freedom is, especially in the 
present condition of the human family.  All nations are coming into 
even closer unity.  Men of different cultures and religions are being 
brought together in closer relationships.  There is a growing 
consciousness of the personal responsibility that every man has.  All 
this is evident.  Consequently, in order that relationships of peace and 
harmony be established and maintained within the whole of mankind, 
it is necessary that religious freedom be everywhere provided with an 
effective constitutional guarantee and that respect be shown for the 
high duty and right of man freely to lead his religious life in society. 
Id. at para. 15 (emphasis added). 
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modern incarnations such as the right to vote313 or to bear arms.314  A 
greater discussion of the right of self-determination will be undertaken 
shortly, as this right directly bears on confession.  The immediate 
discussion, however, will consist of a generalized treatment of the limits 
rights must inevitably endure, which in turn implicates how rights 
alternatively affect and are affected by the common good.     
In order to understand the nature of rights, one must accept that 
“human rights can only be securely enjoyed in certain sorts of milieu—a 
context or framework of mutual respect and trust and common 
understanding, an environment which is physically healthy and in 
which the weak can go about without fear of the whims of the strong.”315  
To contemplate the substance of rights, therefore, is to contemplate the 
limits they must accept for the sake of internal consistency.316  Stated 
more concretely, the exercise of a right by one should not deny the same 
right (or other rights) as held by another.  For example, one’s capacity to 
exercise his right to self-determination is limited by the need to respect 
the self-determination of others.  Similar complementary constraints 
upon the exercise of other rights are derived from an understanding of 
human nature, which, as Professor Finnis explains, can limit freedom:  
On the one hand, we should not say that human rights, 
or their exercise, are subject to the common good:  for 
the maintenance of human rights is a fundamental 
component of the common good.  On the other hand, we 
can appropriately say that most human rights are subject 
to or limited by each other and by other aspects of the 
common good, aspects which could probably be 
subsumed under a very broad conception of human 
rights but which are fittingly indicated . . . by 
expressions such as “public morality,” “public health”, 
“public order.”317 
Human rights and the common good thus relate to each other in a 
circular fashion. As Professor Finnis puts it, rights are both 
                                                 
313 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (discussing the history of voting rights in the 
United States). 
314 U.S. CONST. amend II.  One need hardly be a student of history to see that the right of 
the populace to bear arms was one not recognized in most political systems. 
315 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 216. 
316 Id. at 215-16. 
317 Id. at 218. 
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“fundamental component[s] of the common good” and are “limited” by 
other aspects of the common good.  Accordingly, no individual right can 
be ignored by the common good, nor may it assume absolute priority 
within the common good. 
Referring back to the earlier discussion in this Part, two important 
and generalized limitations upon rights can be deduced.  First, rights are 
limited by the natural desire of humanity for truth and by the justice we 
owe others.  Not only are we individually called toward truth as a desire 
of nature, but we are also called by justice to promote truth for the 
benefit of others and, especially, not to frustrate their natural desire for 
truth.  Second, and as just mentioned above, rights are limited by the 
common good and the duties that we owe to the advancement of it.  
With the preceding in mind, we can now turn to confession, the 
paradigm situation in which truth, justice, the common good, and 
human rights all converge. 
C. Confessions:  A Philosophical “Complex of Values” 
As described above, the act of confessing provides an intersection for 
humanity’s desire for truth, impulse for justice, and need for both to 
achieve the common good, balanced against the imperative of human 
rights and dignity.  The human person relates to the act of confession 
through its intimate connection to the truth.  As observed earlier, truth is 
a natural human desire.  Accurate confession is a naturally desirable act 
because it bestows truth on the listener.  In the context of justice 
generally—and in particular a criminal justice system—truth reigns 
supreme.  A truthful confession is an efficacious means to the truth, and 
thus it has a normative and practical value.  Because a truthful 
confession is singularly capable of using the truth to achieve justice—and 
thereby promoting the common good—it occupies a preeminent position 
within a properly oriented society.  Although the inestimable value of a 
truthful confession from the perspective of the common good is an 
important normative consideration, the matter of human rights and 
dignity must be addressed to complete the analysis.   
Confession cannot be divorced from the rights and dignities of 
human individuals, as these are realized within the common good.  As 
mentioned above, the common good and human rights are intimately 
related to each other, with the latter informing the former and the former 
limiting the latter.  This interdependence sets the parameters for any 
discussion of whether and to what extent a confession may be coerced 
through physical or mental discomfort.  Stated broadly, human dignity 
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cannot be cast aside in seeking the common good because at the heart of 
the common good is human dignity itself.  In the context of confession, 
this most clearly arises in regard to the right to self-determination. 
The right of self-determination mentioned briefly above,318 which is 
sometimes described as the right of free choice or liberty, helps form the 
common good in a way that denies the legitimacy of using some means 
to obtain confessions.  The understanding of human nature that proposes 
a free will and the power of individual choice also proposes a view of 
human dignity that is offended by certain coercive measures.319  This 
holds true even when the state is the actor exerting influence.320  For 
example, torture is recognized in most societies as an illegitimate means 
of obtaining confessions.321  The dignity of the human person prevents 
the right of self-determination from being suborned through torture, 
without regard to whether it might promote truth or effectuate a correct 
determination of guilt or innocence, i.e., justice.  Accordingly, a guilty 
suspect’s dignity may limit the state’s legitimate authority to compel his 
confession.  Contrariwise, a guilty suspect’s dignity is not diminished, 
but rather it can be enhanced, when he freely chooses to confess.   
At the same time, the right to exercise self-determination is not 
unfettered.  It is limited, as noted earlier, not only by the rights of other 
individuals but also by aspects of the common good.  The criminal 
justice system is established and maintained with the primary purpose of 
preventing individuals from exercising an unrestrained free will to the 
detriment of society.322  Indeed, the object of restraining will is a 
justification for criminal punishment.323  Likewise, with respect to 
                                                 
318 Supra note 310. 
319 ADLER, IDEA OF FREEDOM, supra note 310, at 202 (discussing the forms of self-
realization and the varying weight different thinkers have accorded individual choice). 
320 Id. at 224 (discussing human liberty and the law). 
321 This current proscription of torture has not existed throughout history and at times it 
was considered a legitimate means of obtaining information from suspects.  LANGBEIN, 
supra note 19, at 5-8 (describing how with the abolition of ordeals, confessions obtained by 
torture became an accepted means of proving guilt in the thirteenth century Europe); 
Milhizer, Justification and Excuse, supra note 173, at 761. 
322 This is literally Hornbook law.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (Hornbook Series) 22 
(3d ed. 2000) (“The broad purposes of the criminal law are, of course, to make people do 
what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing what society considers to 
be undesirable.  Since criminal law is framed in terms of imposing punishment for bad 
conduct, . . . the emphasis is more on the prevention of the undesirable . . . .“). 
323 Professor Falvey discusses the relationship of criminal punishment and coercing free 
will as follows: 
[T]o constitute punishment, the act [of punishment] must be opposed 
to the will.  If the essence of punishment includes deprivation of some 
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confession, the right of a guilty suspect to self-determination is not 
absolute.  It should be exercised in accord with the natural desire for 
truth and justice, and consistent with the need for both in the context of 
the common good.  Sound public policy would support this, recognizing 
that failing to inform those in a position to confess of the power and 
good it represents to them as individuals and to society in general is no 
less a departure from the needs of human nature than overly coercive 
questioning.  One violates the rights of the individual, the other violates 
the rights of others and the needs of the common good. 
It was Plato who suggested that if we are properly ordered, we 
would choose our punishment rather than seek to avoid it.324  This is a 
lofty ideal indeed.  Yet, as the forgoing discussion demonstrates, it is one 
that is connected with our human nature.  We not only naturally desire 
truth and justice, but we need them to achieve the common good.  Our 
rights, as such, do not exist in a vacuum of inordinate goals; rather, they 
are powers and privileges to be exercised in accord with our natural 
desires.  When human rights are in discord with natural desires, the 
result is the oft-lamented tribulations of depression, guilt, anxiety, and 
regret.  Although sometimes harmful,325 these feelings can also be 
symptomatic of something far more damaging and sinister.326  
Individuals need to conform their actions, and society its laws and 
policies, to a correct understanding of truth, justice, the common good, 
and the human person.  The goal is to advance the common good and 
rights of all without unduly infringing on the human dignity of the 
individual.  When these values and goals are considered in the context of 
                                                                                                             
good, punishment must be opposed to the will because no one wills to 
be deprived of some good. . . .  In committing a crime, a criminal 
follows his own will beyond what is allowable under the law.  For 
justice to be restored, it is necessary that the criminal be deprived, 
because of this excessive indulgence of his will, by undergoing 
something contrary to his will. 
Joseph L Falvey, Jr., Crime and Punishment, A Catholic Perspective, 43 CATHOLIC LAWYER 149, 
153-54 (2004).  Accord FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 263 (punishment seeks to 
restore fairness and accomplish justice “by depriving the criminal of what he gained in his 
criminal act . . . [through] the exercise of self-will or free choice”). 
324 “On my view of it, Polus, a man who acts unjustly, a man who is unjust, is thoroughly 
miserable, the more so if he doesn’t get his due punishment for the wrongdoing he 
commits, the less so if he pays and receives what is due at the hands of both gods and 
men.”  PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 3, at 816. 
325 ANTOINE VERGOTE, GUILT AND DESIRE 43-61 (M.H. Wood trans., 1988) (discussing 
what he calls the “Religious Neurosis of Culpability”). 
326 Recall that modern psychology tends to treat guilt and shame as harmful in the 
broadest (and not a symptomatic) sense.  See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text. 
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contemporary criminal confession jurisprudence, the need for radical 
change becomes abundantly apparent. 
V.  TRANSLATING PRINCIPLES INTO PROCEDURES 
Having just described the values that should inform a principled 
approach to confessions, the final step is to consider ways in which they 
can be effectively incorporated into police practices.  Neither the Court’s 
pre-Miranda nor its post-Miranda jurisprudence satisfactorily 
accomplishes this.  What is needed is a new approach, which is oriented 
toward achieving the most beneficial end (reliable confessions) through 
the use of virtuous and efficacious means (procedures that encourage 
guilty suspects to confess for the right reasons), while concomitantly 
rejecting and condemning immoral practices and procedures regardless 
of their propensity for producing reliable confessions.  A critique of the 
Court’s approach to confessions, and some proposed revisions for 
interrogating suspects, is presented in Part V. 
One caveat is necessary before proceeding. Although the 
constitutionality of some of the proposed changes is obliquely 
considered here, a detailed examination of the origins, meaning, and 
parameters of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protections is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Accordingly, while it is contended that 
all the proposed changes are constitutionally permitted, no claim is 
made that any are constitutionally required.327  Legislatures and other 
legitimate rule-making authorities are capable of instituting all of the 
various components of the proposals made in Part V regardless of 
whether they define, exceed, or simply correspond to constitutional 
minimums.328  
                                                 
327 The relationship between constitutional rights on the one hand, and transcendent 
values and norms on the other, is a complicated subject and beyond the scope of this 
Article.  See generally GARVEY, supra note 97 (considering freedom from the perspective of 
constitutional rights and moral choices); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (argues that modern American political 
discourse, by emphasizing an ever-expanding catalogue of rights to the exclusion of duties 
and responsibilities, has lost its central role in civic life as envisioned by the Founding 
Fathers). 
328 The Supreme Court has instructed that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to 
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary 
upon federal constitutional standards.”  Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).  See 
generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 189, 217 (1988) (reporting that in hundreds of cases state courts have 
recognized rights not available under the federal constitution).  Sources for the protection 
of rights above and beyond those in the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme 
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A. The Most Beneficial End  
Before specific procedural means relating to confessions can be 
offered and evaluated, it is necessary to identify the ends that they 
should seek to accomplish.  This involves translating abstract and 
universal norms identified in Part IV into more tangible and specific 
values, and then further refining these so that they apply to the 
American criminal justice system generally and police interrogations in 
particular.  The treatment here is brief and superficial.  Its limited 
purpose is to inform and guide efforts to reform police practices, so that 
they better respect and promote basic values and appropriately resolve 
any tensions that might arise between them.   
The immutable norms relating to the common good identified in 
Part IV include truth, justice, security, and happiness.  Within the context 
of the criminal justice system, these norms are directly and obviously 
realized when the system seeks and produces accurate and reliable 
results.  Such results, by definition, comport with and promote truth.  
They help achieve justice by giving each his due.  They make people 
more secure by reducing crime and needless intrusions upon their 
privacy and liberty.  They make people less anxious by minimizing the 
fear of false accusations and convictions.329 
In a narrow sense, the criminal justice system achieves accuracy and 
reliability through correct verdicts, where the guilty are convicted and 
the innocent are acquitted,330 as well as by other just dispositions of 
cases.331  More broadly, the desire for accuracy and reliability extends to 
the investigatory and pretrial processes, which involves identifying and 
                                                                                                             
Court and other federal courts, include state constitutions, federal statutes and rules of 
criminal procedure, regulations promulgated by law enforcement agencies, and even the 
Court’s “supervisory authority” over the administration of criminal justice in the federal 
courts.  See DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 1.02 (discussing sources of procedural law). 
329 See generally Safranek, supra note 270, at 352-53 (discussing the importance of 
predictability for a legal system, and relating predictability to truth). 
330 This does not imply the acquittal of a guilty suspect is as harmful as the conviction of 
an innocent person.  As Justice Harlan once explained: 
In a criminal case, . . . we do not view the social disutility of convicting 
an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone 
who is guilty. . . .  In this context, I view the requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
331 In this regard, drawing distinctions between “legal” and “factual” guilt is unnecessary 
for the present discussion and beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Arenella, supra 
note 133, at 214 (discussing factual and legal guilt). 
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bringing the guilty to justice while ensuring that the innocent are not 
falsely accused or otherwise unnecessarily burdened. Police 
investigation of crime generally, and the interrogation of suspects in 
particular, implicates accuracy and reliability in both the narrow and 
broader sense.   
Accuracy and reliability are seriously undervalued, however, when 
they are treated as merely two of many comparably important goals.  
Quite to the contrary, accuracy and reliability together ought to be the 
defining purpose—the lodestar and raison d’etre—of a moral and 
efficacious criminal justice system.  Common sense, philosophical norms, 
our legal tradition, and practical experience all tell us this.  We authorize 
the police to investigate crime on our behalf in order to identify and 
apprehend the guilty, and, derivatively, exonerate the innocent.  We use 
criminal trials to accomplish the same end with greater confidence and 
finality.332  Too much inaccuracy and unreliability can undermine the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, real and perceived.333  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly lauded the fundamental importance of 
accuracy and reliability,334 and even those who emphasize countervailing 
values acknowledge the worthiness of pursuing these goals.335 
Of course, no criminal justice system is absolutely accurate or 
completely reliable, nor can it be seriously claimed that perfection is 
needed for legitimacy. The real issues concerning accuracy and reliability 
involve degrees of certainty and their corresponding costs.  One can 
easily imagine a variety of methods that would improve the accuracy 
and reliability of the justice system, such as the compelled use of truth 
serum and hypnosis, allowing the police unfettered authority to search 
                                                 
332 Criminal trials and criminal investigations have many differences besides degrees of 
confidence and finality.  A criminal trial can lead to a criminal conviction, which constitutes 
a formal condemnation and stigmatization of the one who is convicted.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).  A conviction can 
serve as a basis for criminal punishment to achieve retribution and other purposes.  Falvey, 
supra note 323, at 155-66.  Condemnation, stigmatization, and retribution, among other 
consequences, are not immediately served by criminal investigations. 
333 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.  In discussing the reasonable doubt standard, the Court 
wrote “It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”  Id. 
334 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 
620, 626 (1980); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).  But see Sawyer v. Whitley, 
505 U.S. 333, 356 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s “single-minded 
focus” on finding the truth). 
335 E.g., Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 533, 534 (1999) (“the pursuit of truth—is not the only, or 
even, perhaps, the most important, principle at work”). 
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and seize, and refusing to recognize any testimonial privileges.  These 
and other means are rightly rejected because they offend other important 
rights and values.336  The search for truth must be more than a mere 
slogan, however, and the Court has correctly cautioned in other contexts 
that “we [should not] be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to 
relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable.”337  
Accordingly, the salient inquiry involves identifying what we will 
permit because it promotes accuracy and reliability, and what we will 
prohibit despite its doing so.   
These questions acknowledge that the means used can implicate 
discrete normative considerations apart from those that are integral to 
the ends being sought.  When framed in this manner, four possibilities 
are apparent.  In the first category are situations where discretely moral 
means are available to promote the moral ends of accuracy and 
reliability. Unless some other countervailing values are thereby 
transgressed,338 we are morally obliged to use such means.  The second 
category involves situations where intrinsically immoral means are 
available to promote accuracy and reliability.  Clearly these must be 
rejected, as it is axiomatic that the “ends do not justify the means.”339  
The third category relates to situations where morally “neutral” means340 
are available to promote accuracy and reliability.  Such means should be 
used in the absence of weighty, countervailing moral and practical 
considerations.  The fourth and final category concerns situations where 
the means at issue, although not intrinsically immoral, have associated 
                                                 
336 See Pearse v. Pearse, (1846) 63 Eng. Rep. 957, 970 (Ch.) (“[t]ruth, like all other good 
things, may be loved unwisely—may be pursued too keenly—may cost too much”); see also 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986). 
337 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (discussing the Fourth Amendment 
protections in the context of electronically transmitted conversations). 
338 It is possible, for example, that moral means could promote the end of enhancing 
accuracy and reliability but detract from some other overarching goal, such as efficiency.  
As discussed shortly, in such cases the legitimate authority would have the responsibility 
for establishing policy based on a prudent balancing of these competing goals. 
339 “The end cannot justify the means, for the simple and obvious reason that the means 
employed determine the nature of the ends produced.”  ALDOUS HUXLEY, ENDS AND 
MEANS (1937) (cited in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 397).  Not 
surprisingly, Holmes would disagree.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“[T]he law does undoubtedly 
treat the individual as a means to an end”). 
340 As is ubiquitously observed, whether one drives on the right- or left-hand side of the 
street is not determined by the application of immutable norms.  Once the legitimate 
authority has made this determination, however, one is morally bound to comply.  
Depending on the circumstances—the amount of traffic, the capacity of the roads, etc.—the 
legitimate authority might even be morally obliged to specify such traffic laws. 
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moral and practical costs. In these circumstances, all of the 
countervailing benefits and burdens must be prudently balanced when 
choosing a course of action.  Although the real world is undeniably 
complex and nuanced,341 the above-described categories provide a useful 
construct for beginning our consideration of the legitimacy of specific 
police procedures that seek to obtain accurate and reliable results.   
The complexity of the relationship between means and ends, and the 
wide array of values thereby implicated, can be illustrated with a simple 
example.  Consider an initiative that would allow the police greater 
discretion to search and seize.  Assume none of the specific proposals 
contained in the initiative are intrinsically evil or violate the 
Constitution.  Evaluated in relation to the common good, the initiative 
would be beneficial insofar as it contributes to the accuracy of verdicts 
and the efficiency of investigations, but detrimental insofar as it detracts 
from security and happiness.342  The wisdom of such a program is, 
therefore, debatable, and neither its adoption nor rejection is morally 
compelled.  Such initiatives should be prudently evaluated by legitimate 
decision-makers in two ways:  qualitatively, with reference to the 
importance of the particular values at stake (for example, accuracy and 
efficiency versus security and happiness);343 and quantitatively, with 
respect to how much it enhances or detracts from each of these values.   
Obviously, the relevant normative considerations pertaining to 
police questioning of suspects are not bound exclusively to the common 
good.  Many relate directly to the suspect as an individual,344 with their 
connection to the common good more derivative and attenuated.  
Among the most important and salient of these personal values is 
respect for human dignity of suspects and the protection of their rights, 
                                                 
341 An abundance of complicating and potentially important factors exist beyond the 
boundaries of this construct, such as questions involving interrelationship of norms, 
culture, and law.  For the present purposes of this Article, these and other intricacies are 
intentionally avoided. 
342 The impact on security and happiness may not be one-sided.  For example, allowing 
the police greater discretion to search and seize may cause people to feel less secure and 
more anxious because their right to privacy is thereby diminished.  They may also feel 
more secure and happy because crime is reduced and they are less likely to be victimized.  
These are the types of complexities that the legitimate authority must prudently address 
when making rules and fashioning policy. 
343 Some values, however, are of incommensurable importance and thus not susceptible 
to such an evaluation.  FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 115. 
344 Other individual interests are involved besides those relating to suspects, e.g., victims 
and those who administer the system.  For reasons that should be obvious, this analysis of 
confession jurisprudence focuses primarily on the individual interests of suspects. 
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constitutional and otherwise.345  Although these norms find expression 
in a variety of ways within the criminal justice system,346 they are 
considered here exclusively in relation to accurate and reliable outputs—
including verdicts, charging decisions, search authorizations, and so 
forth—because these goals, as submitted earlier, are the touchstones for a 
principled evaluation of the legitimacy and efficacy of the process.     
Truthful confessions, self-evidently and for all of the reasons 
recounted earlier, enhance the accuracy and reliability of the criminal 
justice system.  Starting with this proposition and applying the 
preceding analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding 
ends and means.  First, the police may never use intrinsically evil means 
in order to obtain truthful confessions.  Second, the police ought to use 
morally beneficial means, such as those that respect the dignity and 
rights of suspects, in order to obtain truthful confessions.  Third, 
decision-makers may balance the benefits of obtaining and using truthful 
confessions against any resulting degradation of a suspect’s dignity and 
rights, as well as other costs and benefits, in reaching a prudent 
accommodation of these competing values, provided that the means 
under consideration are constitutional and not intrinsically evil.  If “truth 
is the primary goal, however, the rules of procedure will sacrifice truth 
only when necessary to accomplish other goals of overriding 
importance.”347  With this guidance as prologue, the legitimacy of police 
practices for obtaining confessions, and the Court’s rationale in 
addressing them, can now be evaluated. 
                                                 
345 These values are sometimes expressed as “fairness.”  The term “fairness” is avoided 
here because it is imprecise and not as philosophically grounded as the terms “human 
rights” and “human dignity.”  For example, fairness sometimes is used to mean equality, in 
which case some might argue that favorable procedures or outcomes for some subjects 
should be degraded so that they more closely approximate the undesirable conditions 
endured by other suspects.  The terms “human dignity” and “rights” are instead used 
because they have their own venerable philosophical pedigrees and better resist being 
defined in relative and potentially negative terms.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing human 
rights and dignity in the context of criminal confessions). 
346 For example, two overarching values of the criminal justice system are equality and 
limiting governmental overreaching.  These values implicate the common good as well as 
the individual person, as does accuracy and reliability, but they are also distinctive.  A 
consideration of other overarching values is unnecessary to the thesis of this Article and is 
beyond its scope. 
347 Grano, Changing World, supra note 16, at 403; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 403 (1976) (attorney-client privilege is limited in scope because it hinders the search for 
truth). 
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B. Permitted and Prohibited Means  
Contrary to the view of the Miranda’s defenders, the traditional 
voluntariness approach to confessions was not all bad.  In the pre-
Miranda cases, the Court frequently offers sound commentary on some of 
the values implicated by police questioning of suspects, and it is 
occasionally even stirring in its eloquence.348  Further, the Court has at 
times been rightly critical of particularly outrageous police behavior 
because it is offensive.349  What is lacking in the cases, however, is a 
proper recognition and consistent application of the overarching norms 
that ought to inform the Court’s voluntariness decisions.  These failings 
are exacerbated in the post-Miranda cases, which rest in part on the 
infirm foundation of the Court’s pre-Miranda jurisprudence.   
The Court’s pre-Miranda approach to voluntariness is normatively 
deficient in many respects, four of which are addressed in Part V.B of the 
Article.  The first and most obvious is the Court’s willingness to 
progressively marginalize and ultimately discount a confession’s 
reliability when assessing its constitutionality.  In early cases, reliability 
was the sine qua non for constitutionality.350  Over time, the Court recast 
reliability as one of several values bearing on the constitutionality of a 
confession.351  In its most recent decision on the subject, the Court 
rejected reliability as a factor in the voluntariness inquiry.352  Although 
the Court’s recognition of countervailing values besides reliability is 
appropriate, its failure to acknowledge that reliability is a factor—let 
alone the preeminent goal—of the criminal justice system is normatively 
unsupportable and renders the resulting analysis fatally flawed.  If 
reliability is the touchstone for the propriety of a confession, then the 
voluntariness inquiry is capable of addressing whether certain 
countervailing costs are acceptable in order to promote this goal.  Having 
instead deemed reliability to be irrelevant, the evaluation of competing 
considerations becomes untethered, inordinate, and ultimately 
meaningless.  The remedy is simple—the Court and rule-makers, both 
substantively and rhetorically, need to return reliability to its proper, 
                                                 
348 “Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may 
substitute trial by ordeal.  The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the 
witness stand.”  Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936). 
349 See infra notes 365-69. 
350 E.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1883). 
351 E.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). 
352 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  The Connelly court instructed that 
reliability was instead exclusively a matter for state evidentiary law.  In my judgment, the 
rules of evidence, as presently constituted, are inadequate to address reliability.  A more 
detailed discussion of their inadequacy is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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elevated status in assessing the voluntariness of a confession.353  To the 
extent that the Court declines to do this, legislators and rule-makers can 
fill the void through statutes354 and other rules and procedures.355      
Having discarded reliability, the Court resorts to its “complex of 
values” for normative content and, ultimately, legitimacy.  As explained 
in Part III.A, the Court’s decisional authority identifies three ostensibly 
discrete considerations that reside within its value complex:  fidelity to 
the adversary system, opposition to especially overbearing police 
practices, and deterrence of police misconduct.  As deterrence is 
necessarily derivative of other values,356 only two considerations—those 
                                                 
353 Rediscovering the importance of reliability would help realize the additional benefit 
of achieving greater symmetry between Fourth Amendment voluntariness (consent to 
search) and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness (consent to speak with police).  
See supra Part II.A. 
354 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (“Nothing we say today disables the 
States from adopting different requirements for . . . conduct[ing custodial interrogations, 
which are more protective of suspects’ rights against compelled self-incrimination, by] . . . 
its employees and officials as a matter of state law.”).  For example, under military law, 
before custodial interrogation a suspect must be advised, inter alia, of the “nature of the 
accusation” that is to be the subject of the questioning.  Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2000) [hereinafter UCMJ].  This additional advice, which is not 
required by Miranda, see Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), is imposed upon the 
military by statute. 
355 In Miranda, the Court describes the Federal Bureau of Investigation procedures 
predating its decision in that case, 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 (1966), which the Court 
characterized as being “consistent with the procedure which we delineate today.”  Id. at 
484.  Rule-makers are presently likewise capable of establishing additional procedural 
requirements for police interrogations and confessions, relating to reliability and other 
values, provided they comply with the minimum requirements specified by Miranda. 
356 Deterrence is a derivative goal insofar as police misconduct is deterred because it is 
judged to be unconstitutional, unlawful, or harmful, and not for the sake of deterrence 
itself.  See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (the exclusionary rule 
is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved”).  The Court has treated deterrence somewhat differently in the case of 
traditional involuntariness and Miranda violations.  Compare Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975), with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements taken in violation of 
Miranda can be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony), and Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385 (1978) (statements that were actually coerced under the traditional due process 
standard cannot be used for impeachment purposes).  Regardless of the specific approach 
used, the goal of minimizing future police misconduct is unassailable, even to those who 
question its constitutionality or effectiveness.  The proposals offered here would achieve 
the same goals and more by directly providing greater control and structure to police 
interrogations, and thereby creating an enhanced moral and professional climate within the 
stationhouse.  Deterrence, on the other hand, seeks to accomplish a less ambitious end by 
resorting to the dubious syllogism that an interrogator will decide not to violate the rights 
of a suspect that he would otherwise transgress because of a generalized fear that a judge 
will later suppress a confession.  The contention here is that the proposed changes would 
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involving the adversary system and those relating to overbearing police 
practices—have independent meaning.  Even granting that these 
remaining values should play a role in assessing voluntariness, the 
Court’s treatment of them betrays a misunderstanding of their normative 
content, and thus this is the second major problem in its pre-Miranda 
jurisprudence.   
Take, for example, the Court’s use of the adversary system as a value 
proxy.  Although the Court’s reasoning on the subject is rather vague, 
the gist of its approach, which seems clear enough, cannot be reconciled 
with a principled understanding of accuracy and reliability as systemic 
touchstones.  If accurate and reliable results are the end to which the 
criminal justice process is properly oriented, then the adversary system’s 
fundamental purpose should be to serve as a means for achieving that 
end.  While the origins and precise contours of the adversary system 
remain a matter of disagreement,357 certainly no reasonable observer 
would dispute that its basic goal is to produce reliable results.358  It is 
likewise nonsensical to conclude that reliability is merely a serendipitous 
by-product of some other overarching but unspecified purpose of the 
adversary system, or that adversary procedures are beneficial for their 
own sake.359   
But this, in essence, is what the Court seems to do when it imports 
adversary rhetoric (and later, in the post-Miranda cases, adversary 
content) into the inquisitorial, pretrial stages of the process.360  Clearly, 
                                                                                                             
result in less “bad” confessions for better reasons, and therefore less need to suppress 
reliable confessions in order to accomplish deterrence. 
357 See generally LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 18, § 1.49(c), at 173-88 
(discussing the origins and parameters of the American adversarial system). 
358 Some, however, have tried.  Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary 
Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121-22 (1987) (the adversarial process is 
not conducive to a reliable verdict).  See generally Safranek, supra note 270, at 346 nn.3-4 
(collecting sources contending that the legal process does not or cannot seek the truth, and 
that the public does not believe the legal process has a relationship to the truth). 
359 For a contrary view, see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Empirical View, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975) (the adversary process obtains truth “only as a 
convenience, a byproduct, or an accidental approximation”). 
360 There is, of course, a comparatively well-established body of Sixth Amendment (U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI) decisional authority that requires that an accused have the benefit of the 
presence of counsel before trial during the critical stages of a criminal proceeding, i.e., “any 
stage in the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might 
derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 
(1967).  In Brewer v. Williams, the Court held 
Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to 
the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have 
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the Court’s purpose is not to aid the search for truth, as any impediments 
to reliable confessions act in opposition to this end.  The Court instead 
seems preoccupied with the misguided goal of preserving a sporting 
chance for a suspect’s acquittal, which would certainly be compromised 
by the introduction into evidence of his reliable, pretrial confession on 
the merits.  It is possible, of course, that legitimate countervailing values, 
which are imbedded in the adversary system, may sometimes outweigh 
the search for truth and justify the imposition of pretrial adversary 
procedures.  The Court, however, has not satisfactorily identified any 
such values nor has it persuasively relied on this reasoning as a basis for 
its voluntariness decisions. Because the Court’s pre-Miranda 
jurisprudence is not grounded on reliability and accuracy, its 
characterization and use of the adversary system as a value proxy 
predictably misapprehends the significance of truth, justice, and other 
bedrock values, and it is, therefore, normatively unsound.   
Even when the Court takes a proper moral stand—as it sometimes 
does with respect to police brutality and overt police coercion—it 
generally eschews clear and consistent pronouncements based on 
immutable value-based criteria in favor of situationally dependent 
resolutions.  What is needed from the Court, but is all too often lacking, 
is firm and comprehensive normative guidance, which declares that 
certain specified practices and procedures are absolutely off limits to 
police.361  This refers to the second category described above, i.e., the use 
of intrinsically immoral means to seek a moral end.  Such guidance 
would express categorical prohibitions rather than ad hoc, after-the-fact 
denunciations.  It would be based on reasoning that is unconcerned with 
                                                                                                             
been initiated against him—”whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” 
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). 
361 There is a Fourth Amendment analogue to this.  In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952), the Court held that the police conduct in that case—“[i]llegally breaking into the 
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the 
forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents . . . offend[s] even hardened sensibilities.”  Id. 
at 172.  The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause 
prohibited the use at trial of even reliable evidence if it is secured in a manner that violates 
“certain decencies of civilized conduct.”  Id. at 173.  To hold otherwise “would be to afford 
brutality the cloak of law.  Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby 
to brutalize the temper of a society.”  Id. at 173-74.  Rochin has been interpreted narrowly in 
subsequent cases.  E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (holding the government 
could introduce trial statements obtained by police who had illegally entered the 
defendant’s home and installed a hidden microphone).  The Irvine Court distinguished 
Rochin because that case, unlike Rochin, did not involve “coercion, violence, or brutality to 
the person.”  Id. at 133.  Rochin, which remains valid Fourth Amendment law, could thus be 
instructive with respect to the issue of traditional involuntariness relating to confessions. 
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the totality of all the circumstances or the psychological peculiarities of a 
suspect.  It would state that the illegitimacy of immoral means does not 
turn on the vulnerabilities, fortitude, age, or intelligence of the person 
questioned, nor does it depend on the subjective motivations or 
experience of the questioner.  It would instruct that some methods are 
never allowed, regardless of whether they result in a reliable confession 
or leave the freedom of a suspect’s will relatively undisturbed.  Immoral 
means should always be rejected because they are intrinsically immoral, 
regardless of the ostensibly moral ends that they seek to achieve or the 
circumstances involved, and the Court has largely failed in its obligation 
to make this point.  Even assuming that certain immoral means are 
constitutionally permitted and thus beyond the Court’s purview, 
legislators and rule-makers can act decisively to prohibit them within 
constitutional bounds.362 
Torture and extreme police brutality363 are the most obvious 
examples of intrinsically immoral means.364  To its credit, the Court has 
over time condemned a wide range of such conduct, including 
whipping365 or beating366 a suspect, depriving him of food,367 water,368 or 
                                                 
362 See supra notes 352-53. 
363 Because there are definitional issues regarding what constitutes “police brutality” in 
the abstract, the text refers to the categorical prohibition of extreme police brutality.  
Professor Troutt has explained that the problem in using too general a definition of police 
brutality is that such “[d]efinitions . . . are multiple and sometimes contradictory, and 
statistics are rarely standardized.”  Alexa P. Freedman, Unscheduled Departures:  The 
Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 684-710 (1996) 
(explaining the numerous problems and concerns inherent in broad definitions of police 
brutality); David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations:  The Use of Fictional 
Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 102 (1999).  See also id. 
at  98-105 (illustrating the definitional and applicational  problems with the term “police 
brutality”).  Although “torture” is also an imprecise term, compare Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, General Assembly Resolution 
3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975) (providing a definition of 
torture with respect to international law), with Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) (defining 
torture for purposes of human rights cases brought in the United States), there seems to be 
less need of a qualifying adjective here.  Regardless of whether the term “torture” or 
“police brutality” is used, the Court has instructed that the traditional due process 
standard would be applied to those cases involving “police torture or other abuse that 
results in a confession.”  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
364 See supra Part IV.C. 
365 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83 (1936). 
366 Reck v. Page, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961). 
367 Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414 (1967); Reck, 367 U.S. at 436-39; Payne v. Arkansas, 
356 U.S. 560, 564 (1958). 
368 Brooks, 389 U.S. at 414. 
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sleep,369 holding a gun to his head,370 keeping him in a naked state,371 and 
threatening him with mob violence.372  In Stein v. New York,373 the Court 
made a fitting normative pronouncement when it declared that certain 
excesses were always prohibited with “no need to weigh or measure its 
effects on the will of the individual victim.”374  Since then, the Court has 
seemed to retreat from this categorical judgment.  In the much more 
recent decision of Arizona v. Fulminante,375 for example, the Court did not 
apply Stein’s rhetoric to a case involving “a credible threat of physical 
violence unless Fulminante [the suspect] confessed.”376  The Court 
instead concluded suppression was appropriate because “Fulminante’s 
will was overborne in such a way as to render the confession the product 
of coercion.”377  Citing Payne v. Arkansas,378 the Court explained that 
suppression of a confession requires both a credible threat of violence 
and an actual overbearing of a suspect’s will.  
While the Court’s decision in Fulminante might be constitutionally 
defensible,379 its reasoning is nonetheless morally lacking.  Even granting 
that outrageous police misconduct might not always require the 
suppression of a later confession on constitutional grounds,380 it remains 
the case that constitutional compliance does not equate to moral 
fidelity.381  It is incumbent upon all—the Court, the legislature, and the 
                                                 
369 Reck, 367 U.S. at 436-39. 
370 Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967). 
371 Brooks, 389 U.S. at 414; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (1945). 
372 Payne, 356 U.S. at 564-66; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 229-31 (1940). 
373 346 U.S. 156 (1953). 
374 Id. at 182. 
375 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
376 Id. at 287.  Fulminante confessed to a fellow prisoner who was also a paid undercover 
F.B.I. Agent informant, after the latter expressed concern about threats to Fulminante’s 
safety posed by other inmates, and offered to protect Fulminante if he told the agent the 
truth about the alleged child murder.  Id. at 283. 
377 Id. at 288.  The dissenting justices did not rest their opinion on Stein’s admonition, but 
instead concluded that Fulminante’s will was not too overborne.  Id. at 305-06 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
378 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
379 As noted in the beginning of this Part, the constitutionality of particular police 
practices is beyond the scope of this Article. 
380 In the appropriate case, one might contend that due process is not offended where 
there is an insufficient nexus between police brutality and a later confession.  See United 
States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t appears most likely that Stein’s per se 
approach is limited to those confessions made substantially concurrently with physical 
violence.”).  Of course, this argument begs questions about the role of deterrence and 
preserving the integrity of the system as bases for justifying suppression. 
381 The history of the Court’s constitutional interpretations sometimes reflects a lack of 
congruence between what is constitutional and what is morally right.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to abortion); Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 
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executive, as is constitutionally fitting for each—to condemn 
unconditionally and prohibit the use of immorally brutal methods for 
obtaining confessions.382  Such action would inform and shape 
constitutional adjudication and policy debate.  It would help inculcate 
values within the law enforcement community and establish legitimate 
expectations for suspects.  It would assist in defining the parameters for 
redress.  It would respect the dignity of individual suspects and serve 
the common good.  
The Court’s approach to police deception and trickery is likewise 
replete with missed opportunities to provide definitive normative 
guidance.  In the post-Miranda line of cases, the Court has called such 
conduct distasteful and unethical,383 and Miranda itself was highly 
critical of such practices.384  The Court has never held, however, that 
lying by police requires suppression of a confession notwithstanding 
compliance with Miranda’s rights warnings requirements.  In the pre-
Miranda cases, the Court has treated police deception as one of many 
relevant factors to be considered in judging the voluntariness of a 
confession.385  If a confession is “otherwise voluntary,” then police 
deception does not render it inadmissible.386  In both lines of cases, the 
Court has framed its criticism of police deception in the context of 
standards for admissibility, as it is obligated to do when passing on the 
constitutionality of a confession consistent with its deterrent rationale for 
                                                                                                             
(1896) (upholding the “separate but equal” doctrine of racial discrimination); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (upholding slavery as a valid property right). 
382 The condemnation and prohibition of police misconduct does not necessarily imply 
that the resulting confession must be suppressed.  Rather, a petitioner may sue a particular 
officer or government department for violations of constitutional rights.  See Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (bringing civil suit against a police officer for an 
alleged violation of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights).  Congress has also provided 
some statutory causes of action against unconstitutional actions by government officials.  
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (recognizing a cause of action when any person “under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” subjects another “to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(h) (recognizing a cause of action for private persons whose constitutional rights are 
violated by federal officers).  If the disallowed practice were nonetheless constitutional, 
then suppression would not be required for deterrent purposes.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 656 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1961)) (explaining that the 
“purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”) 
(emphasis added). 
383 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986). 
384 384 U.S. 436, 453, 455 (1966). 
385 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (police misrepresent the strength of the 
existing case against the suspect). 
386 Id. at 739. 
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suppression.  The Court has never authoritatively declared, however, 
that police should never lie to suspects because this is normatively 
unacceptable.  To the contrary, the Court’s often-tepid rhetoric about 
police deception suggests that it believes that such moral judgments are 
beyond its constitutional charter, or perhaps that it lacks the moral 
certainty to act decisively in this area.   
Lying, of course, is morally illicit.387  Police deception and trickery, 
even short of outright lying, can damage the dignity of suspects and 
compromise their rights.388  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon all—the 
Court, the legislature, and the executive, as is constitutionally fitting for 
each—to condemn unconditionally and prohibit the morally illicit 
deception of a suspect by the police in order to obtain a confession.389  
Such action would benefit individuals and the common good, for many 
of the same reasons as the earlier proposed condemnation and 
prohibition of torture and excessive force by police.  Further, it would 
enhance the integrity of the criminal justice system and help set a proper 
tone for principled reforms to the rights warning protocols, such as those 
proposed in Part V.D, which encourage suspects to speak truthfully and 
candidly with police.   
An unequivocal denunciation of excessive force and lying would not 
resolve all issues concerning prohibited means, but it would be a good 
beginning.  Questions regarding absolute limitations would still abound, 
e.g., when is physical force unconditionally too brutal, and how are lines 
drawn between illicit lying and licit deception.390  Once categorical 
                                                 
387 See generally supra Part IV.B.1-2. 
388 Whether all police deception is morally illicit is beyond the scope of this Article.  See 
generally supra note 286.  It should be noted, however, that such a categorical ban would 
have implications far beyond the paradigm situation of police-suspect questioning 
considered in this Article, and would reach circumstances such as the use of police 
undercover agents, see Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the questioning of prisoners 
of war; GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR pt. III, § 1, 
art. 17 (1949), and the interrogation of terrorist suspects and unlawful combatants, see 
Ralph Ruebner, Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the Age of Terrorism:  The 
Experience of Israel—A Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 500-45 (2003), 
including scenarios where a grave attack is imminent and potentially preventable. 
389 See generally Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (announcing that certain 
physical excesses used to obtain confessions are always prohibited with “no need to weigh 
or measure its effects on the will of the individual victim”). 
390 As Professor Finnis recognizes, “[e]ven the most developed legal systems rightly 
allow a use of force” for various purposes within the criminal justice context.  FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 261.  The same would hold true for coercion and 
deception.  The question, therefore, is not whether force and deception should be 
categorically prohibited, but rather, what are the absolute limits beyond which they are 
always intrinsically evil.  See supra notes 363 (physical force),  388 (deception). 
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parameters are established, however, the inquiry can move into the third 
and fourth categories, where countervailing values are prudently 
balanced.  It is here where the most contentious matters are likely to be 
confronted, such as how much morally licit physical force and stress 
ought the police be allowed to employ, or what kinds of licit deception 
ought they be permitted to use, in seeking confessions?  Judges, 
legislators, and executive agents are presently less capable of addressing 
these difficult issues as a consequence of our collective failure to identify 
moral boundaries and set a proper moral tone.   
One other type of police conduct deserves mention.  In Bram v. 
United States,391 the Court declared that a confession “obtained by any 
direct or implied promises, however slight,” is involuntary.392  The 
Court’s per se condemnation of police promises was later disavowed in 
Fulminante,393 where the Court explained that “under current precedent 
[Bram] does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.”394  This time the Court got it right because promises to 
suspects, unlike brutality or lying, are not always morally objectionable.  
A suspect’s dignity is not inevitably harmed, nor is his capacity to choose 
freely always diminished, by a quid pro quo exchange of a promised 
benefit for a truthful confession. Indeed, some promises may even 
dignify a suspect and enhance the reliability of a confession, such as 
where the police accurately represent that they will convey to the victim 
that the suspect willingly accepted responsibility and was genuinely 
remorseful.  Many promises would be morally objectionable for a variety 
of reasons, but there is no normative basis for absolutely prohibiting all 
promises that contribute to obtaining a confession. 
A third major problem with the Court’s voluntariness approach 
relates not to what is contained in its “complex of values,” but what is 
omitted from it.  The Court, for instance, has never taken the position 
that truthful confessions dignify the confessor, or that moral police 
practices dignify the interrogator.  The Court has also increasingly 
minimized and ultimately discounted the role of virtue and conscience in 
its confession jurisprudence.  Moreover, the Court, even apart from its 
rejection of reliability, has failed to predicate its decisions upon a 
principled understanding of truth, justice, the common good, and 
human dignity, as these values have been traditionally understood and 
                                                 
391 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
392 Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (H. Smith & A. 
Keep, eds., 6th ed. 1896)). 
393 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
394 Id. at 285. 
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constitutionally imbedded.  These errors of omission compound the 
harm caused by the Court’s application of its ill-conceived “complex of 
values,” as this construct is neither informed nor offset by these 
unaccounted for but critical normative considerations, which ought to 
guide judges and other authorities in the exercise of their respective 
powers.  The remedy is simple to state but will be difficult to realize—
the Court and other decision-makers must discover or recapture, as 
appropriate, the genuine values that ought to inform a principled 
approach toward criminal confessions, and then apply them. The 
proposed rights advisement, proposed in Part V.D, can serve as a good 
beginning. 
A fourth major problem with the Court’s voluntariness approach 
involves its inapt treatment of a suspect’s free will.  The Court begins 
with the presumption that if a rational suspect confesses, then this must 
be attributable to some overbearing of his free will.395  The Court, after 
consulting its “complex of values,” endeavors to reach a factual 
determination of how overbearing the police actually were, and 
correlatively how “unfree” the suspect actually was.  As discussed 
earlier, treating the relative freedom of a suspect’s will as a question of 
fact is dubious and ill conceived for a variety of reasons.  To begin with, 
one must assume that this judgment can be factually determined with 
sufficient confidence.  This contemplates that the Court establish 
intermediate thresholds of “free will” that are, in part at least, also 
factually determined.  And, it involves the use of problematic and 
ephemeral empirical sources to assist in defining thresholds and finding 
facts.    
But the difficulties with an empirical approach extend beyond its 
accurate execution.  A case-by-case factual calibration of the relative 
freedom of a suspect’s will implies that normatively derived 
benchmarks, including imperatives and absolutes, are either irrelevant or 
do not exist.  In particular, an empirical approach, or at least the Court’s 
version of it, is oblivious to the intangible benefits of reliable and 
                                                 
395 In other contexts, the Court has been willing to acknowledge that a suspect may 
choose to confess as an expression of his free will, even in the absence of police prompting.  
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), for example, the Court held that the taint 
between an unlawful arrest and a later confession was sufficiently attenuated to allow its 
admission into evidence because the confession was the product of the defendant’s free 
will.  Id. at 491.  The defendant had been released from jail and voluntarily returned to the 
police station, answered questions, and provided a written statement.  Id.; see also Colorado 
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (mentally disturbed suspect went to police station of his 
own accord and confessed). 
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heartfelt confessions.  It is reductionist, in that it does not fully respect 
the human dignity of suspects, nor does it account for a natural 
inclination and acquired habit of accepting responsibility for 
wrongdoing.  It likewise fails to comprehend the immutable content and 
import of truth and justice, nor does it understand or best serve the 
common good.  The Court’s empirical approach at once considers too 
much of what is irrelevant or undeterminable, and too little of what 
really matters. 
The Court, insofar as it is the arbiter of constitutional standards, has 
a legitimate voice in addressing these questions relating to the 
interrogation of suspects.  The quarrel here is not that the Court has 
acted in the realm, but how it has acted.  Too often the Court hides 
behind its totality of the circumstances approach to avoid definitive 
statements about what should and should not be absolutely 
prohibited.396  It routinely embarks on fruitless and misguided 
psychological forays in search of empirical clues about whether this 
particular suspect’s will was free enough.397  When all else fails, it reverts 
to its “complex of values” incantation, which operates more like a 
forgiving expedient than a sound rationale, and, in the end, is neither 
particularly complex nor value based. 
In our tripartite government, legislators and the executive also play 
important if diminished roles in establishing and enforcing the rules for 
taking confessions.398  Their failure to act more boldly can be attributed 
in part to the Court’s expansive treatment of criminal procedure issues as 
constitutional matters.399  But these officials cannot be completely 
absolved for their reticence, since all of the proposed reforms identified 
in this Article can be effectively implemented within the present 
                                                 
396 A good example of this is Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).  Rather than 
specifying the sufficiency or insufficiency of any particular factor standing alone to 
establish involuntariness, the Court “conclude[d] that petitioner’s will was overborne by 
official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused[,]” id. at 323, not to mention the 
petitioner’s repeatedly denied requests to consult with his lawyer.  Id. at 318. 
397 See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (where the Court consulted a number of 
psychologists’ studies and defendant’s psychological history before determining that the 
petitioner’s habeas claim must be dismissed). 
398 As Justice Brandeis famously noted, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .“  
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
399 DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 36 (“The United States Supreme Court took the leading 
role in formulating rules of criminal justice during the 1950s, continuing through the early 
1970s.”). 
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constitutional parameters set by the Court.400  In any event, these 
decision-makers have inherent authority, and even inherent 
responsibility, to prescribe procedures and prohibit practices so that the 
common good is truly served and suspects are genuinely respected.401  
This requires prudent rules and policies, which seek moral and 
efficacious results through moral and efficacious means.  Recognizing 
that each of the branches has its own complimentary responsibilities, all 
three should be oriented toward encouraging reliable and heartfelt 
confessions through means that dignify suspects. 
In summary, we must fundamentally reexamine our approach to 
voluntariness.  This begins with recognizing that reliable and heartfelt 
confessions are beneficial to the individual and society, and thus they 
should be encouraged.  In seeking such confessions, we should use 
means that respect the right of guilty suspects not to confess while 
encouraging them to be virtuous by choosing to confess.  Concomitantly, 
we should not hesitate to declare that certain illicit police practices are 
always wrong regardless of the circumstances.  As a proper approach to 
voluntariness is rooted in values and not fact finding, psychology and 
the social sciences would assume a supportive but diminished role.  
While these disciplines might be useful, for example, in explaining how 
particular police practices tend to promote or detract from normative 
                                                 
400 See supra notes 352-53.  This is particularly evident in light of how state statutory 
requirements regarding the voluntariness of confessions have been interpreted since the 
Miranda decision.  E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3988 (1977) (prohibiting involuntary 
confessions), as interpreted by State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
878 (1995) (advice regarding the benefits of telling the truth, without threat or promise of 
leniency, does not render a confession involuntary); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-50 (2004), as 
interpreted by Porter v. State, 591 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 2003) (an accurate explanation of how 
telling the truth could aid defendant while giving false information could come back to 
haunt him at trial was not a threat or a promise of leniency and so did not render 
defendant’s confession involuntary); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2 (1963), as interpreted by 
People v. Cages,  403 N.E.2d 565 (Ill. App. 1980) (admonitions to tell the truth do not render 
confessions involuntary); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.45 (1971), as interpreted by People v. 
Spellman, 562 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1990), app. den., 575 N.E.2d 413 (N.Y. 1991) (statement by police 
officer to defendant that he should tell the truth or he will be “digging a deeper hole” for 
himself did not render the confession involuntary). 
401 Professor Amsterdam, often a proponent of expansive protections for criminal 
suspects has argued that reform “must be done . . . by local legislators, executives, the 
police command structure and citizens in their communities.”  Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 810 
(1970).  He continues, however, that “In light of past performance—or, rather, 
nonperformance—by all of these persons, this may seem a vain hope.”  Id. 
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goals,402 they would no longer be consulted in a foolish attempt to 
provide normative content or empirically determine the relative freedom 
of a particular suspect’s will.  To the extent that such fact-finding is 
appropriate, this can be left to the sound discretion of trial judges and 
juries.  With these foundational predicates in place, we can turn to 
improving upon the current Miranda warnings by fashioning a more 
meaningful and value-based rights advisement. 
C. More Virtuous and Efficacious Means 
Contrary to the view of Miranda’s detractors, the approach taken in 
the Miranda line of cases is not all bad.  Indeed, as a matter of abstract 
principle and policy, much of it makes good sense.403  As a general 
matter, all suspects, including those who are guilty, ought to be advised 
of correct and accurate information pertaining to their decision whether 
to talk to the police, and ultimately whether to confess.  Miranda is 
beneficial to the extent that it requires the police to provide some of this 
information to a suspect, thereby assisting him in choosing how to 
exercise his right against compelled self-incrimination.404  The proposed 
approach that follows improves upon Miranda, in that it would require 
police to provide additional, correct, and relevant information to 
suspects.  This would facilitate a better informed, and thus a more 
meaningful expression of a suspect’s free will.   
                                                 
402 For example, psychology might tell us that the color blue is soothing and promotes 
candor, or is threatening and causes distress.  This would inform police departments about 
whether they should paint the walls in their interrogation rooms blue or some other color. 
403 The constitutional soundness of Miranda may be quite another matter.  Miranda has 
been criticized as having “no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the 
language of the Fifth Amendment.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., 
dissenting); see WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 401 (the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to police interrogations); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar 
Privilege in Historical Perspective:  The Right To Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 
(1966) (“neither the English nor the American version of the privilege afforded suspects 
and defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating questions”).  Even assuming 
Miranda was constitutional when it was first decided, its continued constitutionality has 
been called into question in light of congressional attempts to overrule it.  Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (by reaffirming of Miranda in 
the face of a proposed Congressional substitute, the Court has assumed for itself “the 
power not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as 
useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States,” which is a “frightening 
antidemocratic power”).  For purposes of this Article, the initial and continuing 
constitutionality of Miranda is assumed. 
404 In this regard, it might be said that Miranda did not provide new rights at the 
stationhouse, but rather merely provided “a mechanism by which the defendant could give 
up these rights.”  Louis M. Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 744 (1992). 
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Enhancing the quality of a suspect’s decision-making benefits him as 
a person.  An individual’s character is shaped by the choices made over a 
lifetime.  The subjective quality of any particular choice can be measured 
only with reference to what the person actually knew when choosing, 
and perhaps what he reasonably should have known.  For example, if a 
person assumes a risk to help another without being aware of the danger 
involved and believing he had no other choice, his act is objectively 
beneficial and his motives are not objectionable.  If, on the other hand, he 
assumes the same risk despite knowing that he could avoid danger 
without any adverse consequences, then his objectively beneficial actions 
are more heroic and praiseworthy.  The proposed, augmented Miranda 
warning, although not requiring confession,405 provides an opportunity 
for suspects to choose more virtuously, and thus to become more 
virtuous. 
The proposed changes to the Miranda rights warnings do more than 
simply expand upon the status quo; rather, they broach fundamental 
considerations that are ignored by the present advisement.  With rights 
come responsibilities, and all decisions—including whether to exercise 
one’s constitutional rights—have consequences.  The proposed 
additional advisements address, in general terms, a suspect’s obligations 
to the common good and the repercussions of his decision whether to 
exercise his rights.  They also identify some of the reasons why it benefits 
all suspects to speak honestly and candidly with the police.  The end 
product is a more balanced and comprehensive rights advisement, which 
in turn facilitates a more thoughtful and well-considered expression of a 
suspect’s informed free will. 
The proposed rights advisement rests upon normative assumptions 
and beliefs discussed in Part IV, which are quite different from those that 
                                                 
405 It is not argued here that a guilty suspect owes a duty to confess his guilt, even though 
doing so might be virtuous.  A comparison can be made to the law’s view of justification as 
a defense to a crime and, conversely, basing criminal guilt on a failure to act (an omission).  
Although an act based on necessity or lesser evils (such as trespassing to rescuing a 
drowning swimmer) may be moral and beneficial, the failure to act is not ordinarily 
criminalized because the law does not “typically oblige[ ] the justified actor to act upon the 
justifying circumstances.”  Milhizer, Justification and Excuse, supra note 173, at 814.  The law 
can, of course, encourage such action.  See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 661 (3d ed. 1982) (explaining that the “so-called ‘Good Samaritan Statutes’ 
. . . do not require aid be given . . . [t]hey merely encourage doctors to stop and give aid”); 
see also Carl V. Nowlin, Don’t Just Stand There, Help Me!:  Broadening the Effect of Minnesota’s 
Good Samaritan Immunity Through Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance Co., 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001 (2004) (discussing the law’s treatment of omissions).  This is what is 
intended by the augmented Miranda warnings proposed in this Article—to encourage guilty 
suspects to confess. 
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undergird the current jurisprudence.  The proposed advisement’s 
expanded protocols better promote truth and justice, as these values are 
correctly understood, as contrasted to the present regime’s emphasis 
upon self-serving decision-making. Additionally, the proposed 
advisement accepts that reliable and heartfelt confessions benefit society 
and thus ought to be encouraged, and that guilty silence is detrimental to 
the common good and thus should be disfavored.  It respects the dignity 
of guilty suspects by empowering them to choose rationally to admit 
wrongdoing and accept a just punishment, while rejecting the 
implication of the present advisement that they should remain silent so 
as to preserve a fighting chance for an acquittal.  In the end, the 
proposed advisement seeks to achieve what is truly best for suspects and 
society, rather than to establish ground rules for managing an 
unsatisfactory equilibrium between the two.  In light of its morally 
beneficial ends and means, the proposed advisement falls within the first 
category of potential circumstances where discretely moral procedures 
are advocated to achieve moral goals.  We are obliged, as was contended 
earlier, to respond favorably to such opportunities.       
As a practical matter, the proposed approach builds upon the 
present rights advisement because any revisions of police procedures for 
custodial interrogations would have to be compatible with the 
framework established by the Court in Miranda.  Although “battered and 
bruised,”406 Miranda lives on.  It has survived despite wholesale changes 
in the Court’s membership,407 a Congressional attempt to overrule it,408 
facially inconsistent interpretations of its scope,409 and decisions that 
recast its very essence.410  Through all of these challenges the Miranda 
                                                 
406 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 77, at 54 (discussing the Warren Court’s leading 
interrogation cases). 
407 Miranda was decided in 1966.  It was reaffirmed as recently as June 28, 2004, by a 
Court composed of entirely new membership.  See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 
(2004). 
408 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (explaining that “Congress may not supersede [Miranda] 
legislatively . . . [and] we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves,” referring to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501). 
409 E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (in a decision permitting the use of 
statements taken in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, the majority 
acknowledges that the Miranda decision itself indicates that unwarned statements are 
barred for all purposes). 
410 In several cases, the Court has referred to the Miranda warnings as a “prophylactic” 
rule, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 
(1973), and “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”  Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 437, 444 (1974).  In a later case, the Court explained that “Miranda announced a 
constitutional rule” and thus was something more than a mere prophylaxis.  Dickerson, 530 
U.S. at 444.  Later still, the Court again referred to the Miranda rules as prophylactic rule.  
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warnings, like all bright-line rules, continued to provide “[a] single, 
familiar standard . . . to guide police officers, who have only limited time 
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interest 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”411  Although some 
have criticized Miranda as representing a triumph of formalism over 
substance and reason,412 the decision nonetheless expresses an 
understandable but flawed reaction to the widespread criticism of the 
imprecision and uncertainty that marked the traditional involuntariness 
standard.413   
Miranda’s lines may seem bright, but they are not rigid.  As is true 
anytime the Court tries to establish a bright-line rule, Miranda has in 
some sense merely shifted the contours of the gray areas.414  
Notwithstanding the Court’s seemingly unequivocal instruction that 
Miranda warnings were required anytime a suspect was subjected to 
custodial interrogation, it has invested considerable time and effort 
refining and readjusting Miranda’s boundaries.  The Court, for example, 
                                                                                                             
Patane, 542 U.S. at 639 (“these prophylactic rules (including the Miranda rule) necessarily 
sweep beyond the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause”). 
411 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (commenting on a Fourth 
Amendment, bright-line rule); see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (“[o]ne of 
the principal advantages of [Miranda] . . . is the clarity of that rule”).  See generally Ronald J. 
Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 363 
n.19 (1994) (arguing that bright-line rules enhance adjudication); Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-
by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”:  The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. 
REV. 127, 141 (1974) (arguing that bright-line rules enhance law enforcement). 
412 See, e.g., Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 35. 
413 See supra notes 40-41. 
414 The blurring of bright lines is not limited to the Miranda line of cases.  Litigators seek 
to advantage their clients by challenging bright-line rules and seeking to redefine their 
scope.  See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(lawyers are “trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the way hounds attack foxes”); Anthony 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 375 (1974) (lawyers 
want rules to be “responsive to every relevant shading of every relevant variation of every 
relevant complexity” that might arise in a criminal case).  Courts respond by developing 
fine distinctions that invariably blur the lines.  See CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 38, 77-81 (1993). 
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has wrestled with the meaning of “custody”415 and “interrogation,”416 
and it has been willing to create exceptions and draw distinctions that 
have further muddied the waters.417  One scholar has ironically observed 
that although “Miranda was intended as a bright-line alternative to the 
much-criticized, totality-of-the-circumstances ‘voluntariness’ standard 
that preceded it[,] . . . ‘voluntariness’ jurisprudence has returned . . . in 
the disguise of the Miranda waiver law.”418   
With respect to the content of the warnings themselves, the Court’s 
decisional authority has been marked by two prominent themes—the 
presumptive adequacy of the standard warnings and the willingness to 
allow modifications to them provided they satisfy certain conditions.  As 
to the former, the Court has consistently instructed that more elaborate 
or comprehensive warnings, beyond a mere advisement of the rights 
specified in Miranda, are unnecessary regardless of whether they are 
correct and helpful.419  It has similarly held that police are not required to 
honor or clarify an ambiguous or equivocal assertion of Miranda rights,420 
                                                 
415 A formal arrest clearly qualifies as custody for Miranda purposes.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
434.  Some lesser intrusions do not.  Id. (holding roadside questioning of a motorist 
detained pursuant to a traffic stop does not constitute custodial interrogation for the 
purposes of Miranda).  Even the questioning of a prisoner does not automatically constitute 
custodial interrogation.  Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).  Despite Miranda’s desire to 
impose bright lines, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation in assessing whether it was custodial.  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 
(1977); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
416 Interrogation includes explicit questioning and its “functional equivalent,” Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), a standard that is sometimes difficult to apply.  See 
also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590 (1990) (holding routine booking questions do 
not trigger the requirement for Miranda warnings); Arizona v. Maur, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) 
(holding police did not interrogate suspect within the meaning of Miranda when they 
allowed him to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer). 
417 E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 (by recognizing a public safety exception to 
Miranda, the Court “acknowledge[d] that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of 
that rule”). 
418 DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 490; see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) 
(declaring that the “totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to determine 
whether there has been a [valid Miranda] waiver”). 
419 E.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding police not required to advise 
suspect of the offenses that would be the subject of the questioning); Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412 (1986) (holding police not required to advise suspect that his sister had retained 
counsel for him, or that counsel had talked with the police); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
316 (1985) (holding police not required to advise suspect that an earlier statement taken in 
violation of Miranda could not be used against the suspect when seeking to obtain a 
statement). 
420 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (holding suspect’s statement “Maybe I 
should talk to a lawyer” was insufficient to constitute an assertion of Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel). 
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even if this would “often be good police practice.”421  Literal adherence 
to Miranda has even been declared sufficient in the face of unethical and 
deceptive police conduct designed to secure a confession.422  Because 
“the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial 
interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves,”423 a formalistic 
compliance with its procedural requirements is almost always adequate 
for Fifth Amendment purposes.424  
On the other hand, the Court has been surprisingly permissive in 
allowing departures from the standard Miranda warnings.  Miranda itself 
recognized that Congress could devise alternative means to prevent 
involuntary confessions.425  Additionally, the Court “has never indicated 
that the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the 
warnings given . . . .“426  Elaborations or modifications to the standard 
rights advisement must, however, satisfy two conditions.  First, they 
must be accurate.  In Duckworth v. Eagan,427 for example, the Court 
approved of an augmented advisement regarding the actual 
representation by counsel428 because it “accurately described the 
procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana”429 and conformed 
                                                 
421 Id. at 461. 
422 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423-24. 
423 Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. 
424 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (advising that an express waiver 
of proper Miranda rights advisement is “usually strong proof” of Fifth Amendment 
compliance).  Miranda warnings and waivers have even been held adequate where the 
police deceive or mislead suspects, provided this does not amount to a deprivation of due 
process.  Burbine, 475 U.S. 412. 
425 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (“[T]he Constitution does not require any 
specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during 
custodial interrogation.  Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards 
. . . so long as they are fully as effective” as the Miranda warning and waiver requirements).  
Years later, however, the Court held that Congress could not overrule Miranda.  Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
426 California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981); see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 
202 (1989).  See generally LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 18, § 6.8(a) 
(collecting cases involving the content of Miranda warnings). 
427 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
428 In Duckworth, the police provided Miranda warnings that included the following 
(italicized) remarks: 
Anything you say can be used against you in court.  You have a right 
to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to 
have him with you during questioning.  You have this right to the 
advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one.  
We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if 
you wish, if and when you go to court. 
Id. at 198 (emphasis in original, with some emphasis in original omitted). 
429 Id. at 204. 
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to Miranda, which “does not require that attorneys be producible on 
call.”430  Second, the modified warnings must “reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a 
suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.”431  This contemplates that 
any additional remarks by an interrogator may not undermine or 
confuse a suspect’s understanding of his Fifth Amendment rights.  Taken 
together, the Court’s precedent allows for (but does not require) 
deviations from the standard Miranda warnings, provided they are 
correct as a matter of law and fact, and they do not detract from the 
efficacy of the standard advisement.432  
D. A Revised Miranda Warning 
Consistent with this precedent and in furtherance of these goals, a 
proposal for a revised Miranda warning is set out below.433  Added 
language is italicized; optional language is also in bold print.  Deleted 
language is over-struck.  
(1) You have the right to remain silent. 
(2)  Anything you say may can and willbe used against 
you in a court of law. 
(3) You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him 
present with you while you are being questioned. 
(4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be 
appointed to represent you before any questioning if 
you wish. 
                                                 
430 Id. 
431 Id. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361). 
432 See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 266 A.2d 753, 755 (Pa. 1970) (disapproving of a 
variation of the Miranda warnings because it is likely to undercut the effect of the warning 
by offering an inducement to speak). 
433 A few preliminary comments about the proposed warnings are necessary.  First, no 
claim is made that the substantive content of the additional warnings, or the proposed 
language itself, is constitutionally required or even the best that can be offered.  Quite to 
the contrary, the proposed warnings can certainly be improved upon, and to the extent that 
they are not constitutionally required states have discretion to experiment with different 
variations of them.  Second, no claim is made that any additional warnings that are 
adopted thereby become constitutionally required, so that the failure to provide them to a 
suspect renders a subsequent confession inadmissible.  Police sometimes give warnings in 
stressful and fast-moving situations, and it is not realistic to require that they memorize 
and easily recite the more comprehensive warnings proposed here.  But where the 
interrogation takes place in calmer and controlled circumstances, a more elaborate warning 
can be used. 
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(5) You can decide at any time to exercise these rights 
and not answer any questions or make any statements. 
(6) If you decide to waive these rights and answer questions, 
you should do so truthfully and candidly. 
(7) If you are innocent and provide truthful statements, these 
may operate to your benefit at trial, or even by avoiding the 
need for a trial altogether.   
(8) If you are guilty and provide truthful statements, these 
may operate to your benefit insofar as you can clear your 
conscience and take responsibility for your actions. 
(9) If you are guilty and provide truthful statements, these 
may be beneficial to the victims, if any, and to society 
generally.  
(10) If you are guilty and provide truthful statements, these 
may be indicative of your rehabilitative potential, and they 
will be communicated to the appropriate authorities. 
Some comments are appropriate with regard to specific proposed 
revisions.  Item 1 and Items 3-5 remain unchanged.  These are correct 
statements about a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.  Item 2 is revised 
so that the misleading language generally used in the present 
advisement—”can and will”434—is replaced with alternative phrasing—
”may”—which is both more accurate and less hostile toward confessions 
generally.435 
Item 6 seems so obvious as to need no explanation.  It is axiomatic 
that if a suspect chooses to speak with the police, he ought to do so 
truthfully.436  Besides promoting moral behavior, such advice helps 
protect suspects from exposure to new and separate offenses, such as 
                                                 
434 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
435 The Miranda Court elsewhere in its opinion used this alternative language, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966) (a suspect “must be warned . . . that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him”) (emphasis added), and this phrasing has been consistently 
approved by the lower courts.  E.g., Morris v. State, 184 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 1971); State v. Davis, 
172 S.E.2d 569 (W. Va. 1970). 
436 A police interrogator would not necessarily act in contravention of Miranda by 
encouraging a suspect to tell the truth and cooperate with police.  Cf. Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (appealing to a suspect’s “interest in telling the truth and 
being helpful to a police officer” was not indicative of custody for purposes of requiring 
Miranda warnings). 
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false swearing, which could arise because they lied to the police.437  It is 
especially fitting to advise suspects to be truthful if police prevarication 
is disallowed or minimized, as recommended earlier in Part V.B.  Of 
course, a suspect can be truthful without being candid.  Accordingly, 
frank and forthcoming responses are affirmatively encouraged, as they 
can be especially beneficial for suspects and the common good for the 
many reasons described in Part IV. 
Item 7 is a correct statement of law and fact, and it complements the 
advice contained in revised Item 2.  Exculpatory statements, such as a 
convincing alibi, may benefit a suspect in several ways.  They may 
establish the suspect’s innocence, resulting in the avoidance of charges.  
They may assist in minimizing the need for further, intrusive 
investigation of the suspect.  Even when a suspect later stands trial, 
exculpatory statements may be admitted in his defense or used to cross-
examine or impeach government witnesses.  Exculpatory statements 
may also benefit the common good, such as when they point a police 
investigation in the correct direction and cause guilty parties to be 
brought to justice. 
The Court has instructed that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, although “sometimes a ‘shelter to the guilty,’ is often ‘a 
protection to the innocent.’”438  Building on this observation, some may 
contend that the present version of the Miranda warnings, which has no 
advice expressly directed to innocent suspects, does a better job of 
protecting the innocent than would proposed Item 7.  They may argue 
that if Item 7 were added to the standard advisement, innocent suspects 
would become more susceptible to rendering a false confession.439   
However, proposed Item 7 can be defended against such criticism is 
several ways.  First, Items 1-5 apprise all suspects, guilty and innocent 
alike, of the full Miranda warnings, including an advisement that they 
can decline or cut off questioning as they wish.  Second, it is doubtful 
that many innocent suspects would falsely confess if appropriate due 
process standards of involuntariness are enforced, such as those 
recommended in Part V.B.  Third, even when confessions are coerced, 
                                                 
437 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (finding that “petitioner was under an 
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately” when he spoke to the authorities, and that 
petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “cannot be construed to 
include the right to commit perjury”). 
438 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’r of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting Quinn 
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)). 
439 See Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 62, at 326. 
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they are generally reliable and corroborated by other credible evidence 
of a suspect’s guilt.  If the fear is that innocent suspects will be wrongly 
convicted based on coerced and false confessions, then this can be 
addressed by strengthening the evidentiary requirements for 
corroboration and reliability.   
The more cogent Fifth Amendment concerns revolve around the 
potential consequences of compelling an innocent defendant to testify at 
trial.  One can imagine all sorts of legitimate reasons why an innocent 
defendant might want to avoid testifying—he may have substandard 
communication skills, a highly prejudicial record, poor demeanor, a 
vague memory, and so forth.  Although similar disadvantages may come 
into play during a police interrogation, they do not have the same 
detrimental impact on a suspect as would problematic trial testimony.  
The police, unlike fact-finders at trial, do not convict or acquit based on 
credibility judgments and the perceived strength of the evidence; rather, 
they investigate potentially fruitful leads regardless of credibility of their 
sources.  Most importantly, police suspicion and investigation has a 
qualitatively different effect upon an individual than does a criminal 
conviction, which is formally stigmatizing and can serve as the basis for 
a just punishment.440  Proposed Item 7 respects these distinctions and 
does not disturb any of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence pertaining 
to trial testimony, and thus any criticism of this addition on that basis is 
misplaced.     
Items 7-9 satisfy the dual requirements for elaborations discussed 
earlier.  First, they are accurate; all of the specific advice contained in 
these items is legally and factually correct.  Any concern about the 
appropriateness of the advice for the circumstances of a particular case is 
alleviated by the manner in which it is expressed, i.e., by using “may” 
instead of “will” when describing the potential consequences of 
confessing.  Also, the optional language in Item 9 can be omitted in cases 
without a discrete victim,441 and thus it can conform more closely to the 
circumstances in the case at hand.  
                                                 
440 See supra note 330. 
441 The term “victim” is imprecise and subject to multiple interpretations.  A more 
specific and detailed definition of the term “victim” is beyond the scope of this Article.  See 
generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (discussing the constitutionality of victim 
impact statements); Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime:  A 
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345 (1965) 
(discussing the social harm component of crimes). 
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Second, none of the additional information found in Items 7-9 
detracts from the efficacy of the standard rights advisement, provided 
Miranda is applied consistent with a correct understanding of human 
rights and dignity, and the common good.  The addition of Items 7-9 
helps achieve a balanced and principled rights advisement, which would 
no longer emphasize individual rights to the exclusion of corresponding 
responsibilities, with the ultimate purpose of indiscriminately 
discouraging confessions.  Rather, these proposed additions appeal to 
the better nature of suspects by encouraging those who are innocent to 
be forthcoming and helpful, and those who are guilty to accept 
responsibility and make reliable and heartfelt confessions.  Such advice 
empowers suspects.  It honors their rights and respects their capacity to 
make rational decisions by more fully informing their choice of whether 
to speak with police.  This facilitates the exercise of free will by 
contributing to, as the Court might put it, a “freer will.”  Items 7-9 further 
all of these desirable goals, and they do so without undermining the 
standard rights advisement that is retained in Items 1-5.442   
For the reasons discussed earlier, the first portion of Item 10—that 
truthful statements of guilt “may be indicative of [a suspect’s] 
rehabilitative potential”—is legally and factually correct.443  As for the 
second portion—that a suspect’s truthful confession “will be 
communicated to the appropriate authorities”—several courts have 
approved of police promises to bring a suspect’s cooperation to the 
attention of the prosecutor.444  Some courts have also held that it is not 
objectionable for the police to tell a suspect that the prosecutor would 
discuss leniency if he confesses,445 or that if the suspect confesses the 
prosecutor might “look at your case a little bit different.”446  These 
decisions correctly recognize that the police may allude to the potentially 
mitigating impact of a confession without coercing a suspect to confess.  
While the police should refrain from making promises that implicate the
                                                 
442 For example, in People v. Jones, 949 P.2d 890 (Cal. 1998), the court held that a police 
officer’s exhortation to a suspect that “the truth is going to set you free” did not render his 
confession involuntary.  Id. at 900.  Similarly, in Ball v. State, 699 A.2d 1170 (Md. 1997), the 
court instructed that it was not improper for the police to tell a suspect that it would be 
“better” for him to tell his story.  Id. at 1179. 
443 See supra note 7. 
444 E.g., United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981); 
see also LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at 454 n.98 (collecting cases 
standing for this proposition). 
445 Commonwealth v. Mandile, 492 N.E.2d 74 (Mass. 1986). 
446 State v. Lacy,  929 P.2d 1288, 1295 (Ariz. 1996). 
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plea-bargaining process447 or constitute veiled threats,448 these concerns 
are not raised by proposed Item 10.   
Some broader potential criticisms of the proposed approach deserve 
brief comment.  Some may argue that the practical effect of the 
recommended expansion to rights advisement is to assist police in 
coercing suspects to confess.  If Miranda warnings are truly needed to 
offset the inevitable coerciveness of custodial interrogation, then some 
may contend that the proposed elaborations could tip the balance and 
compel fence-sitting suspects to confess, especially when result-oriented 
officers employ them.   
Several responses can be offered.  As explained earlier, none of the 
proposed changes are innately coercive.  Quite to the contrary, they each 
enhance rather than detract from a suspect’s ability to exercise an 
informed free will.  With respect to the possible misuse of the 
elaborations, it should be remembered that disreputable interrogators 
are presently able to manipulate the current Miranda warnings for their 
own purposes, and may even get away with lying about whether the 
required advice was given or the suspect waived his rights.449  Despite 
these and other vulnerabilities, Miranda’s defenders have argued that the 
recitation of the warnings450 helps protect suspects451 and educate the 
police,452 while imposing ground rules that guide well-intentioned 
                                                 
447 E.g., United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is improper 
for police to promise that a suspect will not be prosecuted if he confesses); Tingle, 658 F.2d 
1332 (holding that it is improper for police to promise a suspect that lesser punishment 
may be received if the suspect confesses); Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 
1964) (holding that it is improper for police to promise a suspect that certain charges will be 
dropped if the suspect confesses). 
448 E.g., Lyman v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (holding that the confession was coerced 
where the suspect was told that she could lose her welfare payments and custody of her 
children if she did not cooperate, but that the police would help her and recommend 
leniency if she did cooperate). 
449 Schulhofer, Confessions, supra note 36, at 882 (remarking that “Miranda does nothing 
whatsoever to mitigate the pitfalls of the swearing contest [between the suspect and the 
police]”). 
450 Defenders and critics alike generally assume that the police ordinarily comply with 
Miranda’s literal requirements, although they may disagree about the subjective 
motivations for this compliance. 
451 Seidman, supra note 404, at 743 (contending that “if the defendant already 
understands his rights, the very fact that the police must recite them may help to dispel the 
sense of total isolation and powerlessness that otherwise pervades much custodial 
interrogation”). 
452 OTIS STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 64 (1973) (arguing 
that the recitation of Miranda serves an “educational purpose” for the police, by repeatedly 
reminding them of suspects rights). 
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officers453 and constrain those having more sinister motives.  The 
proposed warnings would do a better job of advancing these same 
benefits.  If the ultimate result is that more fence-sitting, guilty suspects 
choose to confess for the right reasons, then this should be welcomed. 
Some may also argue that the proposed elaborations are unnecessary 
and burdensome because police are presently able to advise a suspect 
about this added information once he has decided whether to invoke or 
waive his rights.  Such a criticism misapprehends the law and misses the 
point.  Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, once a suspect 
invokes his “Miranda rights,” police questioning, including supplemental 
advising, must immediately cease.454  Accordingly, the initial rights 
warnings should contain all of the information crucial to a suspect’s 
waiver decision since an under-informed post-warnings rights 
invocation would delay, and could prevent, any further advisements.  
Regardless of whether a suspect ultimately waives his rights, we should 
endeavor to make the pre-interrogation advisement as morally sound 
and balanced as practical because it is, in most cases, the principle means 
of assuring that a suspect exercises an informed free will when deciding 
whether to talk with police.  Absent unusual circumstances, there would 
be scant justification for withholding critical information bearing on a 
suspect’s decision about whether to confess until after he has decided 
whether to invoke or waive his rights.  Better advice leads to better 
choices.   
Moreover, adding the additional information to the mandatory 
advisement is an efficacious way of controlling interrogators.  All agree 
that the police should not enjoy unfettered discretion during custodial 
questioning.  The proposed advisement, or some variant of it, empowers 
the appropriate decision-makers (be they judges, legislators, or executive 
agents),455 as representatives of the people, to exercise greater influence 
                                                 
453 See Seidman, supra note 404, at 743. 
454 Once a suspect invokes his “Miranda right” to silence, the police must “scrupulously 
honor” his rights, which has been interpreted as meaning that the interrogation must 
immediately cease but can be later re-initiated by police in some circumstances.  Michigan 
v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 101 (1973).  If a suspect invokes his “Miranda right” to counsel, the 
suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversation with the police.”  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981).  In Minnick v. Mississippi, the Court later announced that this means that once a 
suspect in custody invokes his “Miranda right” to counsel, the police must not only permit 
him to consult with an attorney, but they may not re-initiate questioning unless counsel is 
present. 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 
455 See supra note 326. 
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over what occurs in the stationhouse.456  Beyond this, it affixes an 
imprimatur to the contents of the formal advisement, which can be 
normatively expressive and enforcing.  In summary, the augmented 
advisement allows the people, through their legitimate representatives, 
to exert greater and more formal control over the substance and 
sequencing of events during an important stage of the interrogation 
process.  
Perhaps the most intractable criticism of the proposed warnings can 
be leveled with equal force at the present rights-advisement regime.  
Even assuming a more elaborative advisement is abstractly correct, one 
may argue that a suspect would be better equipped to evaluate these 
additional considerations and make decisions regarding them with the 
assistance of counsel.  Of course, the present Miranda warnings 
contemplate that suspects will routinely decide whether to waive their 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel without benefit of consulting with a 
lawyer first.  In this regard, the proposed advisement imposes no 
additional burdens on suspects or the exercise of their rights.  Moreover, 
the subject matter of the additional advice does not concern essentially 
legal issues.  Whether a confession is virtuous or serves the common 
good is predominately a question of values and morals, and not law.  
Attorneys may have a fiduciary duty to evaluate such considerations 
when providing legal advice,457 but these are not matters that are 
committed to their special expertise.  Suspects are advised in Items 3-5 
that they may call upon a lawyer for assistance when making these 
decisions, and nothing more is constitutionally required or morally 
necessary.   
In the end, it is uncertain whether more confessions would be 
obtained if all of the proposed recommendations were adopted, i.e., 
those pertaining to both the pre- and post-Miranda jurisprudence.458  
Some of the proposals, such as specific advisements designed to 
                                                 
456 An issue may arise whether the failure to provide any of the additional advice would 
result in the suppression of a confession thereby obtained.  Suppression would not be 
constitutionally required, as the Court’s decisional law does not require this advice.  
Whether some other authority mandates suppression would depend on the remedies that it 
specifies. 
457 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (attorney-client communications), R. 1.6 
(attorney-client confidences) (2002). 
458 Under military law, before custodial interrogation a suspect must be advised, inter 
alia, of the “nature of the accusation” that is to be the subject of the questioning.  UCMJ, 
supra note 354, at art. 31(b).  The author is unaware of any research or anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that the providing of this additional information to suspects has lead to fewer 
confessions. 
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encourage suspects to speak with police, would predictably lead to more 
confessions.  Other proposals, such as categorical prohibitions of certain 
police deception and physical coercion, would predictably lead to fewer 
confessions.  The actual results would probably be mixed and vary 
depending on the circumstances.  No doubt some guilty suspects who 
would confess pursuant to the recommended approach would remain 
silent under the current rules, while some guilty suspects who would 
confess under current rules would remain silent pursuant to the 
recommended approach.  So be it.  The goal is not more confessions at 
any cost, but more reliable confessions obtained in the right way for the 
right reasons.  One would hope that the proposal’s emphasis on values, 
the common good, and individual dignity would, over time, not only 
cause more good confessions to be rendered, but also help create a 
culture where there is less occasion to seek them. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Imagine that a guilty suspect is brought to the police station for 
questioning.  Although he is distraught and scared, he knows that the 
police will not rough him up or lie to him.  As for the investigating 
officers, these options never even cross their minds.  Disreputable police 
practices such as these are expressly prohibited by internal guidelines 
based on court decisions and statutes, but this is not the reason that 
officers reject them.  The investigators find such techniques to be more 
than simply unprofessional; they are personally repugnant and morally 
objectionable, and the officers feel no institutional pressure to resort to 
them. 
The officers, of course, want the suspect to confess if he is guilty.  
Even if he is innocent, they seek his truthful and candid cooperation.  
The suspect, on the other hand, is deeply conflicted.  His initial reaction 
is to avoid accepting responsibility and punishment.  Another part of 
him—perhaps it is his conscience—is a source of disquieting dissonance.  
Someplace deep inside, perhaps so deep that he is not even conscious of 
it, the suspect wants to get things off his chest and come clean. 
The police begin the session with a reading of the mandatory rights 
warnings.  The first portion advises the suspect of his constitutional 
rights.  The police then explain to the suspect, in language dictated by 
legitimate authorities entrusted with the common good, why he should 
act in accordance with his better impulses and take responsibility for his 
misconduct.  The appeal to conscience works, and the suspect freely 
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chooses to confess his guilt, for the right reasons, during the course of a 
respectful interrogation. 
As a consequence of the heartfelt confession, the crime is definitively 
solved and no innocent persons have to suffer the indignities of an 
intrusive investigation.  The suspect later pleads guilty and is convicted.  
His punishment is mitigated because he accepted responsibility and was 
sincerely remorseful.  Through his virtuous act of confessing and his 
suffering a just punishment, the suspect becomes a better person and an 
asset to society. 
The community feels more secure by the suspect’s unassailable 
conviction.  Its confidence in the legitimacy, efficacy, and integrity of the 
criminal justice system is reinforced.  Justice has been done.  The victim 
also gains a sense of closure.  Truth, justice, the common good, and the 
suspect’s dignity (not to mention his constitutional rights) are preserved 
are promoted. 
If such a scenario took place today, it would be largely in spite of our 
contemporary approach to confessions.  We must begin insisting that our 
jurisprudence, with all of its associated rules and procedures, be 
grounded upon immutable values and expressed in practical 
applications that promote those values, or at a minimum are not 
inconsistent with them.  This would reform our criminal justice system 
so that it truly serves the common good and respects the dignity of 
suspects, and thereby encourages beneficial resolutions like the one 
described above.  Individually and collectively, we would all be better 
for it. 
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